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ABSTRACT
STATE AUTONOMY, POLITICAL POWER AND PUBLIC POLICY:
A STUDY OF BRAZILIAN DEVELOPMENT
MAY 1989
LUIZ PEDONE, B.I.E., GEORGIA INSTITUTE OF TECHNOLOGY
M.P.A., UNIVERSIDADE DE BRASILIA
Ph.D., UNIVERSITY OF MASSACHUSETTS/AMHERST
Directed by: Prof. Eric S. Einhorn
This dissertation examines the relationship among
state, political power and public policy in Brazil during its
authoritarian regime (1964-74) and the more liberalized regime
(1974-85). In order to study the autonomy of the Brazilian state
with respect to classes, state elites and societal forces a
framework is developed using Neo-Marxian and Neo-Weberian
concepts. The methodology to study the public policies includes
decision reconstruction, reputational and structural analyses
using investment data and political action as evidence.
Chapters III and IV study how each regime influenced differently
the decision and implementation of the infrastructure, industrial
and mining policies. During 1964-74 the political and financial
autonomy of state enterprises — and the state in general —
prevailed. Autonomy became increasingly restrained by political
liberalization and the economic crises of the 1974-85 period.
Two case studies (Itaipu and Tucurui Hydro-power Projects)
x
was
exemplify both periods. The decision to build Itaipu obeyed
primarily national security interests. The implementation
influenced by Brazilian and international interests. Contrasted
with Itaipu, Tucurui's decision depended on international
industrial and financial interests as well as on powerful
national groups and government elites. This dissertation
concludes that the study of public policies is an important way
to analyze political power and state-society relations. By
comparing development policies, participation and influence
patterns are uncovered and conclusions postulated. First, the
overlap between the leadership of the Hydro-projects does not
indicate a pattern of a group equally influencing more than one
policy area as assumed by pluralism. Second, the peasants and
working class did not influence either policy-making process.
Third, only dominant economic interests benefited from the Hydro-
projects. Fourth, state autonomy was high on the Itaipu decision
but low during its implementation. In Tucurui, it was limited on
both phases. Thus, it is posited that reduced state autonomy anc3
the model of development adopted precluded the ability to carry
out integral social development demanded by the majority. As a
result of this lacuna, elections have helped the demise of the
military regime but they were no guarantee of legitimate
democratic government in the post-1985 period and inclusionary
access to policy-making process.
XI
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CHAPTER I
INTRODUCTION
This dissertation focuses on the Brazilian state during
the bureaucratic-authoritarian regime (1964-85). More
specifically it studies two show-case examples - itaipu and
Tucurui. Itaipu is the world largest hydropower dam, a
binational enterprise with Paraguay spanning the international
waters of the Parana River. The decision to construct Itaipu was
taken at a time when geopolitical considerations predominated.
Ongoing Argentine-Brazilian rivalry in the Southern Cone,
exarcebated by growing Argentine nationalism, convinced many
Brazilian elites that national security mandated the construction
of Itaipu. The second development project that merits closer
examination is Tucurui, the largest totally Brazilian hydropower
plant located in an important mining zone of the Eastern Amazon
region. The decision to build Tucurui included international
considerations as well. The aluminum industry was to be the
direct beneficiary of the Tucurui project since it faced higher
costs of electricity input in industrial economies as a result of
the 1974 oil crisis. Yet even though the project faced severe
drawbacks from the unfavorable international industry's prices,
Tucurui continued, defying sound economic planning in favor of
grandiose export-led growth.
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The underlying assumption of this study is that
political power, policy-making and action of the Brazilian state
during the bureaucratic-authoritarian regime can be better
understood by examining the large-scale programs undertaken in
the past decades, like the construction of itaipu and Tucurui.
The country's economy, apparently doomed to remain in the export-
led agrarian model of the oligarchies up to the 1930s, was
vigorously redirected toward industrialization during the
populist era that swept Latin America in the 1940s and 1950s. As
the populist regime exhausted itself in face of
transnationalization of production and markets, the Brazilian
economy has achieved an unparalleled dynamism and diversification
in the course of a few decades.
Both hydroelectric projects were only part of an
integrated national development scheme to provide the country
with the needed economic infrastructure to industrialize and
become an industrial power on its own right. Electric energy
became one of the preferred state investment sectors: both the
hydroelectric and nuclear power programs were vastly expanded
during the last two decades. In the petroleum sector Brazilian
production has increased tenfold since the first oil shock, and
an Alcohol Program has been instituted to replace, in part,
gasoline as fuel for automobile transportation. In the steel-
making and mining sectors the state oversaw programs promoting
import substitution and the export of non-ferrous semi-processed
3products in addition to ores which had been traditionally
exported. The state, multinationals, and local capital joined
together in a coordinated effort to offset the chronic deficit in
the production of fertil izers and petrochemical products. In all
these sectors, these efforts were instituted to help Brazil
escape from an unprecedented economic crisis brought on by the
balance of payments crisis in the mid-1970s and the debt crisxs
and adjustments of the 1980s.
The development programs and projects that once marked
the Brazilian uniqueness in the Latin American development now
need to be re-examined, highlighting specific efforts to
transform the Brazilian political model of decision-making as
well as the economy. After twenty years of authoritarian regime
time has come to re-examine a few policy decisions of the
period. This re-evaluation can be a learning process on how the
decision-making process did not respond to society demands and
how it needs to be more responsive on a more democratic regime.
Moreover, the recent years 's context of decreased capacity to
invest, 1 of the state-owned enterprises 1 s operational and
financial disarray, and of crippling debt crises (internal and
external) is particularly timely to examine the influence of
these two prototypical projects on the economy.
The state decisions and actions are here presented as
the outcome of an historical, structural, economic, and political
process related to the economic development of a particular sort
4
m a specific social formation. Then, generally, state actions
are analyzed fro, the point of view of specific patterns of
development. This broad analysis, however, is not conducive to a
complete understanding of state actions; they must also be
studied by taking into account the internal dynamics of state
apparatuses. This form of examining policy-making and politics
demands a conception of the state as both a social relation of
domination and as a permanent institutional-bureaucratic
apparatus with interests of its own.
An analytical framework for developing these broad
lines as a general orientation for concrete analyses is presented
in Chapter II. The theoretical aspects of the relations between
the state, capitalist development, and society are analyzed,
conveying a general concept of the state as a player, influencing
and being influenced by the economy and the polity. Within this
chapter the specific study of the bloc-in-power and state
relative autonomy are defined as analytical references for the
exploration of concrete state actions and politics presented in
later empirical chapters. These concepts of bloc-in-power --
provisionally understood as the relationship between political
power and the class structure of society — and of state relative
autonomy — as the manipulation of a state agency under study by
dominant classes, other state agencies or international
institutions — shall be relied upon in this dissertation,
showing that these concepts provide excellent analytical tools
for better conveying the rich and theoretically important
information contained in the case studies.
Analyses of state actions and policies cannot be done,
however, without a thorough evaluation of the structure and
processes that characterized the pattern of development. Thus
Chapter III attempts to address the question through a historical
analysis of the Brazilian case. In the past five decades
Brazilian development has undergone certain periods characterized
by continuities and discontinuities. During the first period,
lasting broadly from the late 1930s until the early 1960s,
import-substitution industrialization and the state's emergence
as a producer in many basic industrial sectors induced deep
transformations in the Brazilian economy. The foundations of
state intervention in the economy were laid during this period
with the creation and expansion of sectoral state productive
enterprises in petroleum, steel, mining and electric power.
The watershed year of 1964 marked a rupture with the
populist regime and its inclusionary social policies but not with
the policy of state intervention in the economy. The
exclusionary policies of the authoritarian regime (1964-85),
directed towards rapid development of the economy, outweighed the
priority given to social policies. Chapters III and IV analyze
the three markedly different periods of the authoritarian regime,
each having its own political power configuration and its own
policy priorities and modes of state action. In the period 1964-
67 an important institutional and political reorganization of the
state occurred. These reforms created a renewed financial
structure for capital accumulation, facilitated by the
increasingly authoritarian character of politics, and setting the
stage for further changes. The second period (1967-1974) can be
seen as the embodiment of prior institutional-political
transformations. The consolidation of the internationalized
development pattern associated with the state and with national
capital coincided with the increased institutionalization of
authoritarianism, which during this period was erroneously
thought to be permanent. The economy was once again jolted by a
new surge of activity, spurred by accelerated capitalist
accumulation generated by special foreign and internal
conditions. m the political arena radical opposition was
effectively suppressed by the formidable legal and clandestine
police-state apparatuses.
During the third period, 1974-1985, crisis shook the
pattern of Brazilian development on both the political and
economic fronts. Neither the institutionalization of the
authoritarian order nor the promises of the economic "miracle"
had materialized, and the rulers turned a strategy of gradual
liberalization ("abertura") that allowed some room for the
reorganization and restructuring of the polity. In recent years,
especially since 1977, civil society has also reorganized itself,
moving from timid factory stoppages to full-blown rallies
demanding "Direct Elections, Now,..2 on the economic front
despite an early accumulation drive in capital goods and basic
primary input products, a combination of slow growth, recession,
high inflation and mounting foreign debt have dominated the
scene
.
Chapter III and IV reconstruct the decisions on
specific policies and state action during these three periods, in
an effort to delineate the dynamics of interests influencing the
sectoral policies. The analysis focuses on the historico-
structural changes of each state sector, presenting the
mobilization of different groups, classes and institutions in the
politics of each of the sectors. The state actions and decisions
are examined taking in consideration the relative state autonomy
— that is, the capacity to decide the sector's own objectives
and policies (political autonomy) and the capacity to implement
them (financial autonomy).
Chapter IV analyzes empirically the last period, 1974-
1985, in terms of the decisional outputs of the last two
authoritarian regime's presidential terms (1974-79 and 1979-85)
in the fields of energy, industrial and mining sectors, and
compares them with results. in this manner not only does the
analysis seek to understand the dynamics of the decision-making
process by analyzing the actors and their political power, but
also how the implementation of the development projects was
affected during the years of crises.
8
Chapter V reconstructs the basic patterns of interest
articulation that has marked the formation, decision and adoption
of Itaipu Hydroelectric project. itaipu involved neighboring
Paraguay as a partner in the binational enterprise, and Argentina
as a potential power contender in the project. Political aspects
of the long-term implementation of the project are stressed in
order to demonstrate the underlying motives, and to map out how
they evolved in subsequent years as the Itaipu project
progressed. As this state policy involved a number of
specific economic and political interests, they are described
along with the question of
-autonomy" and the consequences of
this policy initiative.
Another important project in the electric power sector
is analyzed in Chapter VI, the Brazilian state's decision to
undertake the construction of the Tucurui Hydroelectric Project
in the Amazon region. In this chapter, the changing global
environment surrounding the implementation of the project is
analyzed showing how the articulation of interests have evolved
internationally. For example, the Tucurui infrastructure project
viability was directly related to the interests of the
international bauxite/aluminum industry and the national mining
sector in the Greater Carajas Program -- important players in the
export-led strategy of the late 1970s and early 1980s. Yet, even
with falling international aluminum prices the infrastructure
project went on unhurt, characterizing an instruct for
maintaining economic demand and for the debt adjustment process.
The last chapter summarizes the major empirical
conclusions about the public Dolirie<= ip cies and large scale development
projects with an attempt to contribute to a conceptual
understanding of the articulation of the bloc-in-power and of
politics of power in the past two decades. Bringing the analysis
up to date, some of the conclusions of this dissertation will
explore basic patterns of policy-making and policy implementation
observed during the authoritarian, military regime, which were
uncovered by the empirical analyses of the case studies.
Additionally, this dissertation will try to connect the case
studies of state intervention to the question of democracy in
Brazil
.
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CHAPTER II
STATE, CAPITALISM AND POLICY ACTION
The fundamental role of the state in semi-peripheral
societies is one of the principal reasons why recent analyses
have focused on the state, not only as a facilitator for private
capitalist accumulation but also a major producer of goods and
services. The state therefore has played a key part in the
accumulation process itself.
It is not clear, a priori, which method is best suited
for analyzing of role of the state in semi-periphery countries
like Brazil in recent decades. Recognizing that there is no one
best method in the social sciences, one can begin by suggesting
that any method should at least contain a set of criteria that
accurately depict the sources and means of state action. At the
very least, such a method should also present the means to
evaluate how successful the state policy actions were in
promoting and maintaining economic and political stability in
peripheral social formations. One of the reasons for
concentrating analytical efforts on the state and its policy
action is that in past decades the society-centered diffusionist
modernization theories, such as Rostow's development stages or
Lipset's industrialization-democracy nexus, 1 have lost their
explanatory power: stable polity and economy characteristic of
11
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liberal democratic capitalist central societies failed to
materialize in these semi-peripheral societies.
Once these premises about the strategic importance of
the state are established, the central categor.es for an analysis
of the Brazilian state during the authoritarian experience
should convey how the state and state-building are related to the
particular semi-periphery economic development and how the state
is influenced by the political form of domination. These two
relationships are presented in the next sections, drawing from
pertinent state, capitalism, and political power theoretical and
methodological literature. These categories allow one to analyze
the policy process, both in phases of formation and decision,
examining how capitalist development imperatives and political
domination categories can indicate the nature of the regime and
policy output in this particular social formation. By analyzing
the state's structures and actions, this framework lays out the
actors and power relationships, both within and outside the
state, and their mosaic of interests and resources mobilized when
these entities interact.
Thus, the perspective set forth in this chapter results
from reviewing the Weberian and Marxist literature on capitalist
development and state growth, and the literature that deals with
the specificity of the dependent-peripheral-capitalist
development case. It likewise is dependent upon literature
analyzing political power and classes, and how policies and state
action may result fro, this relationship. This perspective
provi.es insights into the dynamics of specific state action and
the policymaking process by addressing the degree of relative
autonomy of the decisionmakers fro, the state, state agencies or
state enterprises while at the same time defining the
relationship between the decisionmakers and the dominant
classes in a particular social formation. This perspective
furthermore addresses the question of shifting interests and
powers that mutually shape and structurally transform the
patterns of production and of domination that unfold into
institutional arrangements. This system of analysis leads to a
clearer understanding of the development of specific institutions
of dominance and control over determined periods of time.
This chapter will first examine the relationship
between the state and capitalist development, including the
specificity of development in the peripheral societies.
Secondly, the relationship between state bureaucracy and class
is examined to elucidate the concept of bloc-in-power
, while
paying careful attention to Brazilian state enterprises.
Thirdly, some of the major theoretical assumptions about the
question of state action and state autonomy are addressed, with a
particular focus on the Brazilian case.
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The development of capitalism in center countries is
marked by an increase in the functions and powers of the state
over society and economy. while this occurred in democratic
social formations, the politicization of socioeconomic activities
deepened. A series of activities once thought of as being
essentially private became politically controlled and publicly
scrutinized. The alternative to the increased conflict over the
politicization of the capitalist system was state expansion; that
is the submission of all activities to some form of regulation.
This power was accompanied by the unprecedented growth and
exercise of citizen's rights in the political and social sphere
mediated through political organizations and institutions, at
least in the liberal democratic social formations.
Historically, capitalism has been associated with the
increase in state intervention, either through regulatory
policies, services dispensed or directly productive activities.
Capitalist development, as analyzed by Max Weber, requires a
complex division of labor and new ways to administer economic
resources
.
For Weber, interpenetration of state and capitalism in
concrete historical instances were thought to lead to a higher
degree of rationality, state objectivity and neutrality. The
growth of bureaucracy increasingly concentrated management
resources in the hands of few. As ne statedj
This concentration occurs f^y
known and typical fash?™' °
r
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nstance
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capitalist enterprises Cm ^ f development of big
characteristics in thi; process
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process occurs in the^^nrgani^^nsT^9
Efficiency and profit motive were fundamental causes for the
bureaucratization process. Therefore capitalist economic
transformation was the main force behind growth of the state:
^^^%^uTg2S£ KSLSS2 be
large modern capitalist enterprise are themselvesunequalled models of strict bureaucratic crgan^aticn. 3
Despite the state neutrality and objectivity conveyed
by Weber, the state has been historically associated with
determined interests. The capitalist relations of production
have evolved in conjunction with the separation of the public and
private arenas previously joined under feudalism. This meant
separation of producers from their means of production
,
the
separation of the state from production, and the separation of
the coercive functions from individual production units. As
capitalism transformed the relations of production, it required
increased protection from the state in order to successfully
16
implant the new node of production. These developments
contributed to the increase in the coercive capacities of the
state, beginning first with the domination of a territorial base
and then going on to surplus extraction and increased
differentiation of the state itself. 4
Marx's work is a richly detailed account of capitalist
relations of production, but little is said about the social
relations of domination in the sphere of the state and its
formation. Nevertheless, the relationship between the expansion
of the bureaucracies results from the association of interests
linking the state bureaucracies to the capitalist class. For
Marx, the emergence of a relationship between state-capital
requires increased complexities, refined capacities, and
technologies of production, assuming a simultaneous growth of the
state, exactly because the state is a contradictory expression
of the economic transformation. 5
When examining late-peripheral capitalist social
formations the distinctive characteristic of capitalist
development is its dependent nature. Three variants of
dependency ( dependencia ) theory have been developed in the last
decades. Gunder Frank proposed that the dependent capitalism was
nothing but a form of development of underdevelopment, limited by
metropolis impositions. It focused on the process of
accumulation in the metropolis rather than the mediating process
of accumulation taking place in the periphery. 6 Since it is
-possible to have autonomous capitalist development in the
Periphery, according to this strand of d^den^ theory, the
result is continued underdevelopment. Marini and Dos Santos
criticized this strand of d^de^ because of its faulty
Premises: instead of centering the analysis on internal class
relationships, the state, and struggle within the societies, it
focused on how the center industrial capitalism would prevent
changes from occurring in the periphery. However, two of the
outcomes predicted - regional subimperial ism by the more
advanced peripheral economies and revolutionary social movements
-- only occurred partially. V The assumptions ignored the fact
that peripheral industrial accumulation involve accommodations of
interests, both on the periphery and the center, not fulfilled
by prior capitalist development.
In another variant of dependent a
r
which
chronologically pioneered these studies, the Economic Commission
for Latin American ( ECLA) economists, led by Argentine Raul
Prebish analyzed Latin-American capitalist development mapping
its mono-culture and extractive economic activity. The nature of
capitalist development required positive state intervention
through a policy of import-substitution-industrialization
designed to increase purchasing power, create jobs, and to
bridge the technology gap thus offsetting the lack of economic
integration and reducing vulnerability of export-oriented
economy. 8 It also prescribed the dependent states to reform
education system and institute aarari™g arian reform. To placate the
nation capitalist class, increasing threatened by popull st
Politics, this model foresaw the state defending infant
industries against hostile foreign capital, and stimulating
demand via state-owned enterprises. 9 The structural Umits to
ircport-substitution-industrialization predicted by theorists of
this strand of deesndencia, however, were out of date by the lat
1960s. The advent of bureaucratic-authoritarian regimes in Latin
America led to capitalist development, opposed to what was
argued
.
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The third strand of dependencia takes into account the
exhaustion of the expansion of capitalist development in center
countries, the process of internationalization of markets and
production in association with domestic capital. Because of thi
exhaustion, the political situation in specific periphery
societies, in particular in Brazilian society, has deteriorated,
leading to an opening of the economy toward the outside. A
parallel required condition was political stability.
Dependencistas of this branch have striven to demonstrate that
capitalist development is possible in the periphery, despite its
"distortions." The uniqueness of this branch of dependencia was
its associated-development character which required state
intervention to mediate, channelling and altering the direction
of capitalist development. 11 In a further study departing from
previous ECLA or dependencia studies under "development of
19
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y
underdevelopment" or imperialism viewpoint, a crucial differenc
has been observed. The broadened role that the state previousl
performed - i.e., the regulation Qf ^
involvement in a few strategic sectors of the economy - was now
deepened. The state now invested in industrial and productive
enterprise, either alone or in joint ventures involving
transnational or national capital. 12 Both the specificity of the
state as productive enterprise acting in the market and its
specificity as state agency have occurred."
The double insertion of public enterprises requires
future analysis to focus on the state's intervention in the
economy as being an answer to structural deficiencies, such as
the ever-important task of providing basic economic inputs and
infrastructure while occupying strategic sectors, and to focus on
the state's specificity as an organization that at least in
theory represents the public interest. Thus these economic
institutions have a political dimension of their own, being then,
the site of articulation and channeling of conflict in class
interest in the society and economy.
State enterprises act as private firms but they do not
give up their interventionist role. State-owned enterprise,
inserted in the market, become agents of capital accumulation,
entering markets in which the costs of enticing private capital
to invest are greater than the costs of state entrepreneurship
.
State enterprises act in the essential, though less dynamic
sectors of the economy. Additionally the ^^
enterprises can stimulate _ waves Qf ^
By directly affecting the capital goods sector through
procurement policies, state enterprises become in fact, g^
sustainprg by first
eisewnere in the economv°
110\ UP reStBent initiat^for their goods'and service- 'secondly"9™6"^ 1 *™basic social overhead capital essential ' fAv ^ Pr°Vldecapital accumulation and'inputfof"generaTus"^6
Having examined the relations between the state and the
capitalist economy with its specific dependent peripheral
character and having also identified the forms taken by the state
in its entrepreneurial form, an examination of the political
relationships of the state with classes and class interests is
now due.
B. State, Political Dominati on, and Public Polini es
In a determined social formation of capitalist nature
there are classes, institutions and players that contend for
power to politically control the relations among the dominant and
dominated classes. Specific segments of the dominant class make
up the governing class ~ or the "bloc-in-power" 15 — and the
bureaucratic apparatus of the state. Each of these relations
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reflects political practices that- ^-rat inform and contribute to the
formation of oubl i r nni in^r.p c policies, representing demands from both the
dominated and dominant ciasses
. There are aiso sets of
relations representing the mediating institutions of the state-
society relations which may be political parties, patron-client
relations, or other forms of corporatist representation. The
political arena is the site where the interests and practices are
Played to change and direct policy in the struggle for its
formation
.
Political domination, or the distribution of power
that is inherent to policy struggle, is a reflection of the
state's relationship with society. m a democratic regime,
political domination entails power distribution being more
spread out and being held by different competing economic,
ethnic, social groups. The process of power distribution and the
characteristics of the continued unfolding of new arrangements
reflects changes in the structure of power. In authoritarian
regimes, which can assume different forms, political domination
produces a particular pattern of policy output and a specific set
of beneficiary classes. Personalist domination patterns,
portrayed by a caudillo or a junta
, whether civil or military
reflects passive acceptance of domination. Bureaucratic-
authoritarian exclusionary 16 regimes have coercive capacities to
impose public policies that benefit select groups. Inclusionary
authoritarian regimes fit the same bureaucratic pattern but
reveal a limited engagement Qf^ ^
the veneer of legitimacy absent from ^ exclusionary ^.^
Other authoritarian capitalist regies have heen studied hut they
do not reflect Latin American regies in general, or the
Brazilian case in particular. 17
The mechanisms of interest representation can likewise
be classified in pluralist societies where a vast number of
organized interest compete for policy adoption. Corporatism is
one mode of sector representation in society yet corporatism
manifests itself differently in a democratic or authoritarian
regimes, whereas in democratic regimes it assumes a
consociational form, 18 in the authoritarian mode of political
control corporatism is ambivalent. On one hand, its "statizing"
face is responsible for the growth of the state in areas already
"statized" and beyond. On the other hand its "privatizing"
shows segmented state institutions opened to organized interests'
representation
.
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State and Classes
The intrinsic character of the political domination i
he existence of a set of separate classes, both dominant and
dominated. Discussing the presence of a dominant class does not
automatically and a priori imply, in class perspective of
analysis between class and the state, that there is a ruling or
23
governing class, as defined in the Gramscian concept bloc-in-
Power. Political power in dominant classes does not translate
into state power by fiat . The relation ^ ^
needs to be systematically researched. Better understanding this
relationship, its dynamics and results, can better elucidate
these relations in specific social formations and specific
periods of time. 20 consistent examination of the state-class
relationship gives better epistemological results when
accompanied by simultaneous examination of public policies under
the optics of a determined regime type. 21
To focus our analytical framework on the relationship
between state and class and their consequent policies and
regimes, one should examine the three separate methodological
approaches recently presented by Neo-Marxists
. To some,
expanding on Marx's and others' writings, 22 instrumental class
analysis examines the power resources that classes have that can
be mobilized when articulating with the state in specific moments
of policy formation. As it is based on decision reconstruction
techniques of analyzing group access to policy-making so it also
resembles pluralist analytical method of political
domination. 23 Yet this instrumentalist version of class
analysis is a re-edition of managerial/elite approaches. Simply
examining the background and institutional affiliations of elite
members 24 and looking at socialization processes
,
education and
the kinship relations of public officials are inadequate for
determining the degree of pwer hei(j by eutes> assumptiQns
at worK here deal with the affinity between state officials ana
dominant classes, as they have sa.e interests, same background,
same socialization. 25
secondly, the Neo-Harxist structural approach, however
concentrates instead upon the rationality or the internal logic
of capitalist modes of production that imposes structural linits
to voluntaristic state action favoring the capitalist class.
The structuralists claim that just declaring that the state
serves the capitalist class from background/reputation analysis,
or from decision reconstruction, as the instrumentalists do, is
insufficient to prove effective enlace (correlation) between
state policies and dominant classes because, as Poulantzas points
out,
The direct participation of the members of the
capitalist class in the state apparatus and in thegovernment, even when it exists, is not the important
side of the matter. The relation between the bourgeois
class and the state is an objective relation . This
means that if the function of the state in adeterminate social formation and the interests of thedominant class in this function coincide , it is by
reason of the system itself: the direct participation
of the members of the ruling class in the state
apparatus is not the cause but the effect , and,
moreover a chance and a contingent one, of this
objective coincidence. 26
The fundamental advantage of this structuralist version
over the instrumentalist approach is that it provides an
explanation of why policy outputs in capitalist social formations
reflect the interest of capitalism, even when the capitalist
class is not in direct control of or does not exert influence
over the decision-making within the state apparatuses. However,
there are drawbacks to this approach. The most important one is
the extraordinary difficulty in determining precisely how the
capitalist mode limits state action at any historical moment.
Miliband, in reply to Poulantzas, has pointed out the
difficulties of realizing just how constraining are those
•structural constraints' set out by the structural ists . 27
Additionally, the structuralist version fails to give an account
of what are the political mechanisms that guarantee that the
state is in fact captured by the capitalist class. Specifically,
critics fault the structuralist version for not explaining the
concrete mechanisms that the state uses to generate policies
necessary to maintain capital ism . 28 Moreover, this version of
class analysis does not consider the possibility that class
struggle may force the state to adopt policies that are
detrimental to capitalist accumulation. 29
Finally, recent works on the state, political control
and public policies, recognizing that conceptual problems cannot
be fully overcome, have come closest to understanding class,
society and state relationships by utilizing both instrumentalist
and structuralist methods. The state must be conceptualized as
structurally limited by the internal logic of the mode of
production and also as . set of instituUons ^ ^.^
to manipulations by dominant classes and class ^
^
corollary, the degree that p^li^ can be understood by _ or
the other method is, then, "historical ly contingent . "30
in some historical periods state policies can be
explained as the self-reproduction of the state-structure,
dominating and controlling demands from society. m others state
policies are subject to manipulations by the dominant class and
fractions thereof. The extent nf «=i- a 4-« -> 4. •o state action and policies that
can be understood by either causal categories is always subject
to empirical verification. So, as Gold, Lo, and Wright state,
The state is always relatively autonomous: it isnever completely autonomous (that is, free fromactive control by the capitalist class) nor simplymanipulated by members of the ruling class fthatis, free from all structural constraints)
.
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Because the relations among state and classes convey policies
according to the political organization of the dominant classes
the methodology for analysis of state action also offers a
dynamic model of how the bloc-in-power shapes class struggle in
society and how, in turn, the conflicts over policy within the
bloc-in-power and the state are shaped by the same societal
organizations, institutions, state actions and conflicts that it
helped create. 32
27
The previous sections have shown how state
intervention and the state bureaucratic apparatus can be related,
both when performing regulatory functions and when intervening
directly in productive activities in the economy, particularly
the late peripheral dependent ones. it also examined the
political implications of the power structure in a class divided
society may have when discussing the way public policies relate
to specific regime-types or mechanisms of interest
representation. This section presents some clues to why state
interventions are preferentially performed through state
enterprises showing how these are structurally dual institutions
and how their autonomy can variate according to different state
actions. in the course of this section some preliminary
hypotheses about state autonomy will be presented, particularly
state enterprises autonomy and policy action, which will be
investigated later.
Some authors concerned with the role of state
enterprises, emphasize the question of autonomy to extremes,
considering all possibilities for state action, while others tend
to reduce the importance of autonomy placing emphasis on
objectives and financial environments. 33 This framework will
consider state objectives, i.e., programs, projects and financial
schemes, juxtaposed to the concept of autonomy, since objectives
and their financinq are cpntr^i 4-«9 e al to policy formation and decision
Autonomy, then, is a central variable ^ ^ ^
analyzing development programs and their projects/policy output.
State enterprises are instruments for intervening
directly in productive and infrastructure activities. As such
there are political and economic determinants for the state
choosing a specific form of intervention. Some of the economy
factors frequently cited are the provision of basic inputs,
maintaining the level of employment and the importance of
occupying strategic sectors thus replacing both local and foreign
capitalists who are risk averse or financially limited. 34
Although most reasons focus excessively on production of
technical or economically vital strategic supplies, state
enterprises have appeared under political determinants as well.
For example, states launched numerous projects under the
influence of development ideology and motivations relating to a
particular political project on one hand, 35 or because they
desire to set up a site for articulation and compromise of
competing interests. 36
As different as these determinants may be, they apply
to different patterns of creation and evolution of state
enterprises, both within and across social formations.
However, in late capitalist social formation, the general
determinants are the objective requisites of capitalist
development. Political or ideological considerations are less
crucial in late capitalism of Latin America than they were in
Gerschenkron's view for late-comers in Europe. Historical and
structural factors caused Latin America's late industrialization
to impose requisites on the economy that could only be met by
state intervention. Only states have the financial capacity for
long-maturing, low-return activities which private capital is
unwilling to undertake or to which there have been determining
events, such as wars or internal conflicts, that obligated the
state to fulfill. 37 Political or ideological considerations are,
nevertheless, important when one considers that state
enterprises are not merely separate policy-making and decision-
making arenas, each pursuing its own goals according to the
nature of the activity, but rather a coherent totality where
directions are given by governments and "headed, and more or
less well coordinated, by an executive authority." 38
As noted earlier, some of the Marxist theory of the
state literature emphasizes the objective requisites of
capitalist development — the interests of local and foreign
capital -- that force the state to provide basic inputs for their
conditions of existence. These Marxists theorists also stress
the fact that private capital has no interest in performing low
return, long-maturation activities. Opposing this Marxist view,
non-Marxist literature draws attention to market failures and
comparative advantages that state enterprises have with respect
to their financial capacities. 39 In both cases the state is
response for duties which serve ^
^
capitalist development. Initially the state promotes
infrastructure and development while protecting infant
industries.40 These policies _
^^
intervention in other industrial and productive activities as the
objective reguisites become more complex, regui ring greater sums
of investments for large-scale projects.
However, this model of state supported development does
not fully explain, nor does it possess the interna! consistency
necessary to understand state ownership in late capitalist social
formations of Latin American states - especially the most
advanced ones: Mexico and Brazil. it also fails to explain why
the form and extent Brazil and Mexico's late industrialization
included extended support of the state by international
capitalist institutions. m fact, this has forced the state to
act in accordance to exogenous structural factors, turning the
state into a last resort of the dynamics of international
capital. "1 Furthermore, viewing the state as responsible for
objective requisites of capitalist development alone does not
fully illuminate the constraints imposed on the state by the
process of internal class interaction. And reversely, this also
avoids viewing the state as occasionally being "for itself,"
i.e. fully autonomous from class and class interests as if no
other social group has power enough to control it and push
forward its own project. 42
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Therefore, demonstrating need for state enterprises
not enough to understand the creation and growth of state
enterprises and their actions in late capitalism; a more complete
analysis must look into capacities to promote capitalist
accumulation while highlighting historically constraints and
causal linkages. 43 Th is analysis specifies the mechanisms by
which the capitalist imperatives and political demands of the
dominant classes are translated into state enterprises policies
and actions. As seen earlier, by viewing the state as a
reflection of dominant classes, the Marxist instrumentalist
version fails to specify that link. In other non-Marxist
analyses the state is viewed, irrespective of class struggle, as
a rational response to problems in the economy and efficiency
considerations. But this approach also fails to specify the
mechanisms mentioned above inherent in policy formation. Both
versions do not provide an integrated approach to investigating
the nature of the state.
An integrated approach, then, should try to understand
the process of a state enterprise's appearance and growth while
relating state-building to the capitalist development processes,
and the state to society relationships. These relationships must
be analyzed not only in the confines of national boundaries but
also considering the
. . . embeddedness of nations in changing transnational
relationship, such as wars and interstate alliances or
32
This international dimension highlights the vulnerability of late
capitalist social formations with respect to international
financial crises, the dependency situation in a process of
capitalist accumulation, and the lack of sovereignty with respect
external actors or crises that affect domestic economies.
These state enterprises' actions should also be
inserted into the broader political process which translates the
struggle over objective requisites into problems and policies to
be tackled by the state. This sets the stage for examining
competing projects and interests. state enterprises, not being
static entities performing routine tasks, are rather part of a
political process that mediates interests and demands of diverse
forces while at the same time defending their own interests. As
power struggle unfolds, the state enterprises
• s actions involve
attempts to enlarge their own jurisdiction, attempts to mobilize
external and internal resources and allies and attempts to
coalesce with other agencies engaging in long-range commitments
and projects involving multi-actors.
Assuming this view is correct, it then supersedes the
solely entrequista logic or the "solidarity of interest" logic
by which the state enterprises set up programs and projects only
to provide crucial basic inputs for multinational firms. 45 it
also goes beyond the "state for itself" log ic which purports a
Plot to capture the state by military or technical elites. it
also contradicts the models that view state enterprises as
rational and pragmatic responses to structural economic
problems. 46 An Qf these^^ ^^.^ ^^ ^
part of an essentially political process of decision, embedded in
historico-structural analysis of state building and state action.
1
•
Structural Duality
The establishment of state enterprises was closely
related to the initial economic and political conditions of
capitalist development in early stages of industrialization.
Subsequently, state enterprise actions bring forth additional
analytical preoccupations. state enterprises
• s actions occur
simultaneously in the context of market forces and of micro-
economic interests, and in the context of political forces and
macro-economic interests. Organized in this manner, state
enterprises are recurrently referred to in the debates over their
role in capitalist economies as dual structural units: that is,
both a distinctive form of state agency and at the same time, a
special form of private enterprise. This ambiguous identity
results from its double insertion on different spheres of social
relations that have a particular logic of action, and are at
times contradictory: the
34
Y StatS aPP^atus and the market
economy. 47
It is important to observe their specific
organizational format ana the particular strategies o f
::z::
io
::
s market inserted °rq~ —
«
servrces. obv.ously, the nature Qf ^ ^
eventration and the spectrum o f adulations within sectors
,StatS entSrPriSeS
'
behaVi°-
—— -ate d toexternal markets, submit to pressure from tne internationai
economy and sector, capital interests. As an iUustration of
«u. phenomenon, take for example the Bra Z i lian state mining
sector which has been historrcally dependent, in large part, onforeign markets located in the industri.l economies. 48
Technic.! factors and industrial dynamics ere elements
constraining the micro-economic level of state enterprise
operations because they face the same social relations of
Paction as private economic units. So profit motive, market
competition, and pricing policies are internalized by state
enterprises that assume an unlikelv ™i c r,ri K iy role of an entrepreneurial
organization within the state. 49
Vet, exactly because they perform a public function,
state enterprises face macroeconomic and political constraints by
reason of their involvement in social/political relationships
within society (i.e. classes, clients, suppliers, employees,.
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This implies that state enterprise practices
ambiguous. They sometime act as private enterprises involved
competition for markets and resources, profit maximization, the
logic of capitalist accumulation and an antagonistic social
relations of production with their employees. But they remain
state apparatuses: their practices are political, conforming to
a larger
-.public interest", dictated by centralized authority
and/or political demand from society.
State enterprises 's practices will be more market-
oriented or more public interest-oriented depending on the nature
of the goods produced or services performed. if goods and
services are sensitive to political factors (fuel, electricity),
then state enterprises will have dual behavior, oscillating
between preoccupation with efficiency when procuring goods and
services to be delivered to society^ and preoccupation with
politics when pricing the same goods and services.
The structural duality of state enterprises allows them
access to resources not readily available to private firms or
other state agencies, such as income from the sale of goods and
services, access to internal and external financial markets and
stock issuance in the country and abroad. state enterprises
outcompete private enterprises in the labor market as well,
attracting executives with competitive salaries other state
agencies cannot offer either. Furthermore, as state agencies,
they have privileged political access which permits them to
maintain institutional conditions foe •
, _
fostering their permanence aslegitimate state units.
while state enterprises contain a structurai ^
:
CUlatin5 betWee
"
Pri
— "~»
- P-Aic interest behaviorthis does not mean that they operate solely in _ manner ^
another. By having dual logic of actio^ ^^^^^^ ^
only see* to expand their operations if ^
_ ^
politically justified or reflect the public interest. Project
and program expansions, then, must he legitimized under a set o f
negotiated obj ectives, defined under the general political
direction of the central authoritv ™D inn nty. The legitimation process
will depend on the regime, which can tahe several forms-
Plebiscites, legislative votes, or negotiations under the form o,
exclusionary or limited inclusionary politics. 51 At the £ame
time when implementing programs and projects, state enterprises
fight to maintain autonomous action unencumbered by other
forces . 52
This leads to another question: that of state autonomy
and its particular subcategory of state enterprise autonomy.
2. State Autonomy
The variable "state autonomy- is related to the state -
polity, state-economy and intra-state agencies relationships.
Whereas on the broader level, state action is related to the
.eneral political forces guiding and^^ ^^ ^the game, that is
, the scope and Umits of poUticai transacUons
among social classes; on . more specific^ ^
Power," or the "clesse governance," organizes the political
sidelines that shape poUticai practices that in torn structure
the policy process.
Understocking the policy-making process, as an
essent ially political process< ^
contexts in which policy decisions are made. One of these
C°nteXtS 13 ^ ^^t^t^ (state enterprises for
that Matter) where all actors, classes, and class interests
outside the state negotiate and define policies. The second is
^^^^^^im^mt^ where intra-state riva lry or
competition within the same sector are pl ayed out; this is best
exemplified by highly centralized Presidential decisionmaking
ccuncils. Thirdly, the internatiom1l_nai^^
illuminates the relationships between internal and external
forces. These relationships can be both with actors in the more
advanced industrial centers (banks, clients) and with actors in
n ations in the immediate regional range.
Once policy-making as a political process is
established in one of these specific contexts, a few dimensions
of state autonomy in the policy-making process can be examined.
State enterprise action, inserted into one of the three contexts
mentioned above, will conseguently be more autonomous or more
^pendent in relation to class and class ^^
agencies and institutions that compete in the state apparatus, orto nationai interests. „ should be noted ^ ^^ ^ ^
simply a conglomerate of bureaucratic agencies „here certain
sectorai interests are piayed out. The state has ditferent site£
for interest articulation at various levels and jurisdictions
which allow for intra-sector and inter-sector negotiation and
accommodation.
Having acknowledged the existence of the many sites for
interest mediation and conflict resolution in the state apparatus
(agencies, state enterprises, and other bureaucracies,, state
policy-making and action is an outcome of the effective
capacities to decide on policy initiatives and pursue policy
objectives. As far as state autonomy is concerned, the policy
process will be a function of (a, the^rimac^f_th^olicy
area or the sector within the capitalist development and economy
measured by the weight and strategic position of the sector with
respect to the overall economy; (b) the W,n» or nrw Y
of the institution
,
i. e. the relative position of the agency or
state enterprise in the state structure, with an account of how
the institution gained or lost prominence over time, due to
shifting importance on policy area or the amount of resources
managed; and (c) the avail ability and management of resources
at the disposal of the state agency or enterprise which should be
evaluated in terms of guantity and degree of control. To further
clarify the autonomy variable, the conoept Qf ..^^^to be refined intop^^^ and mnmsxi^ms; ^
of which cannot he evaluated resorting only to quantitative
evaluation.
Detailing resources, it can be seen that power
resources involve both political power ana institutional power
Political power resources are related to the privacy position o £
an agency. Their political power, existing because of its
hegemonic position in the state power and authority structure,
reflects the acquisition of powers and capacities to influence
the political process of state action and policy-making. 53 As
state enterprises relate to the dominant sectors of society they
are capable of selecting interests and groups for articulating,
aggregating and organizing interests inside the state. Political
power resources will provide the capacity to allocate other
resources and decide on policies. Political power resources are
revealed by determining state enterprise's capacity to coerce or
induce other interests. The more central agencies are in control
of strategic information the more political power they have. The
political autonomy of an agency or state enterprise then depends
on the agency's being an arbitrating sphere where dynamic
interests are played out. By becoming the center of mediation
among conflicting interests the agency becomes more autonomous
from other power holding agencies and social classes.
4 Uinstitution po„er resources represent ^
capacity to enlarge an enterprise's role in state d
4.. decision-makinq
"
aCtl°n
—
—
—
is
-flectrve of the institutional
cadres to define an approbate area o f policy
, including ficoordrnatron o f other agencies and overseeing allocation in Iparticular sector.
institutional power resources are then another aspect
of political power resources avail.hic *able to an agency. The autonomy
or dependence of institutions will be a reflection of the
capacities described above.
Managerial resources are probably the most critical
factors distinguishing sectors and agencies from one another
They can be classified into financial resources, and into
administrative/technrcal capacities intrinsically involved in the
process of decisionmaking and state action.
Administrative or technical resources will provide the
requisites of an agency to act and decide. So the ability to
compete in the labor market for executive and technical personnel
strengthens or diminishes managerial autonomy. For example, in
the communications and telephone state sector enterprises,
Embratel ^presa Brasileira de Tele^ojunlcasoes § » ) and
Tel6b" S (Selecomunicaooes Brasi 1 eiras_S^) have amassed vast
amount of technical/administrative expertise, which in effect
increased these state agencies autonomy in the formulation and
4
decision of policy for the sector- un,.*on or. Whatever was decided by these
two companies was the state policy for the sector.
Dependence on budgetary appropriations hinders state
agency autonomy, state agencies will seek financial sources
which are negotiation-free (for example, automatically
appropriated funds) while* a f ~u ; niie t the same time they will seek to
increase self-financing capability.
in addition, a state enterprises will avoid to become
dependent on an exclusive source of funding for its action. Whe
lacking the capacity for self-financing, state enterprises will
procure diversified, flexible sources in such a way that its
finances will not suffer if one source is lost by being able to
compensate its budget from other sources.
The state enterprises and state banks have the
privilege to invest capital and disregard pressures from the
institutions which provide the funds and any other outside
interference, except those originating from central decision-
aking agencies. Effective long term control of financial
resources is a necessary but not sufficient condition for
achieving a high degree of relative autonomy.
D. Concluding Remarks With Some Hypotheses
About the Brazilian State Action
The above review of the literature on capitalist
development and political power provides a theoretical framework
m
s a
for analysis of state action
_ ^
^ ^
oependent, peripheral, late industrialized
sociai
f0rmati°n
°
f WhiCh B" Zil is
* P^- exa rapie. Since Bra2il ha
capitalist state geared to, in general, favor capitalist
accusation, then the central guestions beco.e m ano h,, has
thxs process of capital accusation been favored by the
Brazilian state.
in general ter.s, wh* is related to ^ clas£
of Brazilian society; therefore any answer to ^ Brazilian state
favored capitalist accusation has to describe classes within
the context of bloc-in-power: the class composition, the ways
classes have beco.e part of it, the conditions for donating
excluded classes and, most importantly, which class fraction
predominates
.
A discussion of how capital accumulation took place
necessarily entails a historico-structural analysis of policy
areas and policy outcomes that identify which interests, classes
and class fractions have been favored in the process of
capitalist development. Once the answer to the question of how
capitalist accumulation has been arrived at, it then becomes
important to analyze recent state action to better comprehend the
Brazilian process. This is best done through an analysis of
elites and institutions involved in public policy-making and
through reconstructing fundamental policy decisions for state
action. For this purpose I have selected two case studies, the
Xtaipu p ject and the Tucurui ^^^^ ^ whi^be mobl l 12ation of Bra2Uian internationai capitai Jdirect action by the state.
one o f the key indicators of fche ^ s^C1"y relati °nS
— tne literature previously
d—a is a,!^, whose major components
described before hnf -I-K-.4- i.but that have also been encapsulated by Theda
Skocpol in the following passage
State autonomy is not a fixed structure <= -governmental system, it can Li 5 1 feature of any
not only because crises mav H°" ™ S is true
of official strateaier^nH^f Pltate the formulation
administratorrwho^^erw?^0110^5 by Glites or
own potentials To°r 2^^.^^^" th.irbecause the very structural ~X Z° 1 ls also true
acticns change ovirTi^fr^11131? f°r autt»""™s
coercion and administration , ? organizations ofboth structuran^and in IheifS?at?
ranS
5
0rmati0ns
'
^oups and to ^..nSt^^ 1™
Thus, this dissertation focuses on the autonomy of the state to
formulate and implement public policies during the last two
decades. It examines the process of capitalist development that
occurred under the military regime, and it will distinguish two
characteristically different policy-making processes that took
Place under the aegis of this authoritarian regime. During the
first period (1964-1974) a hypothesis of high degree of relative
state autonomy can be presented. Analyzing the class alliance of
the bloc-in-power and the specific policy outputs - that is, the
role of the state in the economy, the role of fY
'
6 oreign capital,and the role of renre^ion a .p essi against political forces - serves thPurpose of demonstrating the dynamics of
nft1 • •
making and implementingpolicies. We exnent- ~ • ,P t0 Pr°Vlde the el
—ts which determine thenigh degree of relative qt.f.s ate autonomy on a selected number of
state policies under stnrivU<3y and
'
ln P"tioular a thorough analysi
of the Itaipu Binational Project.
An adequate understanding of the l964 -74 period ofthe instated phase of the authoritarian regime - is important
for at feast two reasons. First
,
many have
l6SSOnS fr°m BraZilia
"
milit"y exclusionary regime and have
applied them to other countries, not only in Latin America hut
elsewhere in the Third World, one often-heard statement is that
Brazrlxan high economic growth rates were due to the severe
repression imposed upon the opposition and to authoritarian
exclusionary policies which have systematically favored capital
in detriment of labor. Therefore it was argued that
modernization and development predominantly occurred under
authoritarian and non-democratic regimes. 55 Second> ^
authoritarian insulated, exclusionary regime represented a
temporary phase which could not last if Brazil was to transform
itself into a developed, middle-range power, according to the
blueprint established by the military. A less authoritarian
regime, a new international alliance and a revamped economic
model capable of dynamizing the Brazilian economy was necessary
to achieve that Th,,c 4-u • 456 lmP°rtanCe
°
f di
— these topicsthey may provide clues ^ political
^ ro ,. .
F l i an^ economic
^ect.ons i„ Brazil and in Latin
The Brazilian authority ^
the f
ltanan re
^ lme (1964-85) arose with
h
31
;
re of efforts to consoiiaate a
—
—
^
bl°C
— —sea praetorianiEm reduced statet nomy during the inmediateiy ^^^^^ ^ ^
etat. With none o f the classes powerful enoUgh to attain
7°ny °VSr 0th- - -e all^ce
. typicalLat ln American pre-coup situation - the military became theSUSUinerS
" ~ Pa0t
' —^ ^to power and promptly
deactivating civil society's instructs of interest
representation (unions, part ies, universities, armed force s . s
low-ran* organizations, pea s ant organizations, through
repression and suppression of political life. 56 Not only did
the military close institutions and use physical coercion to
intimidate leaders and activists h,,t f*. ,1Vl bu ^ also employed ideological
instruments to enc apsul a te the interests of society in a
bureaucratic and authoritarian manner. 57 It can be inferred
from the available literature that the expansion of state
autonomy in the period subsequent to 1964 was effected to
insulate the state from demands from both the dominant and the
dominated classes while expanding it into sectors crucial to
maintaining the authoritarian character of the regime, i. e.
, the
security and information communities, the national security
at financial and e
—™-
-
th
-tr teg.c productive and infrastructure areas Qf ^
;
S"e P°UCy
~ ~ Crests remained on the
I t;
6
'
°ther^S—— * the capitalist classesand interests.
No singie hegemonic class fraction ga ined control o£
state and attained poUcies favorable to it s particulargMlS
- "
the
-
h
- — * o f interests in certain
areas as shown by Evans .5S How^
either among themselves or with the state elites and institutions
and how they managed to gain the upper han d or to iose it is anindicator of the competition among the fractions of the
capitalist ciass for poiicies within the state. Which class
-naged to ally forma lly or informa il y with the military center
of decision-making and their proxies in the economic decision-
alLances at the state or federal ievel, has always shifted with
time. unable to donate core policy-making apparatuses of the
state, the dominant classes and their fractions sought to control
fragments of the state apparatus, as Abranches has shown. 59
Nevertheless, central policy-making circles remained highly
autonomous, insulated from outside influence during the first
phase of the military authoritarian reg ime, 1964-74.
For the later stages of military rule, 1974-85, it
seems that policies which worked for the late 1960s and early
-70s became increasing
counterproductive to the interests of
specific sectors of the capitalist ciass. Furthermore
increasingly discontent ^
pressure for a political transition of the regime, best
represented by the campaign against .-statist of the mid-to- late
1970s. At the same time, these discontented fractions of the
capitalist class supported the opposition political project in
which they could potentially gain direct control over policy
formation. The capitalist class was further distressed by
external constraints to continued growth caused by a sequence of
crises of the world economy.
internally, the 1974, 1978 and 1982 Congressional
elections challenged the military regime, continually creating
political obstacles for the realization of the long term
authoritarian political projects. 60 within ^ ^ ^
bureaucratic-authoritarian regime, the Geiselista61 faction Qf
the military had to regain power lost to internal repressive
forces, since overall state autonomy of the previous period had
created an indomitable monster within the state that other
factions still grappled with. The central apparatus of the state
regained power under the Geisel Administration (1974-79) and was
allowed to enforce a modicum of coherence in state action while
submitting the state to a rational, centralized policy-making
process. At first, the initial response to the world capitalist
crisis of the mid-1970s was a renewed spurt of grandiose projects
in virtually an strategic areas of energy and hbasic inputs ades lgn similar to the highly repressive t
with th
, autonomous years. Bute condrtrons of continued international crises that
~ SSriOUS lmb— I" the Brazilian economy
« the virtual end of internal guerrilla threats, it hecameincreasingly irrational for the state and for the capitalist
classes to preoccupy themselves excessively with security and
w,th the
..emerging power" notion that fl owed from the ideologicaldoctrine o f
..national security and development,. state act.on
" State P°liCieS
"
eeded
* °-er to adapt to the new
domestic and international situation. A hypothesis of a
diminished autonomy of the state ^»r, wY n can be presented! at this point.
These tensions were observed by O-Donnell, Cardoso and
Rexs, who pointed out the linkage of opposition groups to
capitalist class fractions as conducive to a tenable abertura
project.*? As the econom . c polit . cal condit . ons
increasingly deteriorated (especially after 1980 when inflation
and unemployment hit the Brazilian economy, state organizations
lost their autonomy as decision-makers and formulators of policy
Meanwhile, other elites in the power pact began a political
offensive against state bureaucracies exemplified by the
"antistatist" campaign launched by the Paulista fraction of
capitalist class. These elites, together with lawyers, press
organizations, the renewed labor and the progressive Church
movements, requested liberalization of the regime, end of
exception laws, political amnesty, l iftina ofY/ l l 9 censorship, theright to strike and gubernatorial a ^and presidential elections. 63Whereas the convergence of a renewed lahnbor movement and the
resurgence of the rivii •dvxl socrety organization contributed to theoss o f tate relative autonomyi this ^ ^
the defederation of th e internationai f inanoial situation
the Merest and debt crisis of 1979 . 1982
, and ^ ^^mS1S
^
1979
'
° f «** «—
-
-ate action ineffective
The specific energy sector ana its bureaucracy dealt
With in this dissertation, typified the developments outlined
above. Eletrobras, ztaipu Binacional and Nuclebras, the all-
encompassing systems of electric energy (including nuclear)
bureaucracies, together control a vast system of
subsidiaries/concessionaires which to a large degree were
consolidated in the phase of greatest state relative autonomy
1964-1975. The nature of the "holding companies", the volume of
resources, their articulation with national security apparatuses
their articulation with capitalist industrial sectors, their
capacity tc generate and to borrow financial resources were so
great that it was possible for them to have a high degree of
relative autonomy. One of the indicators for the sector's
relative autonomy is that, up to 1974, Eletrobras's own policy
recommendations were adopted in their entirety as the policy for
the Electric Energy Sector as a whole by the National Department
of Waters and Electric Energy ( DNAEE
, Denartamento NacjonaJ
Aquas g Fneraia gj^trica) and i-h= „•~~ l£3 the Ministry of Mine s and Energy
'
'
fSiaiSi^i2^e_JUna^e_inergia) bnfh ,
thelr . ,
finera , ot of wMch reli ^
-ei legal mandate to formulate ^^^^ poUcy Ano^
SerV1Ce£
"
iSe high "nanciax lever.ge
and reinforcing their financial strength
international financial institutions ye t a „„th. no er indicator isthe level of articulation of interest to thSS the central apparatus ofthe state, i.e. the security comunity, and the relatively low
Participation of capitalist class fraction in the decision-making
Process. Only after the genera i obj ectives had been established
with the military regime, were other actors permitted to
participate" A11 three elMs ^^ ^ ^
of analysis set previously.
Following the 1974 oil crisis and the new political
accomodations of state-civil society relations after 1975, the
level of autonomy of the electric sector was significantly
lowered. The electric sector policy-making functions were
adjusted to the overall energy policy, now centralized at the
President!.! level (Pis^Mnsia^epublica, and at the National
Security Council (CSN, Conselho ^a ,lranra msismX) .
Significantly, when the energy sector resisted its loss of
relative autonomy, the energy bureaucracy was pressured by
several national and international capitalist class interests,
which were keen to guarantee the execution of the energy
infrastructure Dronram Tp g . i n the years thai- **~nat followed, energy
P 1CY e subject to in
— -ng diverseinterests which have contributed to the present financiai
disarray.
m sugary, some tentative hypothe£es wh . ch Biii ^teste. in the following chapters ^ ^
attention win be paid to ^ relative ^ ^^
-tn at the leve! ot state acfcion ^_
at the ievei of the eleotric en£rgy^ ^ ^
studies will be examined in order tQ £eparate o>jt
Afferent political project pursue. by different^ ^
institutions and in order to ana lyze the decisionmaking
processes of state action in general an d the Brazilian state in
particular.
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CHAPTER in
AUTONOMOUS nLwS&j™™ 1*™ AND
The central purpose of the next two chapters is to
present an historico-structnraistru u l account of Brazilian state action
and policy-making process curing the military regime
. Thig
analysis is divided into twQ
_^ ^
-re insulate., authoritarian period of policymaking and state
action (Chapter in,, and another in^
_
influenced by the nni if i^^i -i • !_Y political liberalization and economic crises
(Chapter IV)
.
In the ensuing sections, basic state action and the
basic structure of political power are discussed and analyzed.
These analyses are aimed primarily at mapping out the degree of
state autonomy by focusing on directly associated state actions
processes of state-building and the dynamics of interest
competition in the overall political and policy-making process.
We begin with a brief description of state
interventionist state-building and policy-making during the
period prior to 1964. m this historical review we will
demonstrate that the role of the Brazilian state as an
intervening agent was paramount in the process of capitalist
development and was established long before the military came to
power
.
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razman case is
^ mustrative of the
shlp between^~ing
, political power and the
.
a e Since the inception of fche nationalist/pQpuiist
"0, led by Get,lio vargas< a bureaucratized
as expanded its intervention ^ economy
_ ^through productive functions
_ ^ under^ ^
especially after the establlshment of ^ Ssx^m3 ^be=aBe the dynamic center of ecQnomic transformation>
the conditions for the import-substitution-industri a ii zation
which would continue after Vam^-car9as ' s removal from power in 1945.
The period 1930-45 reorespntc; . hQ , .x p esents the beginning of the
industria ii 2ation process
, and the proce£s ^ consoUdation Qf a
new a i Iiance among th£ dominant sectQrs ^ sQciet^
oligarchical system of interest representation operative
the SsEui2l i£^mM (1889 . 1930) saw the . r poUt . cai
reduced, but not extinguished, with the emergenC£ Qf ^
the urban, industrial bourgeoisie whioh establishe d strong
connection with the central government.l Industrial capitalis.
was this bourgeoisie's conscious project which in the 1930s
institutionalized new ways of participating in the decision-
making process, consolidated during the authoritarian period of
the.Estado_Jiovo (1937-45). 2 The industrial bourgeois class
utilized the state-created institutions
_ the
'
° f F°reign TradS (CFCEX
'^^^^^
««te.»34,. the Technical CouncU Qf EcQnomics ^
( CTEF
,
Conselhp Tecnim Ho t?^
Nacional Council of Industrial ^i and Commercial Policy (CNPIC,
Conselho Nacinn^i Poll> . a Tt^,^^^-^^^^-^^
1944) to
legitimize their direct influence over the noli™ tr-n p licy-making process
w.tnin the bureaucracy. This consultative and corporative
structure, gea red tc policy-ma]cing in the financial and
area, generalized the practice of direct and ciosed negotiation
between the state and the private sector in order to consoiidate
Brazilian capitalist In fact
,
such insulatgd ^
ample sectors of society anH ,,ac. ->d was a resilient trace of the
Brazilian policy-making process throughout.
3
The consultative and corporative decision-making
institutions were an ingredient of the conscious project of
modernizing the state bureaucracy in such a way that some sectors
of the bourgeoisie
- the exporters, national industrialist and
selected agrarian interests - had privileged access to policy
formation and decision-making during the first Vargas period.
Other such institutions were created after the First
Vargas period. In 1945 the Superintendency of currency and
Credit (SUMOC, Superintendent da MnPd a e do rrpHitM took up
_
Central Bank functions. Despite being a division of the powerful
Bank of Brazil (Banco do Brasil) its action was influenced by
e lgn lnterests
, primarUy ^^^^^ «
"
11,9 JUSCelin
°
KUti
—~ (»»-«, the principal
r;un9— - -— Groups med ate;7 " ^ nati °nal ~ capita, capitalinterests rel ated to capital and consumer^
;
ec7 special treatment under the— — • -a was" litated
^ ^—^ - i—cgicl resistance to stateintervention in the economy ana state entrepreneurship. * The
plethora of administrative and fin^i inancial mechanisms created forthe imputation o f the Target Pl an needed coordination, which
was achieved through the innovative ^ ^
representatives or government agencies and tne private sectordeterging tne scale and volume of production
, J
incentives.* In addition fcQ policy .making
_
^ ^
-de decisions on tne utilization of earned Ponds wh.ch were
not subject Congressional oversight and control. 7 Late r, in the
late 1960s, these policy-making apparatus were institutionalized
into a single
"non-decision-making, bureaucratic agency
approve what dominant groups wanted approved. "8 Between 1946
and 1964 sixteen agencies - or mechanises of interest
representation
- were created (or reorganized,, fragmenting the
decision-making process among state agencies, each possessing a
high degree of relative autonomy from central state and were
highly instrumental in capitalist modernization.
9
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The literature analyzing the political economy of tb.Brazilian state productive sectors - steel, min ing, petroleum
,electric power
- as well as the political aspects of the
organization of the National Economic Development Bank (BNDE
£aDS£
-M£iS*^^ 1953), and the
'
efforts to initiate automobile production discusses policy
formation and implementation between 1930 and early 1960s
Luciano Martins explored the concept cf "conservative
modernization., under the aegis of an authoritarian regime (1937 .
1945) when state steel sector was implanted in 1941.10 In the
same work, he analyzed the petroleum sector, the creation of the
BNDE and the implantation of the auto industry - all between
1950 and 1960. Luciano Martins analyzed the interaction between
public decision-makers and entrepreneurs, both domestic and
foreign, concluding that, despite changes at the political level,
the entrepreneurs remained highly dependent upon the state, and
articulated their interest through informal channels or
corporative mechanisms. Therefore, a series of fragmented
relatively autonomous agencies emerged, being at the same time
"apparatus of domination, an exclusive arena for the elites and
arbiter of conflicts among them." 11
During the 1930s, as the implementation of Vargas's
policies became entangled with the domestic struggle between
Fascism and Communism," the military leaders forced Vargas to
institutionalize an authoritarian, intervening state which, as
68
stated by Goes Monteiro
, vargas , s chief Qf staff ^ ^
Forces
,
c;ilec?ive
a
n fr:nd d?s ™* regulate all
organizations and p ?
*he nation
<
creating the
economy. 13
a paratuses adequate to organize our
in contrast with the corporative mechanism of interest
representation, a second group of agencies and state-owned
enterprises were organized soon after the inception of the Est^
NP^P. with the hlgh degree relative state autonomy proposed by the
military. The National Council of Petroleum (CNP, C^nselho
toliU^^' 1938 )> Doce Valley Company (CVRD,
Z^nhl^^ 1942)/ National steel company (cs^
^z^i^^ 1941) resulted from the act . on Qf
the powerful groups within the state who sought highly autonomous
policy-making and implementing mechanisms. 14 Several political
and social forces were unleashed, imbued with an ideology of
national regeneration and a state-building mission. ^
In the steel industry an intricate decision-making
process took place involving foreign private interests,
Brazilian private groups and the strong military heavily inclined
to autarky, i.e. to achieve self-sufficiency in steel supply as
national policy. ^ Most proposals to the steel problem were
-suggestions involving the private domestic and foreign interests
These were sidelined in favor of a statist solution, despite
a
consultations with u-s
_ steei ^^^^ ^ ^^^^^^ i7
-
other state-owned steel
estafciished
;
W
7
S
;:
P
" ^ "ate G~ - -"as Gerais and sioPaulo
.
13
The state mining company — cvRn^ iy CV D — was initially setUP as exporting firm
, and would later consoUdate
producer and exporter firm ln ^^ ^ ^percent of seaborne trade. 19
With respect to petroieum, the international example of
Argentina, Uruguay, Bolivia and Mexican
^^
respective industries prompted the EstM^3 regime to
establi sh a regulating agency, the National Petroleum Council
t™*- ^U.^M^n^^t^, 1938) . The decision toOU a monopoly however would only be made in 1953 . CNp
Brazilian private refineries from trovers, permitting foreign
capital to invest only in Sporting a nd distributing, p lanned the
petroleum industry as a public utility overseeing an phases, and
decided a uniform price nationwide on all oil products and also a
Sole Tax on Liquid Fuels (IUCL, tepost^irdc^obr^^
touidcs,
.
The decision to form the state oil company pitted a
statist, nationalist solution against a free-enterprise system
preferred by the foreign and domestic private interests. This
confrontation lasted for almost a decade (1943-49), delaying
Petrobris decision. The monopoly campaign would resume later
70
d
er
under different a composition of forcesr , including the middle
class, the non-Communists nationalist and Leftist military an
Leftist civil alliance including Socialist, Communist and 1th
Progressive sectors, basicall y a hodge-podge of politioal^
each striving to control the movement. The monopoly solution was
achieved in Vargas second Administration (1951.54) through a
"Petroleum is Ours!" popular campaign. 20
State action in the electric energy sector, dominated
by the much opposed foreign-owned monopolies, 21 was also
advanced under the tutelage of the state Th„y un . e proposal for the
state monopoly Eletrobras (Centrai^Eietrica^rasil^
presented in !953 to be organic along the same lines as
'
Petrobras) was effectively stalled, by powerful associated
Brazilian and foreign interests, in Congress until 1962 .22
Nevertheless, state electric power policies were conducted at
Vargas's Economic Advisory Board. With increased electric power
bottlenecks posing problems for industrialization, the states
took up the role of the foreign companies by setting up a series
of state-owned enterprises. Financing mechanisms were
established at the federal level for the electric energy
sector. 23 credit for the construction Qf generating pQwer
plants was available through the National Bank for Economic
Development (BNDE)
.
This interested BNDE since delaying the
inception of Eletrobras yielded windfall political power to BNDE,
whose control over finances gave ifc^ ^ 7
distributed throughout the country. 24
State action is ultimately the result ofof the complexpolitical process of deciding h„how and where to use scarce
economic resources. As the Brazilian productive structure
transformed itself, beComing more heterogeneous, new class
fragments became part of the power pact participating primarilym the internationalization of the internal marKet, in view of
dampened labors demands. coularfs period (1961-1964, was™ by highly active policy initiatives with dismal outcomes.
State action attempted to resolve *.h> the structural deficiencies of
the economy and society. coularfs Triennal Plan, incorporating
structural and institutional reforms, ignited the political
struggle over the type of capitalism Brazil should pursue. m
society and in the state agencies endless debates over land
reform, educational reform, urban renewal, labor laws reform and
*ore importantly, profit remittance were fought, bringing state
action to paralysis and impasse. The political coalition that
worked together during the Target Plan, was definitively
shattered. 25 What ensued was a deteriorating political e
economic situation that led to a conspiracy by forces of the
opposition concentrated in the Institute for Economic and Social
Research (IPES). 26
State intervention in the Brazilian economy from Vargas
to Goulart was of a dialectical nature, shifting from populist-
nationalist protectionism, to a iiberal and pro. foreign capifcal
Policies. capital accumulation was thus concentrated in the most
dynamic sectors
- those dominated by multinationals - before
taking place in state productive enterprises. Economic factors
were certainly crucial to the demise of Goularfs power pact-
recession, inflation, problems of balance of payments, foreign
debt, internal debt, all combined to exacerbate institutiona!
inadequacies and structural economic bottlenecks. Nevertheless,
the breakdown of the constitutional regime had clear political
'
components. The constant tension between populist-nationalist
policies and liberal orthodox, pro-foreign policies are
represented in the brief description above. Public policies in
the Estado Novo
,
the Vargas's second term, and the Goulart years
focussing on the welfare of the working class clashed with those
implemented during the Eurico Dutra (1946-1951) and Kubistchek
periods. Dutra and Kubistchek pushed policies that promoted the
internationalized associated-depedent mode of development. the
dialectical tension between these two poles was temporarily
smothered with the authoritarian regime after 1964, which for the
next twenty-one years was to promote a paradoxically enlarged
state role while trying to foster a regime of economic
liberalism.
The pattern of capitalist development had projected new
and powerful actors into the political arena. The multinational
durable consumer goods interests rapidly combined with the
-terests o f other politioal aotors ^
» "ve« developmental^ project
. As this rapid
between labor and capital exarcebated by ^ ^
popular segments of society and the increased ability o f the
working class to articulate effectively its demands. In
addition, the political alliance failed to coopt crucia!
fractions of foreign and domestic capitalist lnterests forcing
the basis of opposition to Goulart's interv.nfi •" s l terventionism. Although
Popular uprising and turn to a socialist regime was highly
unlikely at the time, there were real threats to capital
accumulation and to the pact of domination. As pressures from
the lower classes increased the military clamped down. The
military regime instituted a "redemption project," whose initial
task was the dismantling of working class institutions and
parties, in order to demobilize the working classes, in
particular industrial labor unions.
B. The Military Coup and the First MijJ^arx Rule;
The Period 1964-67
The regime established in the aftermath of March 1964
was a rupture with the populist regime of the past, it assumed a
different pattern of state institutionalization, different
structures of power and of authority as well as exclusionary
execution of public policies. 27 The new bloc-in-power
, of which
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a
the military represented the most powerful segment, had two
C
"°" b°nding *—*" «- identification of Communist
threats with the mobilization of th e worKing classes, peasant£
students, lower ranKs o f the military, and 2) the political
«11 to stave off these threats in order to maintain donation
over society. m addition to these ^ ^ ^
power wanted to revert the populist-nationalist economic model
and pursue a model of growth that in effect would exclude a
number of social sectors from the benefits of develops.
in order to succeed, this project needed the exclusion
of threatening political actors, together with the incorporation
of classes and class fractions capable of promoting capitalist
development. After seizing power in March 1964, pro-labor
organizations within the state previously devoted to the
implementation of populist-inclusionary policies were dismantled.
New economic policies promoting orthodox liberal economic
programs were began, strengthening and expanding the role which
international oligopolies would play in the Brazilian economy in
the next years. The military regime, controlling the coercive
apparatus used the National Security with Development Doctrine as
a blueprint for their new Brazil. This doctrine had been taught
at the Superior School of War (ESG, Escola Superior de Knerr. i in
Rio de Janeiro for a decade, preparing cadres of military
officers, tecnicos
,
and entrepreneurs for this long-term
political project. This time, military intervention in Brazil was
to be different from the previous t^nemporary interventions. Thetraditional role of the mil -54- =G lt^y as a "moderating power" -
returning political control to civilian.
28
s soon after crisis was
over
— was now snelv d ^ favnr 0<! ,in t o of long term domination of all
aspects of society.
The winning coalition - the military, the conservative
land-owners, the traditional urban upper class, and the
modernized urban middle class which feared the economic
instability of Goulart regime - formed a contradictory alliance
For them, the previous regime showed the unpreparedness, the
corruption, the weakness and sheer incompetence of civilian
politicians in conveying the stability needed for development.
This conservative coalition was soon dominated by hegemonic
military and technocratic factions defining the political and
economic direction and state action. The modernization of the
state bureaucracy, the adaptation of political institutions to
the needs of the authoritarian regime and the reorganization of
the economy, displaced traditional interests. The landowners and
factory owners, fragments of the domestic bourgeoisie, quickly
found themselves alienated from the political project of
bureaucratic-authoritarianism.
The coalition of the dominant classes began fcQ
as soon as the poiiticai groups o£ the mist^^
effectively controls, the populist civilian and military
leadership purged, and their orqanizati „™g ons suppressed. The
» industrial and financial class fragments, expressions ofthe »odern capitalist dominated the new coalition, while the
Military occupied the central positions in the exercise of power
and authority. The traditional land-owning class who fought
against Communism in the rural areas and against agrarian refer,
also refined, albeit as a „i„or partner, in the new hloc-in-
power. 29
Furthermore, the Superior School of War (ESG) was
convinced that the development of Bra,in= „ ^c r zil's modern industrial and
financial infrastructure could not be accomplished by the
politicians. 30 The ESG's Doctrine of National Security
purported the ideology and strategy of future Brazilian
development. The doctrine related the pursuit of permanent
Sbiectiyes that were to be achieved by policy implementation to
attain current objectives. Among the permanent objectives it
was established that the ESG was solely responsible for defining
national security interests, such as sovereignty, national
integration, social peace, international recognition, and a
particular interpretation of democratic values including limited
freedom of speech, limited personal freedom, and control of the
right to form political parties and hold elections. However,
was in
attainment of the permanent objectives was possible through theimplementation of policies ^o^^^, ^
conjuncture! problems, and had emerged from the analyses and
suggestions of classes and seminars at ESG. The ESQ
essence a vehicie for disseminating the dominant national
security ideology. 31
The first military government headed by Humberto
Castello Branco, the former Chief of staff of the Armed Forces
provided the military regime with new institutions such as the
National Informations Service (SN1, S^rvi^Nacion^
I" ) that^ the State Pro-Pt access to information and
intelligence for decisions in the public and in the private
sphere. 32 Although ^ ^ ^
controlling the political activities of labor unions and student
organizations they realized how hard it was to avoid the interna!
politicization of the military. Eager to prevent the suggestion
of any disunity, purges and exclusionary policies helped the
dominant hard-line faction give the appearance of a ruling
monolithic military establishment. At the same time,
implementing these policies made the hard-liners advance into
positions of command. 33 The increasing self-sufficiency of the
military, in contrast with the relative weakness and dependence
of the domestic bourgeoisie, consolidated their hold over the
state
.
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The increased authoritarianism of the military
demonstrated in the deactivation of the existing political
parties. This took place after the 1965 Gubernatorial elections
in the states of Minas Gerais and Guanabara resulted in victories
considered detrimental to the regime. As a consequence political
activities were funnelled into two parties, one supporting the
military regime - National Renovating Alliance (ARENA) - and
another opposing it - the Brazilian Democratic Movement (MDB)
The Program of Economic Action of the Government (PAEG)
contained diagnoses of the most pressing causes of declining
growth rate. GNP growth was the only statistic the military
thought necessary to legitimize their rule. The PAEG proposed
policies to remedy the economic recession which were not
explicitly exclusionary but required increased use of a strong
hand to obtain compliance. The economic policies, breaking away
from Furtado's Triennial Plan, diagnosed inflation as the
principal problem to be tackled since it endangered economic
growth
.
Additionally, the implementation of the military
development cum security project required adequate organization
of the state in the area of modern regulatory and financial
institutions. Fiscal policy aimed at increasing the extraction
of resources, and policies that curtailed the political use of
administrative and technical resources, were deemed essential to
stimulate economic growth and implement the "restorative 1 '
development project. The 1964 Monetary and Financial
transformed the Currency and Credit Superintendency (SUMOC) into
the Central Bank of Brazil ( BACEN
, B^^t^^Bx^U) and
instituted the National Monetary Council (CMN
, C^^M^^
Nacional)
.
The National Monetary Council became the most
important site for mediation of capitalist interests, classes and
actors sidelined in the previous period, including domestic and
multinational industrial interests, national and foreign banks,
export sectors, state agencies and state enterprises were now
convoked to participate in the decision-making process. Now that
labor unions were effectively controlled and a new labor and wage
legislation were in effect, the decisions of the National
Monetary Council dealt with the share of capital accumulation
that each fragment of capital would receive, banking financial
gains, agricultural subsidies or industrial fiscal incentives . 34
The tax system was re-elaborated paying attention to
the creation of non-inflationary means of getting revenues.
The tax reforms were aimed at increasing the extractive capacity
and included the creation of indexed bonds and bills of the
National Treasury (ORTN and LTN) used for indexing mortgages,
housing loans, construction industry, rents and debts. 35
Efforts were made to regain the confidence of foreign
lenders and investors — government, multilateral and private
alike. In that same year, 1964, the World Bank, the IMF, and
private foreign banks resumed financing to Brazil.
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in one of the first actions of the military government,
Castello Branco changed the job stability regulations introduced
in the 1943 Labor Code to facilitate the capitalist relations of
production. According to the old rules, tenure was granted to
workers with ten years or more of employment, which resulted in
numerous labor lawsuits against multinationals and Brazilian
firms. in 1966, the Time of Employment Compensation Fund (FGTS,
de Garantia por To.^pn de Service) was instituted,
eliminating job tenure and instituting a flat compensation over
the amount of time on the job. The new attractiveness of the
Brazilian labor laws for the multinational firms were directly
related to the depressed wages and unemcumbering labor code.
2
'
State Enterprise Action in the Period 1964-67: Reform
and Institution-Building
The discussion above showed how reform of state
institutions or the installing of new ones has directly affected
the character of the regime. The action of the state enterprises
in this period, as shown below, was also marked by reform and
extended institutionalization, not only in sectors historically
established but also in new areas. Some of the long-lasting
traits instilled in this period of reconstitution of the state
institutions were:
^encS;tiCiZati0n ° f the State enterprises and
b) subordination of their objectives to
cfadSption
C
o?
ity
,
and
^lo^entlbjectives;
operaSon? '
entre*—^ -de of
Vsel
055 ° f ^ S°Cial functions it had before
Yet, these traits were contradictory. The objetives of
state enterprises were subordinated to National Security and
Development objectives but they were implemented by state
enterprises managed as private enterprises. The central
decisions and objetives were taken at the top-echelon levels of
the National Security Council and the presidential level after
which they were carried out by state enterprises. This form of
state action was established in the 1967 Administrative Reform
Act which mandated "centralization of decision and
decentralization of decision execution" as a rule. 36
Despite the initial efforts of the Program of Economic
Action of the Government (PAEG)
, inflation remained high and
economic recovery slow (see Table 3.1). The military was willing
to combat inflation at any cost, no matter how detrimental to the
society at large. Reducing it involved a harsh package that
included recessive policies, emphasized modernizing institutional
reforms, enhanced financial capacities of the state and
controlled labor in order "to make capitalism work." 37
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TABLE 3
.
1
MACRO ECONOMIC INDICATORS
Real
GDP inflation
EXP°rtS Imports
R
T
^
de Current Gross Net
Years growth rate Balance Accounts Foreign Foreign
rate (%) . . , . Balance Debt Debt
(%)
[ } (3) (a)
<
a
> (*) (a) (a)
1960 Q 7 t nJU.
-j
1961 10
•J
"7
1962 5 . 3 -1J
1963 1
.
5 ft 1 o
1964 2 . 9 Q 1
•
q
1965 2 . 7 3 4 K
~?
1966 3 . 8 38 Q
1967 4 . 8
1968 11 . 2 25. 4
1969 10 . 0 20. 2
1970 8. 8 19. 2
1971 12 . 0 19 . 8
1972 11 1 15. 7
1973 14 . 0 15. 5
1974 9. 5 34 . 5
1975 5. 6 29. 4
1976 9 . 7 46. 3
1977 5 . 4 38 . 8
1978 4 . 8 40. 8
1979 6. 8 77
. 2
1980 7 . 9 110. 2
1981 -1. 6 95. 2
1982 9 99 . 7
1983 -3 . 2 213 . 2
1984 4 . 5 238 . 8
1985 8 . 3 235. 1
1.3 1. 3
. 0
1.4 1. 3
. 1
1.2 1. 3 -
. 1
1 . 4 1. 3
. 1
1
. 4 1. 1
. 3
1 . 6
• 9
. 7
1 . 7 1. 3
. 4
1 . 7 1
.
4
. 2
1.9 1 9
. 0
2 . 3 2 . 0
. 3
2 . 7 2 . 5
. 2
2.9 3 . 2 - .3
4 . 0 4 . 2 - .2
6.2 6 . 2
. 0
8.0 12. 6 -4.7
8 . 7 12 . 2 -3
. 5
10.1 12 . 4 -2
. 3
12 . 1 12 . 0
. 1
12 . 7 13 . 7 -1.0
15.2 18 . 0 -2
. 7
20.1 23 . 0 -2
. 8
23 . 3 22 . 1 1.2
19 . 0 18 . 3 .7
21 . 9 15. 4 6.5
27.0 13 . 9 13 .
1
25.6 13 . 2 12.4
. 5 "3
~) • ± z . 8
-
. 2 "J
-J . X z . 6
-
, 4 *Io • z o nz . y
. 1 o£t J . u
. 1 3 . 1JL
. 4 3 . ~J
-5 . (J
. 1 3 . 7 O . J
. 2 3 . 4 3.2
-
. 5 3 . 8 3 . 5
-
. 3 4 . 4 3.7
-
. 6 5. 3 4 . 1
- 1.3 6 . 6 4.9
- 1.5 9 . 5 5.3
- 1.7 12 . 6 6.2
- 7.1 17 . 2 11.9
- 6.7 21. 2 17 . 1
- 6.0 26 . 0 19 . 4
- 4.0 32 . 0 24 . 8
- 7.0 43 . 5 31.6
-10.7 49 . 9 40.2
-12
. 8 53 . 8 46.9
-11.7 71. 9 64 . 4
-15. 4 83 . 2 79 . 2
- 6.8 91. 6 87 . 1
-
. 05 99. 7 87 .8
-
. 65 99 . 7 88 . 1
Source: Coniuntura Economica
. August 1986, 1984, 1980; Economic and
Social Progress in Latin America , 1986 Report,
Inter-American Development Bank, pp. 220,394, 396.
(a) in current US$ billion.
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Following the prescription of the package of policies
with respect to state agencies and state enterprises, the maxn
objective was to eliminate politics in their daily operations and
to cover the deficits and losses caused by the political use of
their funds. This was a particularly Herculean task since many
state agencies lacked self-financing capability. Those agencies
that had an income confronted three main factors, among many,
contributing to their financial situation: a) the rates of
public utilities were eroded by inflation; b) public goods and
services together with industrial products manufactured by the
state enterprises were priced extremely low to maintain political
stability; and c) pricing policies contained heavy subsidies to
industrial consumers (See Table 3.2 - Price Indexes. Public
Goods and Services, 1962-1974 below)
.
State enterprises and agencies, supposedly purged from
political clientelism by now, turned to the adoption of private
management practices in an effort to increase their efficiency.
One of the first measures taken was reviewing the tariffs and
prices for their goods and services so they could reach
"realistic tariffs" which would free them from fiscal budgets. 38
However, steel prices remained partially frozen in order to
generate benefits to the private economy, particularly the auto
industry
.
Another measure was to have separate personnel policies
from those of the Civil Service. While direct Civil Service
salaries were frozen, the salaries of the state enterprises
employees were calculated on a different scale: the
technical/managerial staff of the state enterprises were paid
84
TABLE 3
.
2
PRICE INDEXES.
PUBLIC GOODS AND SERVICES, 1962-1974.
(1965-67=100)
Years
INFLA-
TION
(a)
PETRO-
LEUM
Index
(b)
ELECTRICAL
ENERGY
Index
(b)
STEEL
Index
(b)
RAILROAD
FREIGHT
Index
(b)
PUBLIC
SERVICE TARIFFS
Index
(c)
1962 51 13 8 18 15 81963 81 24 15 31 22 151964 92 45 30 54 45 331965 34 80 68 84 70 661966 39 99 98 99 108 1011967 24 120 134 117 123 133
1968 25 155 156 152 119 159
1969 20 195 202 190 196 197
1970 19 225 257 253 260 254
1971 20 276 305 319 322 315
1972 16 350 366 360 322 392
1973 16 401 405 432 360 443
1974 35 641 512 653 477 526
Sources: a - Coniuntura Economica , from Table 3.1, p. 80.
b - Trebat, Brazil's State-Owned...
, Table 7.1, p. 184.
c - utilities and urban transport aggregate prices
including gas, water, electricity, telephone, bus and train.
salaries that competed with the private sector, making them able
to attract better personnel. 39
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Before 1964 The Federal Railroad Network (RFFSA
, Rede
^^Uri^eaer^^) and shipping Um CQmpanies ^
extensively used as a source of employment and clientelistic,
patrimonial pattern of action, resulting in political dividends
for the Goulart regime. Their autonomy was most prejudiced as a
result. The overstaffing and political price-setting for
services before 1964 were drasticly reversed in order to recoup
losses sustained before 1964. However, these short run measures
together with stopping unprofitable hauls were insufficient to
compete with transportation via highways, in addition, the
absence of secure sources of long term financing was detrimental
for the financial autonomy of the sector. Furthermore, the
decision process in the transportation sector was necessarily
political: for example the RFFSA had to continue running the
deficit-ridden suburban passenger service at low rates to prevent
political unrest. 40
The electric power sector surmounted the anti-statist
campaign with its holding company Eletrobras. After a decade of
"generation project-oriented" growth, the regional and state
companies of the electric power sector were directed
to implant realistic rate-setting procedures, to manage
Eletrobras and its subsidiaries like private firms,
and to respect public money as we respect private
money. 41
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Obsolete rate-setting mechanisms made foreign companies, such as
the Brazilian Traction, Light and Power of Canada, unwilling to
invest in their operations in Brazil, what gave them high
political leverage. The lack of foreign investment increased
number of shortages and the likelihood of rationing, while
providing poor service to about 80 percent of the Brazilian
market. In 1964, just after coming into office, the Minister of
Mines and Energy, Mauro Thibau, restructured the rate
legislation, indexing assets, and reintroducing the return on
investment on basic rates. 42 Raising electricity rates was not
so politically sensitive as increasing train fares but it
indicated a clear pro-foreign-company stance which was resented.
This political opposition to favoritism toward foreign capital
was easy to control since public protest was effectively
suppressed under a harsh press censorship. Whereas higher rates
benefited foreign companies it also generated financial and
economic leverage of the state electric utilities companies.
Eletrobras was also able to increase its sources of funds with
the compulsory loan collected from the regional and states
companies, and with directly collected and earmarked fiscal
resources, previously managed by the BNDE.
In the period 1964-67 Eletrobras struggled to
consolidate and to acquire the institutional resources that would
allow it increased managerial, financial and political autonomy.
Nevertheless, its regional subsidiaries and associated companies
owned by the states of the federation were at that point more
important than Eletrobras. Furnas
,
CHESF/ S , Q Paulo^
generating companies
- CELUSA, CHERP and USELPA which merged
into CESP
~, and Minas Gerais's CEMIG were all large influential
firms in their own right. Despite the long distance from the
location of the generating power plants to the market, they were
able to strike advantageous contracts for the sale of bulk
electric power with the foreign-owned Light. This alone changed
the relationship between the state regulatory agency CNAEE and
the foreign-owned distributors, from a bribery-ridden, corrupt
relationship to a concrete business venture. 43
In the petroleum sector, Petrobras
• s new president,
General Ademar de Queiroz (appointed by Castello Branco and a
participant on the 1964 coup)
,
attempted to insulate Petrobras
from political influence. While expanding its refining
capabilities, Petrobras expropriated private refineries. it also
went through an institution-building process, reorganizing
services and functions in a novel power-sharing system. 44 The
substitution of political appointees by technical personnel laid
the foundations for Petrobras 's increased efficiency, market
share, and profitability in the future growth years. Control
over the expropriated refineries lasted less than two years
(1964-65), at the end of which time they were returned to the
private sector. Two of these refineries, however, reverted back
to Petrobras control in the early 1970s as a result of an
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expansion program. This overall rational policy targeted to put
Petrobras firmly in control of a refining capacity that by 1974
reached over 95 percent of all crude oil in Brazil. 45
Before 1964 the policy decisions taken by the high
management of Petrobras were essentially welfare-leaning causing,
apprehension in the Armed Forces in face of the national security
connotations of this industry. After !967 entrepreneurial
autonomous decisions by the military who controlled Petrobras
facilitated the expansion into distribution and petrochemicals.
Both were compatible with national security objectives since they
continued an autarkic pattern established earlier.
The deep crisis of the steel industry in the mid-1960s
was caused by a decrease in the Gross Fixed Capital Formation of
the sector of 55 percent in 1963 and 25.6 percent in 1964. 46
Managers of state-owned and private enterprises resented the
price-freeze, the lack of control over power and managerial
resources, and the excellent conditions given to imported steel.
The BNDE
,
by controlling the finances of the sector, essentially
dominated steel policy until 1965, diminishing the state steel
sector's autonomy. Nevertheless, at the Brazilian Steel
Institute (IBS), an informal arena for the steel sector's
mediation, state and private entrepreneurs usually concurred
about appropriate measures needed to confront falling profit
rates and increasing financial costs, but they were at odds in
dividing up the market.
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To help organize the steel sector, BNDE and the
international lending agencies (the World Bank and the
international Finance Corporation - IFC) proposed a jointly
sponsored study involving private interests, public interests and
multilateral agencies. A commission was formed by the National
Confederation of Industry (CNI, Confederacy Naciona! da
industria
l
,
the Ministry of Industry and Commerce, the BNDE, the
IBS, the World Bank and the IFC. They contracted Booz-Allen and
Hamilton to analyze and recommend alternative solutions for the
decapitalization of the steel industry and its future
developments. 47 A controversial August 1966 Report followed,
negating the political guidelines by recommending no further
increase in Brazilian steel production. The Minister of
Planning 's defense of the Report, that it had been formulated on
"strictly technical grounds" based solely on market indicators
was disproved by future research. It is now generally
accepted that international oligopolies were fiercely competing
for the potentially large and expanding Brazilian market and had
influenced the expert's recommendations. 49 Politically out of
touch, the Report was a major blunder that had the effect of
rallying private and state enterprises in the Brazilian steel
sector behind a revision of the Report recommendations, done by
the Consultative Group for the Steel Industry.
With respect to the mining sector, this period was a
fundamental shift from the nationalist solution pre-1964, which
put limits to exploration of Brazilian minerals by foreign firms.
The 1967 Constitution and the new Mining Code reverted that
permitting foreign firms to explore minerals in association with
Brazilian firms or individuals. As an important source of
foreign exchange, the military government facilitated the
operation of multinational firms in the sector hoping that
increased exploration would expand exports.
In terms of the mining sector's relative autonomy, the
statist solutions of the past were criticized and modified.
Instead stimuli to the participation of the private sector were
introduced under the aegis of the newly reorganized National
Department of Mineral Research (DNPM) and a revamped Mining Code
CVRD's continued autonomy was due to its high political,
managerial and financial autonomy, which were essential to the
proper functioning of export-oriented activities, which reguired
flexibility and decision-making power.
C. Autonomous State Action in the
Growth Cum Repression Period
1 • Economic Recovery and Political Repression in the Period
1967-74
This period comprises the consolidation of the pattern
of dependent-associated capitalist development which emerged in
the late 1950s and whose political, institutional, and economic
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foundations were laid in the aftermath of the coup fro. 1964-67.
The military regime was increasingly dominated by the "hard-
liners/, who were able to impose their authoritarian-
exclusionary views after Castello Branco's Minister of War, Costa
e Silva, gained the upper hand in the succession and imposed the
hard-line supremacy within the military. The Costa e Silva term
(1967-69) was marked by the institutionalization of repression
and was cut short by his stroke in August 1969. At that time,
his SNI Head, General Emilio Garrastazu Medici (1969-74) came to
power. Medici presided over a period of accelerated growth
spurred by orthodox economic policies, the so-called "miracle."
Unprecedented misery, documented by declines in every indicator
of human welfare, however, necessitated increasingly
authoritarian and repressive political conditions, to avoid the
politicization of the widespreading marginalization of the
working poor. 50
This period corresponded to the institutional spread of
the "national security state apparatuses" 51 through the
strengthening of the Presidency and the strengthening of the
National Security Council and its executive arm, the National
Information Service (SNI). The SNI became a pervasive network of
information and security offices in all state organizations,
enforcing ideological adherence to development and security
concerns. The military executive arm was established at the
Internal Operations Divisions (DOI) , at the different Armies and
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Commands throughout the count rv t„ry. m addition, military personnel
started occupying decision-making positions in the state
enterprises continually created in the 1967-74 period, in
furtherance of the implementation of the ideology of development
with security. 52
The Costa e Silva military government (1967-69) was
marked by political protest and opposition initiated by
politicians whose political rights had been taken. The hard-line
military responded with increased repression to working class and
student organizations. A defiant Congress during 1968 was again
harshly repressed, culminating with the issuance of Institutional
Act 5, which gave full dictatorial powers to the Costa e Silva
regime. Each resistance movement of workers and students,
corresponded to harsher repressive acts. Eventually these
resisting movements adopted urban and rural guerrilla tactics --
which in turn generated the uncontrollable mushrooming of
repressive apparatuses, legal and paramilitary.
After Costa e Silva 's disabling stroke and death,
Medici was elected in a "sui generis" poll taken among the top
brass ignoring the constitutional claims to the presidency of
civilian Vice-President Pedro Aleixo. Despite Medici's ultimatum
to the military leaders that in order to accept the presidency
they would have "to accept any mission he gave them," Medici in
reality let the repressive apparatuses rampage about, in much the
same way as he gave a free rein to state agencies to implement
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autonomous policies. 53 During Medici's term (1969-74) the
repressive apparatuses were given full support to combat the
guerrilla and labor movements. Opposition was effectively
crushed during this period - the harshest dictatorial years of
the military regime. 54
Another undeniable characteristic of Medici's term was
economic growth, constantly celebrated by the Public Relations
Advisory Board (AERP, Assessoria de Relagoes Publicas da
Presidencia da Republics) in an effort to legitimate the
political regime. However the political regime was repudiated by
the Brazilian society not only because of the events involving
torture and disappearances, hushed under a veil of censorship,
but also because of the inequitable distribution of results.
Economic growth as an end in itself without distributive concerns
and as a source of legitimacy, gave impetus to the grandiose
projects that inebriated the military. The Transamazonic
Highway, the Rio-Niteroi Bridge, the Itaipu Hydro-Power Plant and
the Angra I Nuclear Power Plant were intimately linked to the
long-term Doctrine of National Security and Development. The
" Brasil-Potencia " (Brazil- Emerging Power) project continued
throughout the 1970s, reflecting the Superior School of War's
doctrine, which permeated the military and the technocracy in a
"new entrepreneurial self-identity," in times of ineffectual
Congressional politics. 55
In the economic sphere the Minister of Finance, Antonio
Delfim Netto, who remained in office from 1967 to 1974,
implemented large investment programs in the state productive
sectors. m so doing the idle capacity of the capital goods
manufacturing was preempted. This production was predominantly
done by the multinational companies operating in Brazil since the
Target Plan. The funds for such policy came from the renewed
self-financing capacity, new investment attracted through
subsidies and tax credits, and heavy reliance on debt-
financing. 56 Embarking on expansionist policies was therefore
not a product of a single decision but rather it derived from a
combination of factors including a higher degree of relative
autonomy for the state due to increased insulation from societal
demands. Among these factors was the absence of political
challenge due to intense repression, the regime's increased
extractive capacities and the aggressiveness of the foreign
capital in offering loans and suppliers' credits. For some
critics there was no miraculous economic growth in this period;
it could be explained by the cyclic nature of the Brazilian
economy coupled with a special political and economic
conditions. 57 The high growth rate of period 1967-74 averaged
10.4 percent per year (Table 3.1). Even more impressive, the
industrial growth rate averaged 13.05 percent between 1968 and
1973 58
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However, the policy outcomes of this
-growth cum
repression- period can be better understood when income
distribution figures are examined. The process of income
concentration is inferred from the declining share of income
received by the lower 80 percent of the working population
between 1960 and 1970, from 45.5 to 36 percent. 59 Social
conditions of welfare deteriorated with a surge in the number of
slum dwellers
( favelados ) , rising infant mortality rate, and
generally poor living conditions. 60
Even though the economy boomed in high levels of
private consumption and export growth, it was the state action
that was crucial in providing the incentives to growth. As Baer
states
A large proportion of Brazil's capital formation in the
late 1960s and the first half of the 1970s consisted of
public investment and investment activities in
government enterprises (in 1969 this amounted to as
much as 60 percent of total capital formation) . .
.
[I]ncreased steel production capacity, petrochemicals,
iron ore mining, power generating capacity, urban rapid
transit systems, and so on, would all be necessary
regardless of the income distribution. One may,
however, question the wisdom of the huge government
investment in road building, which supported the
capacity expansion of the automobile industry and made
country increasing dependent on the consumption of
petroleum, 80 percent of which is imported. 61
The consequences of the institutional and financial
reforms of the first years of the authoritarian regime were an
expanded and more powerful role of the state in regulating,
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financing and producing capacities. Decree Law 200, the 1967
Administrative Reform Act, enhanced the centralization of
decisions and the decentralization of execution, while allowing
for an unprecedented expansion of state activities in the
productive sectors and facilitated the creation and
transformation of public companies in the federal states into
associated companies to holding federal companies. 6 2 Figure 3.1
below depicts a guideline for state entrepreneurial action in
the years that followed the Administrative Reform.
The regulating capacities of the state were increased
when the Interministerial Price Commission (CIP) was organized.
CIP controlled prices of basic products and had the power to
obstruct credit from official banks and agencies for those who
did not comply with its directives. CIP's ability to control
prices resulted from the power to collect and to analyze the
costs of production thoroughly, thus enabling it to control
crucial sectors of the economy as well as wages and salaries.
CIP was therefore able to manipulate price-control mechanisms,
influencing the capacity of se'l f-f inancing or limiting the
profitability of entire sectors. 63
The financier role of the Brazilian state was modelled
after the National Bank for Economic Development (BNDE) , the main
source of sectorial financing since the fifties. The National
Housing Bank (BNH, Banco Nacional da Habitacao) used the receipts
of the Time of Service Guaranteed Fund (FGTS) to finance the
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Political Direction
Coordinating Economic Councils
Financial Sources Other Regulatory
agencies related
Sectoral Regulating Agency
HOLDING COMPANY
Associated and Subordinated Enterprises including Joint Ventures
FIGURE 3.1 - GENERAL STATE ACTION. INSTITUTIONAL ARRANGEMENT
POLITICAL DIRECTION:
National Security Council
Presidency
Ministry
other
SECTORAL REGULATING AGENCIES
COORDINATING ECONOMIC COUNCILS:
National Monetary Council ( 1964+
Economic Development Council
(1974+)
National Energy Commission
(1979+)
National Department of Mineral Research (DNPM)National Department for Waters and Electric Energy (DNAEE)National Petroleum Council (CNP)
National Co. for the Non-Ferrous and Steel Industry (CONSIDERNational Department of Telecommunications (DENTEL)
National Nuclear Energy Council (CNEN)
Others
HOLDING COMPANIES:
CVRD - Companhia Vale do Rio Doce S.A.
Eletrobras - Centrais Eletricas Brasileiras S.A.
Petrobras - Petroleo Brasileiro S.A.
Siderbras - Siderurgia Brasileira S.A.
Telebras - Telecomunicagoes Brasileiras S.A.
Nuclebras - Empresas Nucleares Brasileiras S.A.
Others
FINANCIAL SOURCES (foreign and domestic):
BNDE; IBRASA ( Investimentos Brasileiros) ; FIBASE (Insumos Basicos
Financiamentos e Participates) ; EMBRAMEC (Mecanica Brasileira) ;
Industrial Development Council (CDI) ; FINAME (Agenda Especial de
Financiamento Industrial) ; World Bank; Inter-American Development
Bank, Private Commercial Banks, Self-Financing, others Development
and Investment agencies.
OTHER RELATED REGULATORY AGENCIES:
Interministerial Price Council (CIP)
Foreign Trade Department (CACEX)
Customs Policy Council (CPA)
FIGURE 3.2 - LIST OF MOST IMPORTANT AGENCIES
housing industry. BNH ' s original objectives were distorted from
financing low income housing to financing the construction of
middle- and upper-income units, adapted after the dynamics of
interests of the housing industry, in addition, the extensive use
of government-guaranteed consumer direct credit helped finance
the acquisition of durable consumer goods adding to the
concentration of income. 64
Moreover, the demand for industrial production was
reinforced by policies of export promotion based upon an
elaborate system of incentives and subsidies whose main objective
was to expand foreign exchange receipts. Calculations show that
8 percent of the increase in sales of manufactured products
during 1968-72 was due to increased exports of traditional
products: shoes, furniture, textile, foodstuff, clothing
.[ 65 ]
Most of the subsidies relating to the increase of exports were
politically controlled by the CDI and by CACEX where export-
import agreements were struck as a result of political
negotiations that weighed capital accumulation interests and the
market conditions. 66
The financing of investments, based on foreign debt,
was greatly facilitated by the Resolution 63 of the Central Bank
which allowed Brazilian banks to borrow abroad and to lend in
dollars domestically. Another important instrument that
contributed to the expansion of foreign debt was Law 4131, which
allowed multinational firms to borrow from foreign financial
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institutions or other parent companies to replenish working
capital with government guarantees. The foreign debt grew
fourfold from 1967 to 1974 (see Table 3.1) with these
instruments. Since the foreign debt began to change from
primarily multilateral agencies loans and suppliers' credits to a
greater predominance of loans from private banks, the old notion
that the "miracle" years were a great period to invest in Brazil
needs to be re-evaluated. 67
Despite Medici's openness to foreign capital, his
policies were assertive of Brazilian state autonomy permitting
foreign capital to invest only in sectors not already occupied by
the state. Increasingly aware of the policy of reliance on
foreign capital, 68 the military viewed themselves as capable of
organizing and promoting the needed accelerated growth in all
fields. To further that self-image retired military officers
occupied middle and upper management positions in most of the
state-owned enterprises, both old and new. However even if the
"hard line" project had been partially "legitimized" by high
rates of growth in the "miracle" years it could not be solely
sustained through widespread repression because neither the
military within the state nor the industrial bourgeoisie directly
benefitting from economic growth were ever able to gain hegemony
in the process of defining political direction and
institutionalization of the regime.
At the end of Medici's term the lack of military
hegemony was sufficient argument for the inception of the
"decompression-, project. The successor of Medici was to be
chosen from among those candidates acceptable, more or less, to
all factions within the military, including the hard-liners
represented during the Medici term.
In summary, the analysis of the patterns of political
and economic actions of the Brazilian state in this period
suggest a group of characteristic traits that were transferred to
the action of the state enterprises subsequently: a)
internationalization
- the state enterprises increasingly
procured goods and services with multinational enterprises
already implanted in Brazil, or looked for joint-ventures in some
sectors in the expansion period; b) depoliticization coupled with
private business-like mentality, increased administrative
competence and search for financial autonomous capacity; c)
increased centralization of high-level decision-making, and
execution through contracts awarded to specific fragment of the
private sector; d) approximation between the objectives of the
National Security state apparatuses and the objectives of the
state enterprises (Examples: Transamazon Highway - Objectives of
National Integration; Itaipu - Brazilian/Paraguayan/Argentinian
geopolitics and international security objectives; Angra I -
military hopes of nuclear technology transfer and Brazil's
entering in the "nuclear age' 1 ; and finally e) relaxation of the
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controls over state enterprises
• s financial operations,
liberating them to deal directly with the private international
financial co^unity, what contributed to the sharp increase in
foreign debt.
2
' SeSS!SS
The previous section has shown how the Brazilian state
apparatus, influenced by the military's concerns, promoted
exclusionary policies that accelerated capitalist development.
Lacking political support from most of the organized groups in
society (labor, press, professional, lawyers) and thereby forced
to hold the regime together with repression and propaganda, the
state sought legitimacy through economic performance during the
presidential terms of Costa e Silva and Medici. The economic
recovery of this period was the result of the maturing of the
productive structure built in the 1950s and 1960s, was supported
by Castello Branco's institutional and political reforms, and was
facilitated by an unprecedented increase in international trade
and credit availability in external financial markets.
Additionally, the recovery was spurred by a set of conditions, as
discussed before, that restructured internal demand during the
years 1968-73. In short, this growth cum repression and
further internationalization of the economy presupposed both the
change in the pattern of production and the change in the
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organization and structure of political power and policymaking.
This section will discuss the state action which took place in
the period and its high degree of political and financial
autonomy
.
The economic policies decided in the central policy-
making agencies (mainly in the National Monetary Council,
directed by the powerful Finance Minister, Delfim Netto) were
instrumental in the recovery but they were not the main
determinant once the interest articulation in the CMN was limited
in political power. Each of the public productive sectors gained
political importance in this dynamic cycle, yet each sector
(electric power, petroleum mining, transportation, steel,
telecommunication) had its own coupling with private national and
international capitalist segments, ranging from cooperation
,
to
toleration to outright conflict. state action was, therefore,
governed by the general distribution of political power.
The policy-makers were quick to tap availability of
foreign savings, channelling resource to the state
entrepreneurial sectors, now that the political appointees were
replaced by the technocratic or military-background managers.
The state combined strategies of resource allocation with
increased intervention aimed at the consolidation of a
oligopolistic productive structure. That resulted in the organic
association of the large national private firms, the large state
enterprises, and the multinational corporations in a "tripod"
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model which was consistently stimulated through mergers, joint-
ventures and a systematic policy of concentrating investments i,
the strategic sector of petroleum/petrochemicals, mining, steel-
making, electric sector, telecommunications and transportation . 69
Notwithstanding the euphoria with accelerated accumulation, the
state sectors competed with each other for resources. As the
productive structure became more heterogenous, the competition
and the cleavages of interests became more fierce for the
definition of priorities within the state. As seen from the
Table of Annual Growth Rate in the Investment of State
Enterprises (Table 3.3) investment was unevenly distributed among
the different state sectors. The following discussion of the
state enterprise action highlights the variable "relative state
autonomy" in which we focus our analysis, by considering the
centrality of the policy and the articulation of interests
seeking to control and to manipulate economic, financial and
political resources.
As discussed in Chapter II political power resources
and financial resources are the underpinnings of state enterprise
action. Each sector mobilizes resources and establishes special
relationships with the central state agencies and with its
particular network of private interests. In addition, these
patterns of interest articulation change over time, modifying the
patterns of resource mobilization.
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TABLE 3
.
3
STATE ENTERPRISE SYSTEMS
ANNUAL GROWTH RATE IN INVESTMENT,
Eletrobras Petrobras 1 CVRD 2 StateYears & Itaipu* steel 3
1969 1. 1 10. 3 5. 31970 31. 3 57 . 6 74 4
1971 13 . 8 44 . 0 39 2
1972 17 8 -2
. 7 43 9
1973 14 4 19 8 -6
.7
1974 9 9 40 5 -15
. 9
1975 22 9 24 3 -24
. 3
24 . 9
77 . 4
21.8
26.1
Source: From tables 4,5,7,8 in Henri Philippe Reichstul andLuciano Coutinho, " Invest imento Estatal 1974-1980: Ciclo eCnse," in Luiz Gonzaga Belluzzo e Renata Coutinho (orqs.)
op . cit
.
^
'
From companies Reports.
Data from Raw, op. cit.
, table 32, p. 350. Investments on
the CVRD subsidiaries not available prior to 1972.
- Based on reports from state companies, holding
Siderbras, and Consider.
2
_
The pattern of investment for the state enterprises
shown above demonstrates not only their performance with respect
to overall economic performance but also provides an idea of the
priority of each state sector to the central state. The negative
values for the average growth rates in Gross Fixed Capital for
the period 1965-69 reflect the downturn in investment in state
enterprises as a result of the economic and institutional
reforms. Anticipating the cyclical rise in the growth rate,
however, investment in energy infrastructure was higher than the
overall investment. In the following period 1970-73, coinciding
with a period of harsh repression, the state enterprises '
s
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investment grew (Table 3.3); the average growth rate in the
Gross Fixed Capital Formation for the state enterprises (Table
3.5) was almost twice as much as the Total Gross Fixed Capital
Formation (Table 3.4). Gross Fixed Capital Formation followed a
discontinuous pattern for the period in question, reflecting
policy priorities negotiated at the central state level.
TABLE 3
.
4
GOVERNMENT AND STATE ENTERPRISES
PERCENTAGE SHARE OF GROSS FIXED CAPITAL FORMATION
(Selected years, by sectors)
1965 1969 1970 1973 1975
GOVERNMENT 24 . 9 22 . 7 18 . 5 16 . 7 16 . 9
ST. ENTERP. 9 . 2 4 . 4 8 . 0 10 . 5
Steel 5.0 0.8 0.7 2 . 0 2 . 9
Mining 0.6 0.6 0.9 0.6 0.7
Elec. Power 1.4 2 . 1 4 . 8 5.6 na
Chemicals 2 . 2 0.9 1.6 2 . 3 5.0
Source: Sulamis Dain, "Aspectos do Investimento
Empresarial do Estado." (Table II) - Grupo de
Estudos do Setor Publico/ FINEP, 1978.
Obs.: negative due to decapital ization
.
na - not available.
The pronounced discontinuities found in the average
investment growth followed a pattern of large sectoral investment
done in "blocks," regardless of economic conditions. Investment
was greater for the electric setor in the late 1960s, while the
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steel sector was the leading investment block in the next two
periods combined, growing at 60 percent and 40 percent for the
years 1970-73 and 1973-75 respectively, increasing its share in
the Gross Fixed Capital Stock from 0.8 percent in 1969 to 2 .
9
percent in 1975. in the third period, the leading block, the
petroleum/petrochemical sector, averaged a growth rate in the
Gross Fixed Capital Formation of 70.8 percent. Likewise, its
share in the Gross Fixed Capital Stock increased from 0.9 percent
in 1969 to 5.0 percent in 1975.
TABLE 3.5
AVERAGE GROWTH RATE
GROSS FIXED CAPITAL FORMATION
(Selected years)
1965-69 1970-73 1973-75
TOTAL 13 . 5 15. 0 16.7
GOVERNMENT 11.2 12 . 2 17 .9
ST. ENTERP. -5.5 27.7 na
Steel -22 . 0 60.0 40.0
Mining -11. 0 22 . 5 4 . 5
Elec. Power 37.0 22 . 0 .2
Chemicals - 8.5 30.0 70.8
Source: Sulamis Dain, "Aspectos do Investimento
Empresarial do Estado." (Table II) - Grupo de
Estudos do Setor Publico/ FINEP, 1978.
na - not available.
The pattern of uses of resources refers to analysis of
the patterns of investments describing how each sector fared
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relative to the others, while the analysis of the sources of
financing sheds light on the financial underpinnings of the state
relative autonomy variable. Relative state autonomy is often
achieved by control of the sources of the financial^ ^j. ui i i and economic
resources. So, understanding how a sector had more or less
resources for their use depended on a number of things, including
their capacity of self-financing through the sale of goods and
services, the role of internal capitalization and the degree of
foreign indebtedness incurred by each of the major productive
sectors. Ideally the more the state enterprises had control over
their own resources, the more they were capable of deciding and
executing their policies. There were other circumstances that
influenced the state autonomy, however, such as the role of the
national security doctrine or the influence of the private
sector, both domestic and multinational.
Up until 1965, while the major source of financing
investments within Brazil were the BNDE and budgetary
appropriations, external financing came primarily from
multilateral agencies. Shortly after, that changed with the
renewed capacity of state enterprises to generate funds from the
provisions, at realistic prices, of goods and services. As
resources increased they were used for state enterprises •
s
expansion thus sustaining economic growth. At the same time,
budget allocations were diminished in order to reduce the deficit
incurred during the 1962-67 crisis.
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The concern of creating means of self-financing
investment affected the relative autonomy of the state
enterprises in important ways. while pricing policies did in
fact help the electric power, the petroleum and the mining
sectors, the pricing of steel products was kept depressed to keep
down the cost of production of durable-consumer goods, a sector
dominated by multinational corporations. The contradictions of
interests, pitting the executives of the steel plants against the
executives of these multinational corporations interested in
maintaining low prices, ended up hurting the state steel sector.
Although prices of electricity, telephone and urban transport
were readjusted (See Table 3.2) soon they were being maintained
unrealistically low and used again as a political instrument in
the fight against inflation. Despite this fact, for a while
these resources were sufficient to guarantee a high aggregate
self-finance ratio in the period, as seen in Tables 3.6, 3.7 and
3.8 below.
The earmarked Sole Tax on Electric Energy (IUEE) and
the Sole Tax on Liquid Fuels (IUCL)
, raised directly from the
consumers of electricity or petroleum products, are considered by
Eletrobras and Petrobras as their "own resources." 70 Although
not subsidies, these earmarked taxes can be better viewed as
government transfers to the state enterprises. For the purposes
of this analysis, however, they will be considered as self-
generated resources since the actual transfers were not linked to
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annual budget appropriations but rather done automatically,
shielded against political changes. These funds, sales surpluses
and earmarked funds were relatively stable during the period
1967-74, accounting for 45 percent of resources benefitting
Eletrobras and the majority of the funds allocated to Petrobras
(See Table 3.6), whose policies were relatively independent from
the political direction of the central state apparatus.
A second form of securing funds for the sectoral
investments, was equity provision by the government, made on an
irregular basis. These funds were allocated in accordance with
the sector's needs on capacity for a self-generating surplus from
the sale of products or services. In addition to capital
infusions from the Treasury, under the form of retained earnings
and depreciation funds, equity was also raised through the sale
of shares in the stock market. The total privately subscribed
voting and non-voting capital was never significant, even in the
joint ventures where the state capital has always remained in
control. However, the volume of sale of five of the most popular
state enterprises 1 s stock represented more than 20 percent of
overall trading in the Sao Paulo Stock Exchange between 1971 and
1973. 71 The sale of stock to the public forced the state
enterprises to adopt profit-seeking behavior. This in turn
constrained the government's ability to use in their public
roles. The sale of stock competing for resources in the market
also contributed to the confrontation between the private sector
Ill
and the state during the anti-statist campaign that was waged
later on.
The third major form of investment financing — long
term borrowing from international commercial banks — initially
was not as important as they later became. According to Trebat,
their share increased from less than 15 percent in 1968 to 25.2
percent in 1974. 72 In terms of domestic loans, the Brazilian
private banks had a minimal role in the financing of investment.
The state enterprises historically relied on the state-owned
banks. In particular the BNDE
, at least up to 1965, when the BNDE
decided to emphasize loans to the private sector. 73 As domestic
sources for long term loans dried up for the state enterprises,
foreign sources of long term financing became more available, as
illustrated in Table 3.6. The state enterprises — particularly
those in the transportation and in the electric power sector —
continued to receive project financing from the Inter American
Development Bank, the World Bank (International Bank for
Reconstruction and Development)
. These agencies maintained a
good relationship with the Brazilian state at the same that they
looked after economic interests in the First World. In the case
of the Brazilian loans, 15 percent of the funds were used as
suppliers credit to purchase capital goods in the US, Japanese
and European market. 74 Special circumstances accelerated
Brazilian foreign indebtedness in the period 1967-74. For one,
the situation of high liquidity in the so-called Euro-markets
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TABLE 3 .
6
SOURCES OF INVESTMENT FUNDS (Selected Years)
Self-Financing Capital
Subscription
Long Term
Borrowing
Optg. Earmarked Gvt. Prvt Domst
. Frgn
ELECTRICITY
1968
1971
1973
27 .
1
25.5
34
. 4
14.3 30.6 1.7
19.8 19.6 2.7
19.9 20.0 0.3
13.9
13 . 5
6.5
12 . 4
18.9
18 . 9
PETROLEUM
1968-70
1969- 73
1973
66. 1
50.4/69.3
70
21.9 2.1 i.o
40. 1
21.6
3 . 0
na
na
5.9
na
na
STEEL
1969-73 22 16 10 30
MINING
1964-68
1969-74
70
65
8
10 1.5
na
1.5
12
22
Sources: Luciano Coutinho and Henri Philippe Reichstul -
"Tendencias Recentes do Investimento Empresarial do Estado."
Paper presented at the I Seminario Latino-Americano de
Politicas Publicas - FUNDAP/CLACSO - Sao Paulo, Dec. 1978,
Table 5, p. 20; Henri Philippe Reichstul, "Financiamento do
Setor Energetico" - Table 8A, p. 119; Wilson Dutra and
Vitoria Salles, Padroes de Financiamento em Empresas
Estatais (Rio: FINEP, 1978, mimeo)
, pp. 79ff; Trebat,
Brazil's State-Owned..
. op. cit
.
,
p. 174.
Note: opto - operations generated; earmarked taxes; gvt -
government; pvt -private; domst - domestic; fqn - foreign;
na - not available.
coincided with the internal cycle of accelerated economic growth,
which stimulated the demand for large amounts of credit by the
private and the public sector. Additionally, the institutions of
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the Brazilian financial system were not yet mature enough for
that kind of rapid expansion, forcing a considerable portion of
the demand for credit to be met by operations involving the use
of foreign exchange. The increase in foreign indebtedness -
almost fivefold between 1967 and 1974, from US$ 3.2 to 17.9
billion
— was predominantly financial in its character,
according to Davidoff Cruz's analysis of the loans, financing
contracts and the formation of international reserves. According
to this author, the contracts for financing US$ 6.8 billion were
counteracted by interests costs amounting to US$ 6.16 billion and
the creation of a reserve of US$ 6.16 billion, that is, creating
a purchasing power for capital goods and raw materials that was
not used in the period and returned to the mainstream of the
international financial market. 75
Long term borrowing in the international market rapidly
became the way in which state enterprises were quickly able to
implement the projects linked to their expansion programs.
Different sectors had different access to these foreign loans,
depending on several factors. In general the share of investment
of the private sector remained stable at 65 percent of the Gross
Fixed Capital Formation. However, the share of the public sector
investment through government budgets has gradually lost
importance in favor of investments through public enterprises as
indicated in Table 3.7.
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The important lessons behind the shifts in investments
patterns in sectoral state enterprises is the obvious commitment
to industrialization and infrastructure projects capable of, in
the future, paying their own way, while de-emphasizing the
policies. Table 3.7 illustrates this shift in the relative
autonomy of the state toward productive sectors.
TABLE 3.7
INVESTMENT SHARES OF THE PUBLIC AND PRIVATE SECTOR(as a Percentage of the Gross Fixed Capital Formation)
Years Public Sector Investment
Government Large State Private Sector TOTAL
Budget Enterprises (a)
1947 31. 1 3 . 2 65. 7 1001959 19 . 9 8 . 3 71. 8 1001965 24 9 13 . 6 61. 5 1001966 20 3 13 . 9 65. 8 100
1967 22 9 16 3 60 7 100
1968 19 . 3 14 1 66 6 100
1969 22 .7 12 4 64 8 100
1970 18 5 15 9 65 . 5 100
1971 17 . 5 17
. 2 65
. 3 100
1972 16 . 1 18 . 3 65 . 6 100
1973 16 . 5 19 . 3 64 . 1 100
1974 16 . 4 20 . 3 63 . 2 100
1975 16.9 20.5 62.5 100
1976 17.7 25.1 57.2 100
1977 17.5 25.4 57.0 100
1978 16.1 23.3 60.5 100
1979 11.8 21.8 66.3 100
Sources: Calculated from Table 5.2 - Estimated Breakdown of
Public and Private Gross Fixed Capital Formation, 1947-
1979 (Cr$ 000 current) - Trebat, Brazil ' s. .
.
, p. 121.
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-distributive nature of the state intervention. Soc.al spending
" education, health systems, public housing, judicial systems ~
fell far behind spending on infrastructure and basic
industries. 76 The shift fro, government spending, including a
larger share of social spending, to spending of the government
through large state enterprises indicated increased capability of
the entrepreneurial sector of the state to decide their own
Table 3.8 reflects the technical indivisibilities and
the percent of total state enterprise investment required to
either implant a whole new industry, as was the case of
petrochemicals, or to expand existing state productive sectors.
TABLE 3
.
8
SECTORAL ALLOCATION OF STATE ENTERPRISE INVESTMENT (%)
SECTORS 1947 1956 65 66-69 70-5 76-9
Steel 34 16 46 4 9 13
Mining 10 8 6 4 6 4
Pet.+ Petrochem 1 52 20 19 21 23
Telecommunic
.
6 9 10
Electric Power 5 13 55 43 40
Railroad (a) 39 12 10 12 12 10
Not Classified 16 7 5
Sources: Arnaldo Werneck "As atividades empresariais do Governo
Federal do Brasil" Revista Brasileira de Economia (1979)
:
105, for 1947-65; Trebat, "An Evaluation..
, op.cit.
.
Appendix C table 43. for 1966-75; Annual Reports of major
firms in each sector, for 1976-79; Trebat, Brazil 's.
.
.
p. 120
.
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Having analyzed the uses and sources of financial and
econcic resources we now turn to the political and institutional
resources controlled by the state entrepreneurial sectors in the
period 1967-74.
The state enterprise action in the electric energy
sector reflected the relative importance of the production of
electricity for the industrial development in this period. A
comprehensive consolidation took place, affecting the more than
two dozen utilities at the state and at the regional levels. ^
Unmatched by other state entrepreneurial sector also was the
degree of financial autonomy, as it can seen from the above
discussion
.
Jose Costa Cavalcanti, first Minister of Mines and
Energy (1967-69) and later Minister of the Interior (1969-74)78
was the central figure in the energy sector's consolidation and
reorganization. As a retired general Costa Cavalcanti was
committed to the military pressures of "permanent occupation" of
the state apparatus in name of the defense of strategic, national
security interests. 79 He was the first president of Itaipu
Binational (1974-85) and was later given the presidency of
Eletrobras (1980-85). Directors at the regional and state-level
subsidiaries and associated companies of Eletrobras were
designated from the regional political supporters of the military
regime and technocrats.
Brazil's abundant hydroelectric potential militated
against using imported oil or coal for domestic energy needs.
Prior experience and the prospects for high profits attracted the
large private national construction firms and the multinational
capital goods firms into the execution of the sweeping
recommendations of the CANAMBRA studies, 80 accounting for a
program of construction of power plants in the South-Central and
southern regions through the mid-1970s. of the institutions
involved in the domestic projects the regional utility Furnas was
central to the generation and transmission energy to the
industrializing South-Central Region. The CANAMBRA studies were
contracted by Furnas since Eletrobras, the electric sector
holding, did not have the resources nor the institutional
strength to underwrite such a study. Eletrobras importance as an
institution was given after its consolidation as the planning and
financial center for articulation of the interests linked to the
electric energy sector. Expansion of the electric sector's
jurisdiction increased its political power and its capacity for
action as more than two dozen associated companies mobilized
federal, regional and state political and economic resources. 81
The Sao Paulo Energy Company (CESP) , the most valuable in terms
of assets, was well accredited and trusted in the international
financial community, commercial banks and multilateral agencies,
and capital goods industries. This capacity enabled CESP to
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pursue a vast program of generation and distribution of electri
energy to the state of Sao Paulo. 82
Domestic projects were complemented with international
projects as well. International negotiations for the Itaipu
project were initiated with Paraguay and Argentina, itaipu
reflected the interests of the technobureaucrats of the electric
sector, based on technical demand studies, but, more importantly,
Itaipu was a project of central importance for the highest level
of planning and decision-making apparatuses of the National
Security Council and the top military brass. The decision to go
ahead with Itaipu was part of the overall advancement of the
national development scheme labelled Brazil Emerging Power
( Brasil-Potencia or Brasil-Grandf^
. The Brazilian-Argentine
rivalry, more rhetorical in nature than it seems, was at a height
with the 1972 imminent return of Peron to Argentina. The
Brazilian military considered Peron another Goulart, but the
Paraguayan Generalissimo Stroessner viewed Peron as a possible
ally, and this worried the Brazilian military. 83 Although
Eletrobras role in the designing of Itaipu was minimal, it is the
Brazilian partner in the Itaipu Binational Entity providing the
US$ 50 million capital. Eletrobras also loaned the Paraguayan
National Electricity Administration (ANDE, Administracion
Nacional de Electricidad ) its share of US$ 50 million in the
partnership. Eletrobras continued its role of procuring funds
for the Itaipu Project.
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The electric energy sector reconciled several
interests, in particular those related with the Itaipu project.
First the national security interest was addressed with a strong
Brazilian presence in the important geopolitical frontier of
Paraguay, Argentina and Brazil where Itaipu was going to the
built. Second, Itaipu and the expansion program of Eletrobras and
its associated companies were congruent with the interests of the
civil construction companies and capital goods industry.
Whereas military security reasons were also behind the
decision to build the Angra I Nuclear Power Plant, this project
also was an important component of the electric energy policy.
Costa e Silva gave the recently created National Commission for
Nuclear Energy (CNEN) and Eletrobras's subsidiary, Furnas, the
responsibility for planning and execution. Medici inherited the
project and in 1971 international bids were made for a project,
won by Westinghouse
.
The planned four-year project (1972-76) --
which was budgeted at US$ 304 million — took until 1983 to be
completed at a cost of US$ 2 billion, and is now operating at 30
percent capacity due to flaws in the equipment design. All cost
overruns were borne by the Brazilian Eletrobras.
The electric power sector and the telecommunications
sector became progressively included on the concerns of the hard-
liners in the central national security agencies. Electric power
was a case of concern since a less than adequate supply would be
considered dangerous to national security, thus an impediment to
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development. Accordingly, the Itaipu Hydroelectric and Angra I
Nuclear Power Plants were decisions made outside the sphere of
electric power sector. The political autonomy of the
telecommunications sector guaranteed financial support for
investment sometimes obstructed by other investment decisions
with greater priority. 84
A similar pattern was followed for sources of funds for
financing the expansion of electric power sector. Only after
1972 could Eletrobras consolidate its position as the electric
sector's financial holding company, when it expanded its control
over resources previously controlled by its subsidiaries. Unlike
the steel sector, the electric sector had access to earmarked
revenues and enjoyed the support from the multilateral agencies.
Furthermore, the nature of the electric power services, atomized
throughout different regions, justified prices high enough to
generate resources for investment. The contribution of the funds
originated from operating surplus and the Sole Tax on Electric
Energy varied in the different years considered during this
period as it can be seen in the Table 3.6.
The telecommunication sector did not rank as high as
electric power as a priority for investment. Data for this sector
are unreliable for this period. Nevertheless, its
institutionalization process with the creation of the Ministry of
Communications and the subsequent modernization of small local
companies, most of which operating with antiquated eguipment,
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signalled the growing political support for the modernization of
the communications sector and the structural changes this
entailed. The restructuring of the communications sector in many
ways resembled the electric sector's restructuring since it also
transformed local and regional utilities into state-owned
enterprises. This reorganization and upgrading included systems
for interurban and international communications, long-distance TV
broadcasting, as well as telex and data transmission installed by
Embratel (Empresa Brasileira de Telecmnunicacoes
. 1965) and
Telebras ( Telecomunicacoes Brasileiras
. 1972).
The political autonomy of the telecommunications
sector was never high despite security-conscious retired military
personnel occupying high level key-positions. 85 Incentives
provided by Embratel and Telebras to the domestic
telecommunication industry to do research and develop equipment
failed to stimulate local technical innovation. Contracts for
telephone systems invariably were given to multinational
telecommunications firms (ITT, Ericsson, Siemens), since they had
technical edge for the supply of the equipment needed.
In the telecommunication sector, between 1965 and 1974
the innumerable small, scattered companies were conglomerated
into twenty-two State companies, all under the umbrella of the
Telebras. Telebras, established in 1972, participated in a
mixed-economy type of capital ownership. The long-distance
telecommunications company, Embratel, was initially established
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in
to implant a modern, technology-intensive network linking the
different regions of the country with international
communications systems. Telebra^ » = *-v,« k i ^ •x ciuc. l i o s, as the holding company, was
charge of funding and promoting research and development of
telephony systems.
Of all state and regional companies, the State of Sao
Paulo's TELESP
( Telecomuni cacoes de Sao Paulo) became the largest
one, rapidly expanding its services. Due to its high
profitability TELESP became a major capital investor in other
state telephone companies alongside Telebras. 86
If the autonomy of the communication utilities was low
that was not the case in the petroleum/petrochemical sector. Its
autonomy can be traced to a systematic reduction of Petrobras's
politicization, carried out from 1964 to 1968. Through this
depoliticization process, Petrobras could fully use its financial
resources on programs related to its entrepreneurial objectives,
totally unencumbered by political clientelism, while greatly
expanding into future growth areas, and thereby augmenting
Petrobras's political power. The growth of the economy after
1968, in particular the surge in the number of automobiles,
trucks and industrial equipment sold, forced the parallel
expansion of gasoline and other oil-derived products up,
affecting Petrobras's long range strategy.
The primacy and the political autonomy of the Petrobras
Group was enhanced by General Ernesto Geisel's nomination as its
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president. He presided over a period in which there was not only
consolidation of the managerial and finanoial functions, but also
an extension into new activities. Geisel
-s tenure as Chief of
the Military Household and as Secretary-General of the National
Security Council (1964-1967) certainly entitled him to implement
Brazilian "security with development- interests in the field of
petroleum and petrochemical policy. Geisel, acting independently
from the political direction of the Minister of Mines and Energy,
Antonio Dias Leite (1969-74), had the political support of the
military and the political leadership to launch Petrobras in
ventures abroad. Petrobras soon became the largest single oil
buyer in the Western world. It also began prospecting and
production in international ventures (Africa and Middle East)
,
while simultaneously engaged in distribution. To generate the
necessary capital for this expansion and diversification
Petrobras initiated the triple alliance with local and
multinational capital in the petrochemical industry. 87
So, under the direction of Geisel (1969-1974),
Petrobras experienced growth and diversification while expanding
its more profitable activities: distribution, refining and
petrochemicals. Distribution of petroleum products by Petrobras,
which was not part of the company's initial operating plans in
1953, was permitted only for governmental organizations in 1962,
but was fully undertaken by 1968. Petrobras Distribuidora — the
subsidiary for distribution — expanded its share in the
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Brazilian fuel market from 12.7 percent in 1967 to 27.5 percent
in 1973.88 Petrobr, s alsQ ^
^
repurchasing two of the private refineries, as already mentioned.
Petrobras associated with a number of multinational and Brazilian
capital in the building of a petrochemical complex in the
Northeastern city of Camacari, state of Bahia. Petroauisa -
Petrobras «s subsidiary for petrochemicals - controlled the
major firms taking up an investment of more than US$ 600 million
between 1970 and 1974, accounting for more than 50 percent of the
total investment in the Petrochemical Pole. 89 The petrochemical
sector was analyzed by Evans, emphasizing its institutional
novelty: the particular tripod form of association among state,
foreign and local capital. 90 Nine medium size firms, out of
total fifteen, were set up with an average investment of US$ 51
million in roughly equal parts from the three sources of
capitals, none having a controlling majority and always with the
state capital being at least equal to foreign capital. Three
smaller firms with an average investment of US$ 20 million were
predominantly of national private ownership.
As in the case of electric power sector, the Sole Tax
on Liquid Fuels (IUCL) was raised directly from the consumers of
petroleum products and this fact made Petrobras claim them as
"self-generated resources." Petrobras 's policies were relatively
more independent from the political direction of the central
state apparatus, in particular because of the efforts in
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depoliticizing and turning the firm more efficient. This was
done in a period of with a high degree of self-financing, what
made it easy to resume investment by 1969, and continue investing
through 1973. Self-finance ratio averaged 60 percent, with 40
percent of its resources made up by earmarked taxes and
government capital subscription. Foreign loans were not
significant in this period, reflecting a high degree of relative
autonomy
.
While the Booz-Allen and Hamilton Report restricted the
autonomy of the state steel and metallurgical sector by
recommending no increase in domestic production, the managerial
leadership of the public and private firms were working out the
details of Plan I of the National Steel Industry (1968-1970),
calling for an expansion of productive facilities. Since the
Brazilian firms were unable to supply the internal market with
adequate amounts of steel, imports supplemented the shortfall at
advantageously low prices, corroborating fears already set in
motion by the Booz-Allen and Hamilton Report that it was of all
interest to Japanese, American and European steel firms to delay
as much as possible the expansion of Brazilian productive
capacity.
Having enjoyed tremendous autonomy in the early years
and in spite of being historically managed by military officers
at the middle and higher strata of the managerial hierarchy, the
steel industry had trouble being recognized as a high priority
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sector by the central government. The favored multinational auto
industry, of which steel products were a significant cost
component, pressured the state to maintain low prices, a goal
that conflicted with the financial needs of the steel sector.
The steel industry was not even provided with a stable and
certain source of financing, such as earmarked revenues, denoting
exactly how it was on the government's list of priorities. Only
after Medici was empowered and his trusted technocrat, Marcus
Vinicius Pratini de Moraes, became Minister of Industry and
Commerce (the ministry controlling steel production and policy-
making) would the steel sector regain the centrality it once had
at the beginning of the industrialization process in the 1940s. 91
The steel industry's process of overcoming its
difficulties imposed by the lack of financial soundness, either
via prices or earmarked tax revenues, led it to stress the
importance of institutionalizing a central agency for the steel
industry. Since the recommendations of the Booz-Allen and
Hamilton Report were difficult to follow, the BNDE formed, in
1967, a Consulting Group for the Steel Industry (GCIS, Grupo
Consultivo da Industria Siderurgica ) , where all segments of the
sector — the governmental agencies, the state enterprises, and
the private companies -- were represented for policy formation.
The Plan I for the Development of the Steel Industry was
assembled, but it still provided no mechanism to acquire autonomy
and to institutionalize a central agency for interest mediation.
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Not surprisingly it provided no way out of the deep crisis since
it maintained the function of providing cheap intermediate input
to auto and housing industry, booming at the end of the 1960s. 92
The difficulty of state and private enterprises in
accumulating enough capital prompted the managers to propose a
permanent site for interest representation in the state, to
offset the threats of denationalization of the sector. But its
adoption only occurred in the Medici term, when the segmented
interests were conglomerated in a corporative-like institution
National Council for the Non-Ferrous and Steel Industry
(CONSIDER)
— for policy formation and planning. As Abranches
notes, Consider's institutionalization was a process where
"institution-building and ideology blend in planning." 93
The establishment of Consider within the Ministry of
Industry and Commerce was followed by the creation of the holding
Siderbras ( Siderurgia Brasileira ) in 1973, both instrumental in
the design of ambitious state steel-making plans. Despite
Siderbras being chartered to be the financial holding for the
steel sector, it could not fully perform its functions since the
pricing and imports policy were subject to negotiations with
other private sector producing and users interests (especially
the auto and housing industries) in other institutions such as
the price control board (CIP) , the tariff policy council (CPA)
,
foreign exchange board (CACEX) , as well as negotiations with
domestic and foreign financial institutions.
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High levels of political resources were also controlled
by the steel sector, and to a lesser extent by the railroad
transportation. Nevertheless, both were unable to readily
translate that political power into policy outputs and into
effective flow of funds needed for investment. The political
resources manipulated by the steel sector, although not as high
as Petrobras's, were sufficient to press for sectoral policies,
after CONSIDER was instituted. The investment in the steel state
firms became subject to political criteria and competition from
foreign companies rather than the usual demand criteria. At the
same time, the sector had to rely on foreign sources of finances
since the sector's sel f-generated resources were insufficient to
finance the Phase II of the Expansion of Steel Industry (1972-
76) . As a result of forceful political negotiations conducted by
the Minister Pratini de Moraes the Inter-American Development
Bank, the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development
made US$ 600 million available in supplier's credits and long-
term loans to the Brazilian steel program, even before knowing
what processes or eguipment were needed for the expansion
program, or who was going to execute it. 94
In the case of state-owned steel mills — CSN,
Usiminas, Cosipa and Acesita -- pricing policies seriously
affected both sel f-f inancing ratio and capital accumulation, as
seen before. Despite prices increases in steel products between
1968 and 1974 they were inadeguate to offset the losses. Foreign
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loans were negotiated after successive delays, enabling the
completion of the Phase I! of the Expansion Plan only in 1976,
after an enormous growth in imports of steel occurred^ The
projected costs of the Phase II, amounting to US S 1.3 billion 47
percent of which were to be provided by the International Bank
for Reconstruction and Development and the Inter American
Development Bank. However, the poor financial record of the steel
companies, coupled with its impossibility of raising prices, made
the multilateral agencies retreat to 30 percent, forcing BNDE and
the Brazilian government to step in and cover the needed
resources
.
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In the mining sector, the centrality of CVRD and its
subsidiaries was due to capacity for generating foreign exchange.
Its political utility as a barrier to the encroachment of the
multinational mining giants. ^ The CVRD conglomerate's polices
were endorsed by the central government which subscribed to
CVRD's improvement program. This program, consisting of the
construction of the port and of the first pellet mill at
Tubarao, State of Espirito Santo, of financing CVRD's expansion
into the activities of shipping and bulk-carrier, and of the
improvement of the railroad used for iron ore transportation into
the Port of Tubarao in the period 1964-67, provided the
conditions for CVRD's improved performance in the boom years.
CVRD interest in extending its markets into the U.S.
coincided with the discovery of Carajas by a U.S. Steel
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subsidiary, u.s Steel had been trying unsuccessfully to get in
the Brazilian steel market - as evident in ^ Qf ^
Booz-Allen and Hamilton Report^ now tried ^ assooiate
itself with CVRD in the exploration of minerals on the Eastern
Amazon. since Carajas was a project linked to the foreign
market, us steel initially controlled strategic decisions of when
to invest. It was waiting to see how technological development
would affect it, deciding to delay investment until when it would
be more profitable. cvrd's struggle to recover decision-making
autonomy coincided with the culmination of the seaborne iron ore
trade, which made the us Steel/CVRD partnership increasingly
unstable as the U.S. company withdrew looking for other markets,
to invest in."
Nevertheless, the CVRD obtained a competitive position
in the expanding international iron ore market, from 1968 to
1973. In this period Brazil's share in iron ore mining was 11
percent of world output. The CVRD alone accounted for 7 percent
of the world's output and 60 percent of Brazil's. The increase
in iron ore production was attributable to increased ocean-borne
trade, together with the emergence of Japanese modern production.
Japanese demand for raw materials gave the CVRD an opportunity to
emerge as a major world supplier. 100 The Minister of Mines and
Energy, Dias Leite (1969-1974), a former CVRD president,
personally negotiated with the Japanese the initial exploration
Carajas's iron reserves and bauxite/alumina project on the
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Eastern AmaZ on. Negotiations in the late 1970 s would change the
nature of the Carajas Program, what win be discussed in the next
section
.
At par with the importance of the mining sector in
generating foreign exchange, CVRD also benefitted from the
designation of its former president, Antonio Dias Leite, as
Minister of Mines and Energy (1969-1974), what gave CVRD prestige
and favored relationship with central power. In the period 1964-
73 CVRD institutionalized 43 associated or subsidiary companies
in iron mining, pellet plant, non-ferrous (aluminum and titanium)
mining, forestry/wood/pulp, phosphates, engineering services,
shipping and marketing, 39 of them only in 1969-73 period, when
Dias Leite was Minister. CVRD consolidated its export-
orientation supplying ores or semi-processed products to more
than twenty countries by 1974. Japan was the largest single
country buying more than a third of the CVRD exports, what
represented, for Japan, more than 12 percent of total iron ore
imported
.
In the period 1967-74 among the major companies
established as subsidiaries and associated to CVRD was the
association with multinational and local capital to explore the
vast iron ore mines of the Greater Carajas Program (Serra dos
Carajas is located in the State of Para, in the Eastern Amazon).
In order to expand its markets abroad, CVRD formed joint-ventures
with Italy, Spain and Japan to implant pellet mills (Itabrasco,
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Hispanobrasco and Nibrasco) to export intermediately processed
ore. in addition, CVRD diversified its mineral activities,
starting to survey and to explore non-ferrous minerals. It also
began projects in other non-mineral activities such as pulp,
paper, fertilizers and phosphates.
With respect to political resources, Petrobras and
CVRD were the state enterprises that displayed highest levels of
political resources, measured by the high degree of freedom in
defining goals and policies. Such political autonomy helped
Petrobras and CVRD impose their decisions on most other state
institutions and the private sector. They became real "states
within the state" 101 in face of their substantial ability to
generate resources needed for their own expansion and
diversification, and their contribution to the economy, as
discussed earlier.
TABLE 3 .
9
STATE ENTERPRISE SELF-FINANCE RATIO
As Percent of Investment, 1966-79
Yrs. Self-Finance
Ratio
Yrs. Self-Finance
Ratio
1966 81 1973 54
1967 56 1974 46
1968 63 1975 35
1969 63 1976 35
1970 59 1977 39
1971 53 1978 37
1972 50 1979 34
Source: From SEST's State Productive Sector (electric power, oil
mining, telecommunications, steel) reports. Railroad
investments were almost totally financed by the multilateral
agencies, World Bank and Inter-American Development Bank.
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Unlike the state steel companies, the mining sector
relied on a 65 percent self-financing ratio for its expansion
during the boom of sea-borne trade of iron ore. Foreign loans
accounted for 22 percent of the investment, while the remainder
was capital subscription. The mining sector could therefore
count on both political and managerial resources to pursue
autonomous policy-making.
D.—Implications and Conclusions
While in the initial years of the period the self-
financing ratio was impressive, complimentary funds were required
when the rapid expansion of the state enterprises began —
averaging an annual increase in investment of 2 3 percent 102
for the period 1968-73. The share represented by self-financing
grew progressively smaller as a result of the greater demand for
resources obligating the firms to seek external sources.
TABLE 3.10
AVERAGES OF SELF-FINANCE RATIO, Selected Years
1966 1967-70 1970-74 1975-79
81.0 60.3 52.4 36.0
Source: Calculated from Trebat, Brazil State-Owned. .
.
.
op. cit
.
, p. 206. Table of Investment and Surplus a
(profits and depreciation allowances) for public
enterprises, 1966-79.
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External sources of financing for the state enterprises
programs included government funds, private equity and domestic
and foreign long tern, loans. Government transfers from the
Treasury, which were estimated at 38 percent in 1 969 by Luciano
Martins^ dropped to^ ^ ^ ^
Trebat.104 Although these .^.^
^ ^
diminishing dependence on Treasury funds, the governmental
transfers took other forms, such as earmarked taxes or capital
subscriptions
.
A similar pattern was followed for sources of funds
financing the expansion of electric power sector. Eletrobras
consolidated its position as the financial holding company for
the sector, expanding its control even over resources previously
controlled by its subsidiaries after 1972. Unlike the steel
sector, the electric sector had access to earmarked revenues and
enjoyed support from the multilateral agencies. The nature of the
electric power services, atomized throughout different regions,
justified prices high enough to generate resources for
investment. The contribution of the funds originated from
operating surplus and the Sole Tax varied as it can be seen in
Table 3.6.
In spite of differences among the mining, steel,
electric power and petroleum sectors, the overall pattern of
finance was divided up between 50 percent self-generated funds
and 50 percent capital subscriptions and long term loans,
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privily foreign loans. This pattern continued through the mid-
1970s until the economic crisis of the 1980s, as it will be seen
next
.
More importantly, the political power of the state to
formulate policies and to expand institutionally the state
sector isolated it from society and made it impermeable to
political demands. This led to a rapid growth of state
intervention and/or action in the associated capitalist
development of Brazil during this period.
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CHAPTER IV
POLITICAL POWER, STATE ACTION AND THE LIMITS OFAUTONOMOUS POLICY-MAKING UNDER WI^CI^SS
A. State Action and Political Pqwpt-
in the Growth Under Duress Period
In this chapter we will analyze state action in Brazil
initially from the political and economic viewpoint, followed by
an analysis of the variable relative state autonomy on selected
policy areas. In this period, we will see how political demands
for liberalization, which included industrial entrepreneurs
demands for government spending policies favoring their interest,
internal bureaucratic power struggles, and pressures from labor
union for better salaries and better working conditions effected
a reduction in relative state autonomy.
1
-
Grandeur Development. Political Liberalization and Economic
Crises. 1974-1985
The year 1974 represents a watershed in the
authoritarian-bureaucratic regime; at this time the first steps
towards liberalization and away from the previous harshly
repressive regime were taken. At the outset of the period,
demarcated by the presidential terms of Generals Ernesto Geisel
(1974-79) and Joao Baptista Figueiredo (1979-1985), it was clear
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that civil society had enough of promises of economic growth to
legitimize an authoritarian state. The government's efforts at
sloganeering and propaganda (
-P^_F^n^_Br^l! and Brazil
^glng^ower) fell on deaf ears. As stated by stepan
...the authoritarian state had failed in its an^nf ^win ideological hegemony in civi! sSciiSyt* P °
The lack of institutionalization of the authoritarian regime, as
described by Samuel HuntingW, strengthened the political
parties and the opposing civil society organizations (The
Brazilian Press Association, the Brazilian Bar Association, the
Church, the Base Ecclesiastical Communities and independent labor
unions). These organizations gained in popularity by continually
stressing the high social costs of the exclusionary social and
economic policies implemented from 1964 to 1974. This public
outcry forced the government to modify its electoral politics.
Although more liberal rules for election, manipulations
of apportionments and of the rules regulating political
advertisement prevented the MDB, later joined by other opposition
parties, from complete victories on the 1974, 1978 and 1982
Congressional and Gubernatorial elections making a significant
difference in the liberalization process. 3 In 1983-1984 the
transition to a civilian government was carefully orchestrated by
moderate politicians and military leaders.
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Geisel presided over the first term of the
liberalization process. As a former president of Petrobras,
Secretary-General of the National Security Council under Castello
Branco, he was, above all, a man acceptable to the bloc-in-power
made up of military hard-1 iners . 4 Geisel 's task of liberalizing
the political regime was considerably more difficult since the
Brazilian state was emerging from a period in which it enjoyed
considerable capacity to mobilize political, institutional and
financial resources and to direct private investment. Before
liberalization, the state was also able to consolidate its own
productive capacities, despite the fact that accelerated economic
growth benefitted the multinational durable-consumer goods and
the capital goods industries. The consolidation of the state
enterprises as well as the state's ability to intervene directly
in the economy were sensibly weakened as the political and
economic crises unraveled in the late 1970s and early 1980s.
Geisel' s "slow, gradual and secure" decompression
project was actually designed by Golbery do Couto e Silva --
notable for his covert campaign to overthrow Goulart and his
creation of the SNI in the 1960s. 5 The political abertura
project was designed to lessen the influence of the Army hard-
liners in Brazilian politics and had the specific objective of
restricting the free-roaming repressive apparatuses, which were,
according to Luciano Martins
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;;;taaon^^g .
t0 C?^r01 thS pities of the regime'sprotagonists including the military hierarchy)
a sorter SS ^t
S
h
°Wn
f
-thod
- ideological criteria, asrt of wi in the regime. 6
But the objectives of the political opening were not
only political. By 1974 the political opening served the purpose
of making possible an economic transformation. It was clear that
to continue economic growth and to achieve international power
status
—
as blueprinted by the military National Security and
Development Doctrine — the Brazilian economy needed to
transform its productive structure of basic and intermediate
inputs, of capital goods, and address the energy question. These
intertwined objectives were translated into the Second National
Development Plan (PND II), promulgated under an already oil-
troubled economy in 1974.
Having strengthened the decision-making power of the
presidency through the creation of the Economic Development
Council, authoritatively ruled by the chief-executive 7
,
Geisel's
response to the 1973-74 economic crisis was to pursue "a maximum
of development possible with a minimum of indispensable
security." 8 This was to be achieved with the execution of large
scale sectoral development projects of the PND II (1975-79)
(Itaipu Hydro-power Plant, Angra I, Nuclear Program, Petroleum
Production, Ferrovia do Acq , Acominas , Expansion of Steel
Industry - Stage III, Greater Carajas Mining and Industrial
Program, Tucurui Hydro-power Plant, Metro systems, Telephone
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Program). These programs, according to the Planning Minister
Joao Paulo dos Reis Velloso and Finance Minister Mario Henrique
Simonsen, were perceived as the solution to critical bottlenecks
hindering national development, and to radically transform
Brazil's industrial profile. The objective was to "cross the
threshold between underdevelopment and development-«9
: to become
a world power.
The policies for the period 1975-79 reflect this
decision for global recognition. The PND II projected large
increases in the installed capacity in the production of
chemicals and non-metallic basic and intermediate goods. The
installed capacity of the steel and metallurgical industry -- in
particular flat-sheet and heavy profiles -- was to increase by
some 220 percent. Heavy capital goods production was projected
to double in those years primarily in order to provide the
equipment and facilities necessary for exploration and production
of domestic oil (a projected increase of 115 percent on the
production of domestic oil after the imported oil-bill went up 45
percent) and for investments made in other energy related
projects. 10 Brazilian energy deficiencies were to be surmounted
with the energy from Itaipu and other regional power plants, as
well as with the energy provided by the power plants built under
the controversial Teuton-Brazilian Nuclear Accord signed in 1975.
Table 4.1 shows some specific PND II 's targets.
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The PND II linked the needs of energy policy to
industrial policy in order to achieve a fully, developed capital
goods sector, articulating the dynamics of interest believed
indispensable to an industrial country by the designers of the
Brasil-Grande7,a Project. After all, if Brazil was to be an
industrial economy it had to be self-sufficient in energy, steel
products, non-ferrous metallurgical products, petroleum and
chemical products, cement, paper and pulp and minerals. Some of
the PND II projects would only mature a decade or two later,
demanding huge amount of investment, not available with internal
savings alone. The outcomes of the PND II policies and projects
varied: some of them became symbols of the unduly optimistic
Grandeza project while others were partially successful. Still
others were frustrated by unforeseen contingencies as it will be
analyzed later in the section of state action and autonomy.
For the PND II designers, unduly optimistic about
Brazilian outlook, there was no need to opt between accelerated
capitalist expansion and containing inflation; incremental
adjustments would take care of changing circumstances. The
Finance Minister Simonsen stated, before 200 entrepreneurs of the
Federation of Industries of the State of Sao Paulo (FIESP) that
with inflation contained and with the relative abundance of
credit it would not be difficult to bypass adverse international
circumstances. For him, the country was, as he stated, "an
island of progress in a world in economic crisis." 11
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TABLE 4 .
1
PRIORITY PROJECTS CONTAINED IN PND II
Sectors
Capital Goods Industry
Total Production (000 t)
Mech and Elt Eqpt (000 t)
Tractors (000 units)
Naval Construction (000 TPB)
Railroad material (000 t)
1974 Forecast
1979
Increase
(%)
2000
898
44
410
122
Steel & Metallurgical Industry
Installed capacity in 000 t
Steel
Aluminium
Copper
Zinc
Chemical industry
Installed capacity in 000 t
3400
1603
84
1140
214
70
70
90
170
75
8600 22300 150
& Heavy Profile 4100 13100 220
Special Steel 4600 8300 80
120 190 50
10 60 500
33 58 76
Sulfuric Acid 986 3380 244
Soda Ash (Barrilha) 273 700 156
Chlorine 212 593 179
Fertilizers 585 1199 105
Thermoplastic Resins 408 891 118
Artificial and Synthetics Fib 176 253 45
Elastomers Synthetic 144 239 66
Detergents 27 75 178
Ethane 343 710 109
Ammonia 268 577 115
(continued next page)
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TABLE 4.1 (cont.)
Intermediary Non-Metallic RnnHs -j nc^i 1M capacity in 000 t
project up to 30.06.76)
Cement
FUip 17130 26190 551547 2860 85Paper
\_> / 2900 20
Minina
iron Ore Production (million t) 60 138 130iron ore Export (million t) 44 98 123Expenditures in Nuclear Minerals
Kesearcn (Cr$ million 1975) 304 660 117
Electric Eneray
Installed Capacity (million KW) 17 . 6 7 8 n
Consumption (million GW/h) 61 107 75
Petroleum
Refining Capacity (000 bbd) 1020 1650 62
Investment in Exploration and
Development of Production in
(Cr$ bn 1975) 2 . 2 8 . 0 264
Total Investment 26 56 115
Source: From Seplan, II PND , pp. 103-4 - Some of the targets
have changed after the issuance of the Plan, in order to increase
production
.
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The Emerging Power project that stemmed out of the
economic policies could only accomplished in tandem with the
implementation of the liberalization process since it required
the acquiescence of society. The liberalization process,
however, included both "systolic" and "diastolic" movements —
using Golbery's analogy between cardiac rhythmic contractions and
dilations and the opening up of the authoritarian regime. That
is, for each political "concession" by the regime or conquest by
the opposition a correspondent and equally significant
authoritarian move on the part of the hard-line would take place.
Below, in Figure 4.1, some examples, chronologically arranged,
depict the style of implementation of the liberalization policy
during Geisel and Figueiredo terms.
The maintenance of political power by the " Geiselista "
group was so paramount for the liberalization process that the
challenge of the hard-liner Sylvio Frota, Army Minister, met with
Geisel' s firmness: Frota was fired, keeping the reins of the
process firmly in Geisel" s grip. 12 The challenge of the hard-
line to Geisel reappeared when Figueiredo was named Geisel'
s
successor, since the hard-line felt Figueiredo could not control
civil society and its increasingly bold demands. The Geisel-
Golbery strategy placated military opposition to abertura by
putting special emergency safeguards measures in place of the
outgoing Institutional Act 5, in January 1979.
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DIASTOLES 1
* Suspension of censorship
prior to printing of
newspapers, 1974.
* 1974 Senate elections: wonby MDB in 16 out 22 states;
MDB made 44% of the Chamber,
and controlled Rio de Janeiro,
Sao Paulo, Rio Grande do Sul
Parana, Acre and Amazonas
State Assemblies.
* Opposition strategy: no
automatic Decree-Laws in view
of government loss of 2/3 of
Chamber, 1975.
* Geisel dismisses General
Ednardo D'Avila Melo,
Commander of II Army, Sao
Paulo, 1976.
* Resurgence of labor and
student movements, 1977.
* Dismissal of Minister of the
Army, General Sylvio Frota,
Oct. 1977.
* 1978 Elections: MDB
increased 4 chairs and won in
a number of State Assemblies.
* Organizations of civil
society - " Estado de Direito "-
campaign (Rule of Law), 1977+.
1/ Minister Golbery's analogy
to cardiac rhythmic
contractions and dilations.
TERM
SYSTOLES 1
* Imprisonment of thejournalists Lourenco Diaferia,
Carlos Garcia, and US Consulm Recife, PE, 1974-5.
* Deprivation of political
mandates of members of
Congress, using the
Institutional Act 5, 1974-78.
* Lei Falcao 2 controlling
electoral and political party
propaganda on radio and on TV
for the 1976 municipal
elections, following the 1974
MDB 1 s victories.
* Imprisonment and death of
Wladimir Herzog and Manuel
Fiel Filho in the confines of
the DOI - Second Army, Sao
Paulo, November 1975 and March
1976.
* Regrouping of hard-line
behind Sylvio Frota, Army
Minister for succession of
Geisel, 1976-77.
* Closing of Congress and
issuance of the Electoral
Package keeping indirect
gubernatorial elections, 1/3
Senators appointed by
government and changing
criterium of proportionality,
April 1977.
2/ Named after Minister of
Justice, Armando Falcao.
FIGURE 4.1 - SELECTED EXAMPLES OF "SYSTOLES" AND
"DIASTOLES", 1974-85.
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FIGUEIREDO TERM
* End of Institutional Act 5,
January 1979.
* Amnesty to exiles, political
prisoners and cassados
,
1979.
* Reorganization of the
political parties, 1979-80.
* Conversations with the
moderates of the Popular Party
begin, 1979-80.
* Strikes and stoppages
tolerated, 1979.
* Chaves, civilian vice-
president, substituted
Figueiredo while he was
undergoing heart-treatment,
1981
.
* Realignment of the Popular
Party with the PMDB, 1982.
* 1982 elections with the
opposition parties (PMDB, PDT)
winning in 10 States,
including the most important.
* Increased politicization of
macroeconomic issues (foreign
debt and IMF's adjustment
policies) , 1983
.
* Presidential elections
articulations. Opposition
working on direct elections or
a moderate candidate for
indirect elections, 1983-84.
* "Diretas-Ja ! " campaign with
mobilization of civil society,
1984
* Indirect election of
Tancredo Neves, with the help
of government party
dissidents
.
FIGURE 4 .
1
* Institution of Emergency
Measures and Safeguards in the
Constitution, 1979.
* Amnesty was also given to
torturers but it did not
reinstate civil and military
personnel, 1979.
* Provocateurs acts in strikes
and demonstrations,
firebombing of newsstands and
letter bomb to Brazilian Bar
Association, 1980-81.
* Crack down on the 200.000-
strike; imprisonment of union
leaders and charge under the
National Security Code, 1980.
* Attentat to a MayDay
Festival resulting the death
of the bomb planters, agents
of the Army's Secret Service,
April 1981.
* Golbery's resignation in
protest of covering up wrong
doings of hard-liners in the
Riocentro case, August 1981.
* Successive Decree-laws
following the IMF adjustment
policies against the wishes of
the congress, with the Federal
District surrounded by troops
under Emergency measures,
1983 .
* Brasilia put under state of
Emergency during vote on the
Dante de Oliveira Amendment
calling for direct
presidential elections in
1984; TV and radio coverage
was censored, and telephone
communications were cut off,
April 1984.
(cont
.
)
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While the soft-line (blandos) military performed the
double strategy of political opening and economic transformation
called for in PND II, Brazilian macroeconomic variables showed
huge trade account deficits, averaging US$ 5.3 billion annually
from 1974 to 1978, largely due to imports on basic inputs, oil
and fuels and capital goods. Brazil was forced to borrow
heavily, not only to finance development projects, but also to
pay for the burgeoning trade deficits. The Brazilian government
accepted the funds aggressively proffered by international
financial capitalist institutions, 13 disregarding future risks.
These risks were soon apparent, despite the decline in
trade deficit and the relative stabilization of inflation at a
plateau of 40 percent annually. A sharp increase in the external
debt from US$ 6 billion in December 1973 to US$ 32 billion in
1978 while terms of trade deteriorated and interest payments
soared (See Table 4.2), placed Brazil's balance of payments in
crisis
.
By 1977 the economic "miracle" of the early 1970s had
ended. Investment policies of PND II projects were reassessed.
Planning Minister Reis Velloso, who had the upper hand in
development policies, lost control of policy-making to Finance
Minister Simonsen. Simonsen implemented an austerity drive --
attempting to curb inflation, cutting investment by Cr$ 40
billion (US$ 2.83 billion), and restricting credit. He kept the
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currency overvalued, stimulating the flow of foreign loans to
improve the debt profile and to rebuild the exhausted
reserves. 14 The austerity drive failed politically and caused
labor strikes and student protests to reappear after 10 years of
repression. Society began to feel uneasy about the impact of the
austerity program. 15
In 1977 Geisel announced the "April Package" calling
off direct gubernatorial elections and specifying further
limitations for the November 1978 elections. The restrictions
were part of restructuring and reorganizing political power since
the most industrial states consistently voted for the opposition
party. The package effected changes in the electoral rules that
guaranteed a pro-government majority in the Senate (by nominating
1/3 of the Senators) and by changing the criteria of
apportionment to favor the peripheral and less industrial states,
more dependent on central government hand-outs.
Workers 's demands were not the only ones voiced in the
years 1977-78. As the balance of payments crisis and high rates
of inflation cut in to the level of investment, PND II projects
were cut back. This set in motion complaints from the private
sector, orchestrated in a campaign condemning the estatizacao of
the economy. Luciano Martins analyzed the campaign revealing its
inherent contradictions. He argues that the private sector
enjoyed the state's demand for goods and services, without which
it would be worse off. The private sector was particularly
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dependent on the state during downturns on the business cycle.
Peter Evans, using a slightly different argumen t, contends that
it was a clear case of mutua i needs and reassurances to maintain
the syste, going. 16 Therefore ^ against ^
state intervention was a fallacy
In spite of some improvement in inflation and the
balance of payment deficit by 1978, during the following years
the Brazilian foreign debt soared, the public deficit grew and
the macroeconomic variables of interest rate, exchange rate and
inflation rate fluctuated. Foreign credit inflow increased
inflation, which went from a plateau of 30-40 percent yearly to
110 percent in 1980 and to a 220-250 percent plateau in 1984.
The public deficit rose from 2.5 percent in 1978 to 6.2 percent
of the GDP in 1982. 17
When Figueiredo came to power for a six-year term in
1979, he had to confront political liberalization (abertura)
which included an amnesty law, return of exiles, reorganization
of political parties, and an increasingly active labor movement.
At the same time Figueiredo maintained the hard-line as an ally,
obtaining the support of the sistema by appointing his Military
Academy colleague, General Walter Pires, as his Army Minister.
The implementation of abertura however proved to be no easy
matter. Golbery, maintained by Figueiredo as his main political
advisor, devised a strategy of dialogue with a "trustworthy"
opposition political party. This "trustworthy" interlocutor of
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the regi.e
- the Popular Party (PP
, P^idp^p^)
,
composed
of moderates from the MDB together with ARENA dissidents - was,
however, only one of a fragmented six-political party system that
emerged from the state sponsored bi-party system after 1979.18
Additional troubles to abertura came from the rise of
interest rates and oil prices in 1979, hitting hard the
vulnerable Brazilian economy, as shown on Table 4.2. First, the
tripling of oil prices in 1979-80 made Brazilian annual
expenditures on oil imports jump from US$ 4 billion in 1978 to
US$ 10 billion in 1980-82. The imported oil represented more
than 1/3 of total imports supplying 80 percent of Brazilian
consumption. Second, as the interest rate soared, 3/4 of the
Brazilian foreign debt were directly affected since it had been
contracted at floating interest rates. As a consequence, the debt
soared from US$ 40.2 in 1979 to US$ 65.6 billion in 1982 and to
US$ 100 billion in 1984. Once again jolted by external events,
Brazil's net interest paid abroad increased from US$ 2.7 billion
in 1978 to US$ 12 billion in 1982. (See Table 4.2).
One of the effects of the disequilibria in the external
accounts was increased demands from the private national firms
for participating in policy-making and decision-making. Despite
the rhetoric that the PND II would strengthen the private
national firms, the plan favored the state firms and the
multinationals. By 1978, the combined forces of the political
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opposition and of the entrepreneurs clamored against government
economic policies and demanded a return to democracy. a group
of Sao Paulo's leading entrepreneurs signed the ManifJ^of_the
light, formally breaking an alliance that existed since the
inception of the military regime. 19 That defied state autonomy
as new policies would increasingly be debated openly in contrast
to an insulated system of decision making. The monopoly of
economic policy making at the National Monetary Council and at
the Economic Development Council was shattered as policy matters
were discussed on news media. 20
Other challenges to the state's political power — the
new independent labor union's strikes, the remaking political
parties and of meeting social demands — were tolerated as part
of the political liberalization agenda of the first year of the
Figueiredo's government. In April 1980, however, when the
economic conditions were rapidly deteriorating, a strike of.
200, 000-metal workers proved to be too much for the military
regime. Leaders of the strike, including Luiz Ignacio da Silva
(Lula)
,
who had already been demoted from the presidency of the
Sao Bernardo Metal Worker's Union by an act of the Minister of
Labor, were imprisoned under the National Security Law.
Following the crackdown on the labor unions, the opponents of
abertura
.
whom Figueiredo had tried to placate in 1979, waged a
terrorist campaign sending a letter-bomb to the Brazilian Bar
Association killing a secretary, and fire-bombing newsstands
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TABLE 4.2
BRAZIL
EXTERNAL ACCOUNTS
,
1972-84
.
(in current US$ million)
1972 1973 1974 1975 1976 1977 1978
Index of
Terms of Trade
Prices Export/
Imports
Base 1977 = 100
Exports 3,991
Imports
Fuels & Lub. 469
Capital Goods 1,734
Basic Inputs 1,291
TOTAL IMPORTS 4,232
Net Interests
Payments
Net Foreign Debt 5,283
Avg. Interest Rate na
Deficit in Current
Accounts -241
95
6, 199
769
2
,
142
1,993
6, 192
6, 156
na
7
78
7
,
951
2
,
962
3
,
119
4
,
664
12,641
-652
11, 897
na
-7, 123
76
8, 670
3
, 100
3
,
934
3
,
595
12 ,210
-1, 498
17 , 131
na
-6,701
85
10, 128
3
,
841
3
,
619
3
, 140
12 , 383
-1, 810
19, 492
na
-6, 017
100
12
,
120
4
,
081
3
, 101
3
,
202
12 , 023
-2 , 104
24 , 782
na
-4 , 037
87
12 , 659
4 ,483
3
,
552
3
,
286
13 , 683
-2
, 696
31 , 616
na
-6,015
(continued next page)
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TABLE 4.2 (cont.)
Avg
.
1973/78
1979 1980 1981 1982 1983 1984
Index of Terms
of Trade Prices
Export/Imports 87 79 65. 3 55. 3 53 . 7 53
. 6 58
Exports 9, 621 15, 244 20, 132 23
,
680 20, 182 21,900 27 , 005
Imports
Fuels & Lub.
Cap. Goods
Basic Ipts
3 ,206
3
,
244
3 ,313
6,
3,
4,
773
775
160
10, 200
4
,
381
5, 010
11,
4,
3,
339
023
796
10, 457
3, 272
3
,
048
8
, 607
2
,
505
2, 141
7,330
2
,
200
2
,
059
TOTAL IMPORTS 11,522 17, 961 22 , 955 22
,
086 19, 396 15, 428 13,937
Net Interests
Payments 1,976 -5, 347
-7,457 - 10, 305 - 12,550 -
-10,263 -
-10
, 076
Net Frgn.Debt 18,503
Avg. Int. Rate 15.2
40,
16
215
.9
46, 934
18.5
53,
21
904
.9
65, 659
23 . 3
76,756
15. 6
76, 673
13 . 1
Deficit in
Cur Acts -5
,
276 10, 741 -12 , 807 -11 ,717 -16, 310
-6,837 166
Coniuntura Economic^ January 1986, p. 112; Boletim
Banco Central do Brasil. a) Avg. interest rate =
Net interest paid/net foreign debt, year before;
c) Exchange rate does not consider incentives to
export and import tariffs (what would be the
effective rate) ; d) Base 1977 = 100.
na - not available.
In current US$ million.
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which sold Progressive/Radical publications. The hard-line
realized that the political process escaped their control,
therefore their tactic was to frighten the most outspoken
organizations pushing for abertura - the lawyers association and
the media.
The ultimate hard-line terrorist act occurred on April
30, 1981. Two Army Information Center (CIEx, Centre de
Informacoes do Exercito
) agents - the Army Secret Service -
were presumably preparing to plant a bomb set to go off during
the next days
• s Festival. Inadvertently, the bomb exploded,
killing one of the two Army agents. The mass panic, stampeding,
and inevitable deaths that would certainly have occurred during
the festival were averted. But even so, the Army quickly
released a condemnation of the "leftist terrorist attack
[against the Army]. "21 The cover _up was so sweeping tnat even
top military brass attended the sergeant's funeral. Despite all
the public relations maneuvering most Brazilian were convinced
that this was a hard-liners' last desperate attempt to stop the
political liberalization.
The intensity of the provocations and terrorism of the
hard-line was contained but the abertura process was once more in
jeopardy. Golbery wanted a thorough investigation, with well-
publicized prosecution against the officers involved. To prevent
exposure of the military officers ultimately responsible for
planing the terrorist act, the hard-liners, represented by the
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Head of the SNI, General Octavxo Aguiar de Medeiros, pressured
Figueiredo to disregard Golbery's advise. Figueiredo
-s
reluctance to prosecute those responsible, regardless of who they
were, led to Golbery-s resignation as the main political
coordinator of the Figueiredo government in August 1981.
Nevertheless, Golbery's liberalization strategy was
absorbed, transformed, and advanced by society so, in reality,
Golbery-s resignation had the effect of putting the hard-liners
on the defensive. Another loss of political power for the hard-
liners was their inability to prevent the civilian Vice-president
Chaves from replacing Figueiredo in September and October 1981,
when the President underwent heart surgery. The times had
certainly changed since 1969 when the civilian Vice-president
Pedro Aleixo's claims to the presidency were ignored on the
occasion of Costa e Silva's stroke and death.
In 1981, economic recession hit Brazil after 15 years
of continuous growth. As important as both oil crises may have
been, at that time debt servicing was more damaging than oil
outlays. As Brazilian exports -- aided by export incentives —
grew by more than 50 percent in the 1979-80 period, oil imports
rose more than 70 percent due to the deterioration of the terms
of trade. The trade deficit reached US$ 2.8 billion in 1980.
Oil imports represented more than 55 percent of total imports by
1983, but they declined thereafter, partly due to the increase in
domestic production and partly to increased use of sugar-cane
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alcohol as a fuel, replacing 20 percent of domestic oil
consumption, interest parents were combined with the high
service rates on new short term loans, taken to avoid stopping
development projects. Resources were draining away, including
the seemingly high reserves at the end of l 978 (US$ u billion)
which were quickly dissipated in oil payments and debt servicing.
The economic team in the Figueiredo Administration,
with Simonsen as the Secretary of Planning, recommended
deceleration of the economy. m 1974, simonsen and Velloso had
chosen not to deactivate the economy because it was important to
maintain the entrepreneurs' drive and engage them in the
restructuring of the basic, intermediate and capital goods
industries. 22 The 1974 plan had been to "attack the problem of
capitalist development at the root with a long lasting solution,
not just a transitory solution to the petroleum crisis. "23 In
1979, however, the economy was already growing slowly, and those
investment programs which continued after 1977 were going to be
continued as priority projects. The second oil shock, however,
prompted Simonsen's call, in July 1979, for a recession and a
"wartime economy. "24 A wave Qf worker , s str ikes and criticisms
from the Sao Paulo entrepreneurs ensued. As a demonstration of
the growing weakness of the central state, with respect to the
private entrepreneurs demands, Simonsen was replaced by Delfim
Netto soon thereafter.
169
Deifies resumption of control over economic policy for
the second time was cheered by the P^t, entrepreneurs. He
refused to accept recession, extinguished a few of the heterodox
instruments of foreign trade ~ such as prior depQsits ^
restrictive similarity criteria for imports - and then
maxidevalued the currency. Del fim , s expansionary policies tried
to maintain the public support needed for the ongoing
liberalization process. 25 Nevertheless, one year later they
resulted in inflation of over 100 percent (1980), the
dilapidation of reserves and a surge in short term debt. 26
Delfim was not living up to the entrepreneur's expectations and
he was forced to retreat. He then introduced orthodox measures
interrupting 15 years of continued expansion and growth dating to
1966. The man who began the "miracle," ended it by setting a
deep recession in motion. Investment dwindled as the credibility
of the government collapsed and the outward transfer of resources
(the excess of the trade balance plus nonfactor services)
increased from 0.4 percent of the GDP in 1980 to 5 percent of GDP
in 1983. As stated by Batista Junior
The outward transfer of resources effected in 1981-83
was much more significant as a proportion of domestic
output than the inward transfer in the 1960s and 1970s.Thus in contrast to what had happened up to 1978, the
rate of gross fixed capital formation fell continuously
from 27.9 percent in 1974-78 to 16.4 percent in
1984 . 27
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The high degree of relative state autonomy of ten years
earlier had turned into dependence on the private banks and
IMF-mandated adjustment program that sgueezed salaries and wages
As these new forces occupied the political arena, adjustment
Policies put into effect by decree-laws worsened the social and
economic conditions of the working classes.
The 1981-83 economic recession was a dramatic
experience to Brazilian society, which was used to a growth
economy. For the government Ministers, though, it was different.
Delfim claimed that going to the IMF in early 1983 and adopting
the IMF monitoring of the economy was responsible for the 8
percent growth in GNP and the US$ 13 billion export surplus in
the Brazilian recovery of 1984, thus ignoring the deep social and
political consequences of the adjustment program. As Delfim said
"!aS n
^
ces
^
ry to do this economic adjustment. It wasdone and with success. I proudly claim that for
/S S°Sn ^ WaS d°ne ' the Productive systemwas put to work and unemployment rapidly returned toformer levels, showing that the economy does reallv
respond to commands. 2 « y
The social costs of the adjustment were evident by 1984
and the political system had been responding accordingly.
Although the 1982 elections were one of the cleanest ever, they
were subject to manipulations, much as happened in 1978. In
October 1981, the government created the sub-leaenda artifice, by
which a party could have more than one candidate for governor and
their votes would be coined in the benefit of the front-runner
This proposal was defeated in Congress with the help of 10
dissident PDS-Deputies. According to a National Information
Service (SNI) report, there were strong possibilities for a
sweeping opposition victory in most gubernatorial races. 29 This
information coupled with the defeat of the s^^ prompted
another governmental "November 1981 Package,- which included
mandatory straight-ticket voting and prohibited party
coalitions. Geisel
- although out of power still an
authoritative figure - made statements during an interview
indicative of the limits placed upon the liberalization process,
and the limited opposition tolerated by the military. He stated,
The opposition is not obligated to oppose [sic]. Thefirst role of the politician is to negotiate and theopposition was intransigent as if it dominated thegovernment, with a power that it does not have. Thatis why the government, using its majority, reacted. inclear Portuguese: they have exposed themselves to theprinciple of Physics: to each action corresponds anequal and opposite reaction. 30
The Popular Party (PP) responded to this last "package"
by rejoining the PMDB, setting in motion a series of alliances
between PP moderates and PMDB "authentic" (historic MDB
opposition politicians). The PDS regained the ability to push
recessive economic policies through Congress by coopting the new
PTB a party dominated by the Planning Minister Delfim Netto
and his Paulista supporters. 31 The quorum for Constitutional
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agents was again raised to 2/3 of the Congress and the 1985
Presidential Electoral College was reshaped to favor the PDS
candidate. These were precautionary measures taken in view of
the prospect of a sweeping victory of the opposition candidates
in the November 1982 elections for governor.
As the 1981-83 recession evolved, civil society reacted
with demonstrations, strikes and looting. Business leaders
produced manifestos attacking government policies. This
discontent was dampened by the expectations created by the
upcoming 1982 gubernatorial and general elections. While the
1982 elections were a decisive test of the process of political
liberalization, the economic recession provided the backdrop for
increased demands on the state from organized groups. 32
The turnout confirmed the opposition's voting strength
but it was not matched by actual seats occupied in Congress.
While the opposition parties received a combined 70 percent of
the total vote, the PDS maintained its majority in the Senate and
in the electoral college, due in large part to the senators
appointed in 1978 and to tampering with apportionments. In the
Chamber, the PDS lost its majority but it could still win crucial
votes with the help of PTB
.
In the mayoral and gubernatorial
races, the government hopes of making elections more "localized"
and getting voters to support local PDS candidates proved to be a
success: the PDS recorded nine victories in the Northeast, a
region accustomed to patronage. Altogether, the PDS won thirteen
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gubernatorial races. In the other regions the strength of the
candidates emerging from the fusion of the PP and PMDB forced the
"located" strategy to fail
, since lt was ^ ^ Qf ^^
that pulled the vote. A new political power distribution emerged
from the elections. The opposition had gained a political base,
in the three states won by the PMDB ticket (Sao Paulo, Minas
Gerais and Parana), the number of mayors grew from 91 to 740.
Among the nine PMDB elected governors, three were from the most
important states. 33 The change in poliUcal power^^
the 1982 election, when even PCS governors, supposedly government
supporters, turned against Figueiredo's policies. In two very
important cases, the governors of Pernambuco and Santa Catarina
supported direct presidential elections in 1984 and a Constituent
Assembly
.
Delfim's economic adjustment, scheduled to begin right
after the elections in order to avoid greater political losses,
was responsible for an increase in unemployment and a fall in
real salaries and wages throughout 1983. Adopting the IMF
prescription and monitoring of the economy, Delfim cut
investments, postponed programs — such as the Nuclear Program —
while adopting a maxi-devaluation to spur exports. This, in
turn, caused the capital goods industry to squirm under the
prospects of continued losses. it was a break of the political
commitment to sustained growth which caused the state to lose the
support of the entrepreneurial classes, especially the industrial
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and Paulista coalition, who turned their back on th.11 o K e governinent
and its recessive policies, with the uncertainty about the
future of direct elections or who the opposition candidate would
be, the entrepreneurial classes pressed more demands on the state
at the end of 1983
. However, as Bresser Pereira points out
piiiw'of thVutOT,OT>y of the economicu_L_Lcy or the state was stronqlv reduced Th 0 e 4. a L .
The new political reality meant that the government
would not be able simply to impose its will on the states. The
strengthening of the local and state level executives forced
negotiations at the federal level, especially concerning the
policies needed to implement the IMF stabilization plan in
December 1982. As a consequence, Figueiredo's political power
and decision-making capacity diminished after the 1981-83
recession, the elections and the cresting of the debt crisis.
Figueiredo's inability to lead and Delfim's discredit as an
economic policy-maker fomented disunity and contradictions, even
among high officials. The question of succession reflected this:
Figueiredo's lukewarm support for his Minister of the Interior
Mario Andreazza was paralleled by plans to make the then head of
the SNI, General Octavio Medeiros, the PDS candidate. 35
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F.gueiredo even toyed with a strategy to prolong his government
for one year with the promise of a direot presidential eleotion
in 1 986 . None of these options wQrked s . nce
Minister Mario Andreazza, and vioe-president Aureliano Chaves
stubbornly maintained their oandidaoies. This disunity was
bluntly rebuffed by the Minister of Sooial Welfare, Helio
Beltrao, who resigned in protest at government policies. The
crisis of governance of the last two years of the military regime
was deepened by adherence to IMF-recommended recessive economic
policies, while the transition to civilian government was being
negotiated. 36
The political power of the hard-line subsequently
diminished with exposures of corruption, together with
Congressional investigations and press reports of illicit
activities by the top-echelon military security apparatus of the
state
— including an alleged assassination. 37 Moreover, state
political inability was clear when a demonstration staged by
50,000 middle-echelon state enterprise employees marched against
the IMF and government wage policies in June 1983, in the first
Brazilian public service strike ever. 38
By the end of 1983, Minas Gerais Governor Tancredo
Neves (PMDB) made a political accord with the Mineiro Vice-
president Aureliano Chaves in which they promised support for the
man who could get the nomination of his party. Tancredo made a
second deal with Deputy Ulysses Guimaraes, PMDB National
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president and historic oDDonpnt ofpp e the military regime, that if
the Dante de Oliveira Amendment - calling for direct
presidential election - was ratified, Tancredo would support
Ulysses's candidacy for President. But if it was not, then
Ulysses would support Tancredo in the indirect election in the
electoral College. Tancredo was also seen by the military as the
civilian capable of making the transition without major ruptures.
That is, of avoiding the risks of a direct election in which
unpalatable candidates had a major chance of winning and of
avoiding lawsuits against the military involved in the
repression, as in Argentina. 39
During the first four months of 1984, the Brazilian
political scene was dominated by a civil society-centered
movement — the "Direct Presidential Election, Now!
--campaign
( Diretas-Ja )
.
Hundreds of thousands took to the streets of most
state capitals. Despite its massive popularity, the Dante de
Oliveira Amendment failed to achieve a two thirds majority by 22
votes. This was due in part to a government campaign against the
amendment, which included placing Brasilia and the vicinity under
a State of Military Emergency, prohibiting the PDS dissident
mayors and local representatives from lobbying PDS Deputies,
censorship of live radio and television coverage of the voting in
Congress, and economic pressure on PDS dissidents by the Minister
of Planning, who threatened to cut off funds to the states and
regions of those voting against the government. 40 In June, soon
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after the defeat, in June, negotiations began with the dissident
top-echelon of the PDS: the former president of the PDS, Jose
Sarney, and the PDS leader in the Senate, Marco Maciel, together
with Vice-president Aureliano Chaves. The dissidents formed the
Democratic Alliance between the Liberal Front (a "party" formed
by PDS dissidents) and the PMDB and formalized the Tancredo
Neves-Jose Sarney presidential ticket. Paulo Maluf, the PDS • s
choice as presidential candidate, was defeated in the Electoral
College in January 1985.
The first phase of the transition process was thus
complete. The second phase — represented by the incoming
administration, however, — was troubled from the start. Tancredo
Neves fell ill on the eve of his inauguration, and died six weeks
later, on April 21, 1985.
Although these political events represented the end of
an era of a centralized authoritarian military regime they did
not mean the military's complete withdrawal from Brazilian
politics, nor the end of the centralized authoritarian mode of
policy-making. Tancredo Neves' s moderation and his pact with the
regime's party dissidents and with moderate military leaders
assured the transition to civilian government but not the
economic and social transformations promised in the Diretas-Ja
1
campaign
.
The themes we have covered in this section can now be
brought together to reveal the role of state autonomy during the
178
abertura process. Geisel's coming to the presidency coincided
with the end of the favorable economic conditions during which
the "miracle" occurred. His decision to proceed further with
development projects was an option that raised criticisms and
limited state autonomy from industrial and financial fragments of
national and foreign capital. The absence of a cogent economic
policy at the beginning of Figueiredo's term, — Simonsen's stop,
Delfim's go and stop again) left Brazil on the verge of a balance
of payments crisis in September 1982, provoking IMF demands and
negotiations with private Japanese, North American and European
banks. As a result of that process of recessive adjustment,
terms of trade deteriorated, new loans were cut off, domestic
industrial production dropped with capital goods production
plunging more than 40 percent in 1982 41
,
unemployment soared and
a series of economic indicators began to signal a deep recession
in the Brazilian economy.
The entrepreneurial class — progressively more
sympathetic to opposition ideas in the period 1977-78 — were in
dismay by 1984, protesting against corrupt government officials
and policies that impoverished Brazilian society, resulting in
violence, unemployment and criminality. 42 More importantly the
promises of abertura could only be kept within a context of
legitimacy which, with Tancredo's death, lingered even more
ominously. Early in 1984, Cristovam Buarque stated,
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employment in SSFS ^£nS ^^in^ ^
perform these four things together. As the IMF
prxncio?^
minlSte
S
ing acc°r<3ing to outdated
?^te?n»J "7
eVe
"
for the lon3 term interests of the
SSS^i^tS'^.SS1* sections will
We have seen how political power shifted from the
centralized, repressive, authoritarian regime, with exclusionary
policies of the Medici era to a dictabland, during the Figueiredo
term, despite all attempts by the hard-liners to control and
direct the elections and political liberalization. We have seen
how the relative autonomy of the state to formulate and adopt
economic development policies diminished in view of political
power shifts. The form of the Brazilian transition, with few
ruptures between a civilian government and the military continued
tutelage of the political system. Nevertheless, its effect over
specific policy areas are worth analyzing. This is our next
task.
2
• State Action and Autonomy in the Growth cum Debt Period:
Grandiose Projects and the Crisis
Having presented the political and economic background,
we will now analyze state action and autonomy in this period.
The bulk of state action with respect to the production of
electric power, oil, steel, iron-ore and other products and
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services ttok place within the state enterprises, which decided
upon and implemented a number of large sectoral programs. The
institutional arenas of the state enterprises, their regulatory
agencies and the sectoral councils (Figures 3.1, 3.2) became the
centers of policy mediation within the state.
The dynamics of interests and the patterns of state
enterprise action observed in this period differ significantly
from those observed in the "growth cum repression- period. In
general, government objectives were constrained by increased
demands consequent upon political liberalization and the
deterioration of economic conditions. while in the growth cum
repression, period the state enterprises strived for autonomous
growth and for a role as providers of the low-cost inputs needed
for the good performance of the durable consumer goods industry,
in the 1974-85 decade state enterprises were called upon to
implement the sectoral programs of the Second National
Development Plan (PND II, 1974-79). This modified strategy
turned the state enterprises into real policy instruments,
despite the fact that, by 1977, some PND II sectoral programs had
been discontinued, or their objectives re-evaluated. Yet some of
the state-owned enterprises sectoral programs -- whose policies
could have made a substantial difference in development plans and
whose decision-makers were in a position to mobilize strong
political support — continued their role as promoters of long
term development strategies. Notwithstanding these efforts, all
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state-owned enterprises were unable to prevent the growing use of
their flexible entrepreneurial structures and economic strength
to accomplish the short term macroeconomic objectives of the
Brazilian state, such as borrowing foreign currency to solve
balance of payment problems or keeping demand high for capital
and intermediate goods, therefore loosing state autonomy.
State enterprises also functioned as political escape-
valves, providing at least 8,000 highly-paid positions to retired
military and to other Brazilian elites. ^ Clientelism in state-
owned enterprises created a political Gordian knot for the post-
1985 transition period - that is, how to defuse a powerful state
enterprise bureaucratic machinery dominated by privilege,
corruption and inefficiency. Different trends influenced the
pattern of state enterprise action during the PND II period.
First, clientelistic relationships were exacerbated as Brazilian
and foreign suppliers, contractors and other groups, were favored
with special contract clauses, special market reserves,
subsidies, exemptions and fiscal incentives, as the case of
Tucurui illustrates. Secondly, some of the initial objectives of
the PND II proved untenable and unrealistic as the situation
required the use of financially healthy state enterprises to
borrow abroad in order to solve short-term macroeconomic
problems. Consequently, by 1985, state enterprises found
themselves in a position of economic disarray, financial
indebtedness and political distress, mistrusted by both Brazilian
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society and the private sector, former beneficiary of its
actions
.
The state enterprises relative autonomy was frequently
hampered by government objective of curbing inflation. To do
that, the government maintained public prices and rates down to
avoid inflationary pressures, as shown in Table 4.7, that
influenced negatively the financial autonomy and profitability of
the state enterprises. Government made efforts to control
unchecked state-owned enterprise spending - especially with the
creation of the Secretariat of state Enterprises Control (SEST,
Secretaria de Control e da^_Estatais ) in 1979. However, these
efforts were not sufficient to hold the pressures from the
private sector to continue grandiose projects. Unending project
cost-overruns forced the government to allocate capital
investment beyond the limits imposed by the central planning
agencies, thus increasing the public debt. At the same time, the
state enterprises decision-makers continued having enough
discretion to define investments in development projects, thus
defending their own interests regardless of the availability of
resources or the real need for the project. On the one hand,
the private sector demanded increased spending but, on the other
hand, it furthered demands towards a more democratic rule.
The year of 1974 witnessed important policy shifts,
when Geisel adopted a set of specific policies designed to
tackle the incipient state of the basic input and capital goods
industries, and the need to meet national energy reguirements
, in
both the electrio power and transportation fuel, pressing
problems which demanded "an imperious and unavoidable
resolution," as stated by the principal architect of the PND II,
Planning Minister Reis Velloso. 45
The PND II- s objective of transforming the Brazilian
economy was aimed at legitimizing Brazil's claim as a world
power, what was in conformity with the principles of National
Security Doctrine. Policy-makers wanted the PND II's "second
import-substitution industrialization phase" to implant capital
goods industries, stimulating the national private sector in an
all-out effort to cross the threshold between development and
underdevelopment
.
But there were problems. Not conforming to the state's
efforts to adapt the Brazilian economy to the new world reality,
the durable consumer goods industry still believed that it
deserved incentives and credits of the so-called "miracle years."
Therefore, it barely complied with the reorganization of the
economy, and countered the new policies with much foot-dragging.
Conversely, the BNDE strengthened its institutional structure to
meet the new requirements of Brazilian basic industries, of the
mechanical industry and of participating in the stock of
Brazilian firms that took part in the execution of the PND II
goals. BNDE ' s new subsidiaries -- FIBASE, EMBRAMEC, and IBRASA
— became the major financial sources for the firms executing the
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objectives of the PND 11.46 Jn ^ ^ .^.^.^
change, a major decision-making arena was formed, centralizing
decisions in the President's office, through the Economic
Development Council (CDE, C^hoje^^
Presided over by Geisel, the CDE was the central decision-making
agency, coordinating policies already discussed by the National
Monetary Council, the Industrial Development Council, and other
specific sectoral policy councils. CDE worked in tandem with the
high-level strategic and tactical decision-making process of the
National Security Council. In most cases, the CDE was the
central locus of decision-making, being
formally what the CMN had informally been in the 1969-
74 period, the supreme decision-making site for
economic deliberation. 47
The CDE's decisions were aimed at changing the thrust
of the industrialization process and providing the huge
investments required. However, those decisions were taken in the
context of worldwide recession and the resulting cyclical
reversion of internal growth. These decisions involved new
policies aimed at increasing the production of capital goods,
basic and intermediate inputs — steel and non-ferrous metals,
petroleum/petrochemicals, fertilizers and phosphates, and
minerals, while reducing imports on these items which accounted
for 61.6 percent of total imports for the year 1974. 48 The
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production increase in those items was highly energy-intensive
which increased the electric power demand. These pressures
forced decisions about the implementation of large-scale energy
programs, both hydroelectric and nuclear.
The PND II decision also involved other related
aspects: industrial deconcentrat ion
,
integration of peripheral
regions to the core of Brazil's more developed states, and
international relations, specifically trade.
The PND II
i
8 energy, mining and industrial projects
were accompanied by a decision to deconcentrate regionally, in
order to achieve one of the critical goals of the National
integration Program (PIN): the integration of the Eastern Amazon
and Western Frontiers, which is a National Security Doctrine's
objective. Asserting control over the vast, sparsely populated
Brazilian territories was the way the military found to confront
the attraction that the Amazon's profit potential exerted on
international interests. it is not surprising that PND II
included large-scale regional infrastructure (electric power
plants, railroads, urban development projects) in addition to
industrial projects, as a way of simultaneously achieving
development, national integration and security objectives.
Policy-makers sought industrial deconcentrat ion to
avoid the political consequences of having a concentrated and
powerful industrial labor force in the State of Sao Paulo and
other Southeastern industrial states. These states were a
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stronghold for MDB votes in th P iq 7 ^e 1974 election, and would continue
to be in other elections as well. 49
The PND II policies were also directly linked to
international relations. Domestic development policy -
industrial, energy and mineral policies
-, overlapped with
foreign policy. Brazilian-Paraguayan-Argentine regional economic
and geopolitical concerns guided the Itaipu decision, while
international investment and the export of mineral and
industrialized products were instrumental in the Tucurui decision
-- the largest state infrastructure project within the regional
development framework of the Greater Carajas Program. These two
projects will be discussed in detail on chapters V and VI. m
the case of nuclear policy, Brazil's Accord with West Germany had
international repercussions which pitted the Geisel government
against the Carter Administration. In the case of oil supply,
Brazil strived to maintain good relations with the Arab and OPEC-
member countries by engaging in a foreign policy of "responsible
pragmatism." This included an anti-Zionist vote in the United
Nations in 1975, Petrobras's exploration in oil-producing
countries, Brazilian construction firms executing extensive civil
works in Arab and other oil-producing countries, and selling arms
to Arab countries — all of which was aimed at guaranteeing the
supply of oil for internal Brazilian consumption.
Yet the majority of the funds needed to finance the
projects had to be borrowed, thus contributing significantly to
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the debt crisis of the 1980s. Foreign sources of funding -
private commercial banks, multilateral agencies - by far
outweighed the internal sources of development financing. 50 As
a consequence, most of the economic and social policies after
the 1982 debt crisis were conditioned by decisions made by the
IMF, multilateral agencies and foreign private banks. Therefore
large investment pursued to further national security and
development objectives paradoxically have undermined
sovereignty .
"
One of Geisel's objectives was to shift away from the
relatively large participation by multinational corporations in
the economy to a greater involvement of the state and of the
domestic private sector in national development in furtherance of
the historical autarkic trends. Severe Gomes, a nationalist
Paulista entrepreneur, was named Minister of Industry and
Commerce, signalling that the Brazilian private sector's time had
arrived. He strived to implement policies encouraging the
domestic private sector to participate in large scale development
projects, 51 later corroborated by Velloso,
the government directed its entire incentive system to
the sectors considered of highest priority, thus
utilizing the entire range of available BNDE incentive
mechanisms, in addition to other exceptional measures.
52
This strategy entailed not only accumulating favors and
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incentives but also pressuring entrepreneurs for more ambitious
expansion. As Velloso said
SSrt 10n? Council of Non-Ferrous Metals and
Council %lt7X°^ERl 9aVe thS EC0n°mic development
sSc£ I lIS } 1St ° f Pro^cts, we realized thatu h a ist was incapable of giving Brazil self-
ba^
1?^!?' l^' Und6r my advice < CONSIDER had to go
crow?*
GfrePreneurs ^ ask them to design largerP
*°l °}S "' We were g01^ back to talk to Ermiriowith Alcoa, with Alcan, to see if they would go beyondthe expansion already programmed. And, likewise inmany sectors, we convoked [sic] the entrepreneurs toenlarge a few projects. This was the case in the paperand pulp industries. 53 ^
Nevertheless the call for private sector participation
was soon offset by the government's use of its own state
enterprises to implement the Plan. In the short period between
1974 and 1975, 54 new state enterprises were created,
diversifying and expanding state-owned enterprise. 54 As Lessa
pointed out, "the PND II put large state enterprises at the
center stage of industrialization" 55 since the gargantuan
investments of the state enterprise systems (Eletrobras + state
Electric Power Companies + Itaipu Binational, Nuclebras,
Petrobras, Siderbras, Telebras, CVRD, and others) were strategic
in generating enough demand to the private sectors to compensate
for the cyclical downturn of the economy. In reality, after the
1977 cuts and re-evaluations of PND II's policies, only such
large scale long maturation projects as Carajas, Itaipu and
Tucurui were maintained at full scale, not only for their long
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maturation period into the 1990s hn+- piyyu , but also for the interests they
mobilized
.
56
Intense negotiations between the state and private
sector re-evaluated most of the PND II projects, particularly
after the effects of the US$ 30 billion-hiatus of resources in
the period 1974-78 (See Table 4.2 - External Accounts) aggravated
inflation, interest rates and other macroeconomic variables.
Notwithstanding cuts and these negotiations, most investment were
channelled to electric and nuclear energy, to selected industrial
sectors, and to mining; the capital goods demanded by these
development projects prevented an earlier deep recession. The
continued interventionist role of the Brazilian state was
candidly expressed by Velloso:
If you want to act entirely within the market systemthe present conditions of the Brazilian economy... ywill not have the private sector in steel-making, infertilizers, in petrochemicals, in non-ferrous
metallurgy, etc... 57
For Velloso the core of the problem was to apply existing
resources to sectors that were vital to Brazilian economic
development and at the same time resolve the balance of payments
deficit. Yet the government response was more government
incentives to low direct return and long maturation sectors. 58
A sector by sector analysis shows that the energy
sector had the most consistent flow of financing and the most
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consistent political power support, although that was not readily
translated into autonomous policy action. Table 4.3 depicts the
trends of state enterprise investment. Petrobras investment were
initially directed to petrochemicals, and in the early 1980s to
producing off-shore petroleum. Eletrobras investments (including
Itaipu Binacional and State Concessionaires) sustained investment
in the late 1970s but these crumbled with the 1982 debt crisis.
Likewise the state steel sector invested heavily in the late
1970s, but suffered the consequences when it had to repay without
an internal or external market to absorb productive capacity.
The mining sector (CVRD) sustained its growth throughout the
period largely by diversifying activities (pulp and paper,
fertilizers, non-ferrous metallurgy) and by the political support
given to the Greater Carajas Program for its export component.
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TABLE 4 . 3
STATE ENTREPRENEURIAL GROUP INVESTMENTS (Cr$ billion - base 1980)
1974 197 5 1976 1977 1978 1979
Petrobras 8 0.4 101.6 97.6 99.6 101.1 102.3
E
ItaIpu"
S an<3 142
- 8 18 °- 5 201
- 4 225
-* "4
. 4 253.3
State Utilities
Nuclebras
14 . 3
Siderbras 46.2 59.4 46.9 58.6 88.2 134.7
Transportation
DNER, RFF
,
Portobras, Metro
Ferrovia do Ago
Telecommunications
Telebras- Embratel
& state concesio-
naries
CVRD Group 21.7 18.0 28.7 23.7 3.2 12 6holding, Docenave
Cenibra, Valesul
Albras, Alunorte
Sources: Reports from the companies 1974-79.
SEST, Relatorios 1980-84. Deflated by igp-di,
Coniuntura Economica
. 1980.
average exchange rate: Cr$/US$ 52.70
(continued next page)
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TABLE 4
. 3 (cont.
)
1 Q d r\x y o u 1981 1982 1983 1984
Petrobras 117
. 6 150.9 180. 2 133
. 6 110
. 6
Eletrobras
Itaipu
State Utilities
107
.
4 8
48
.
1
Qo
9
101.2
"7 1 c;/ ± . D
78
. 6
94 . 8
65.9
85.1
67 .
51 .
53 .
8
9
7
10. 0
24 . 6
56.9
Nuclebras 7 . 6 19 . 8 25.7 21
.
4 18 . 7
Siderbras 113
. 2 94 . 2 68 . 3 37
. 4 16 fiX \J * o
Transportation
DNER
,
RFF,
Portobras, Metro
Ferrovia do Ago
87 . 6 80 . 2 64
. 2 55. 9 41.8
Telecommunications
Telebras- Embratel
& state concesio-
naries
55 . 3 57
. 5 65. 2 50 . 1 46.3
CVRD Group
holding, Docenave
Cenibra, Valesul
Albras, Alunorte
26. 2 45.0 54 . 1 31. 3 36.9
Sources: Reports from the companies 1974-84. SEST, Relatorios
1980-84
.
Deflated by igp-di, Conjuntura Economica .
1980 average exchange rate: Cr$/US$ 52.70
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TABLE 4.4
GROWTH RATE IN STATE ENTERPRISE
INVESTMENT, 1975-1984, %
Petrobras
Eletrobras and
Itaipu
State Utilities
Nuclebras
Siderbras
Transportation
Telecommunications
CVRD Group
1975
26.4
26.4
-17
. 0
1976
-3
. 9
11.6
28.6 -20.9
1977
2 . 1
11.8
24 . 8
1978 1979
1.5
13 . 0
50. 5
1 . 2
-0.4
52 . 7
59.2 -17.3 -17.3 -35.7
Source: Calculated from State Entrepreneurial
Group Investment, Table 4.3.
(continued next page)
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TABLE 4.4 (cont.)
1980 1981 1982 1983 1984
Petrobras 14 . 9 28 . 3 19
. 4 -25. 8 -17
. 2
Eletrobras and
Itaipu
State Utilities
-19
. 1 -5.
46.
60.
5
5
7
-6.
-7
.
8
3
8
3
-28
-21
-36
5
2
9
-85
-52
5
2
6
9
Nuclebras
-49
. 9 160
. 5 29 8 -16 7 -12 6
Siderbras
-15
. 9 -16
. 8 -27 5 -45 2 -55 6
Transportation
-8
. 4 -19 9 -12 9 -25 2
Telecommunications 3 . 9 13 4 -23 1 -7 6
CVRD Group 107 . 9 71 . 7 20 . 2 -65 3 17 . 9
Calculated from State Entrepreneurial Group
Investment
,
Table 4.3.
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*—ine case * of-Electrical Energy and Petroleum
In this section we will analyze how the 1974
quadrupling of oil prices induced policy-makers to pay renewed
attention to energy policy. m so doing we will evaluate the
relative political and financial autonomy of the state
enterprises involved in the hydroelectric and nuclear power
projects and petroleum and transportation sectors.
1
"
EleGtrica]
^
nPrrTY ' Hydroelectric and Nuclear Power Policy
The Eletrobras system (regional and state level firms
plus Itaipu) was coming out of a period of high relative state
autonomy (1967-73). In the 1974-79 period, Eletrobras was in the
thick of energy politics: Itaipu Binational involved
historically troublesome relations with Argentina and Paraguay,
in addition to highly politicized relations with particular
fractions of capitalist interests and political power centers.
The decision to invest in the Northeast during Geisel's term
stemmed politically from the fact that two former Northeastern
Governors were the Eletrobras 's President, Antonio Carlos
Magalhaes, of Bahia, and the Director of Coordination, Colonel
Cesar Cals (retired), of Ceara. Both were powerful and gained
Geisel's trust with respect to projects and priorities.
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As an illustration of the high-powered politics of the
electric power sector, when Figueiredo was chosen to succeed
Geisel, he wanted to guarantee that the upcoming 1982
gubernatorial elections would be controlled by trustworthy
regional state leaders. Anton.o Carlos Magalhaes emerged as his
choice to be State Governor of Bahia in the 1978 indirect
election. Cesar Cals was elected Senator indirectly, under the
April 1977 Package, and was subsequently appointed Minister of
Mines and Energy (1979-85). Figueiredo also kept General Costa
Cavalcanti (retired) as the powerful General-director of Itaipu
Binational, by then entering its critical phase. As part of a
regional political compromise, Mauricio Schulman was nominated
president of Eletrobras at the indication of the new Governor of
Parana, Ney Braga (1979-1983) - who had been Geisel "a Minister
of Education, a critical area in those years of political
opening. Despite Geisel's support to Braga and Schulman, in a
mere 18 months Cals and Schulman were at odds with each other.
Schulman's priorities (development of coal-fired power plants
favoring his Southern regional interests) collided with central
government priorities. The President, the National Security
Council and the Ministry of Mines and Energy (Cesar Cals) were
only interested in maintaining highly visible and political
projects. Eletrobras, pressed by financial difficulties, was
ordered to make an additional 15 percent cut in its budget for
Fiscal-Year 1980, shifting investment to Itaipu, Tucurui and to
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the Nuclear Program. Schulman challenged Cals's decision and
also confronted the powerful Planning Minister, Delfim Netto.
Schulman succumbed to pressures and was replaced by Costa
Cavalcanti, who held both offices during the remaining five years
of Figueiredo's term. According to government logic, Costa
Cavalcanti
-s appointment was only natural since Itaipu
investments had the highest priority, given its international
(Paraguayan partners, equipment purchases, loans) and national
commitments, 5 9 as will be analyzed in Chapter V.
The change in command at Eletrobras was not entirely
accepted by Nuclebras and nuclear energy supporters. Costa
Cavalcanti 'a defense of hydro-projects coupled with the serious
political, financial and technical difficulties the Nuclear
Program as a whole faced, were enough to entice a heated defense
of the Program by the president of the National Nuclear Energy
Council, Rex Nazareth and by the president of Nuclebras, Paulo
Nogueira Batista. 60
Although Eletrobras" s political autonomy vis-a-vis
central government was maintained by Costa Cavalcanti' s efforts,
as the 1981-83 economic crisis deepened, Eletrobras 's financial
autonomy suffered severely. While self-generated resources were
most important in the 1970-74 period, loans supplied the major
portion of the investments done in this sector for the 1974-85
period, reaching 93.7 percent in 1984, as shown in Table 4.5.
Electricity rates were constantly used to curb inflation, sharply
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reducing the volume of self-generated resources, according to
Table 4.7. As resources from the Treasury also diminished,
Eletrobras. economic potential was exploited in getting foreign
loans that were also used for other expenditures and for
amortization and servicing of previously incurred debt. 61
Beginning in 1981, self-generated resources were
insufficient to pay for current expenditures, therefore other
resources from government allocations, reserves and plain
emissions were made in order to compensate for the lack of
resources even to pay personnel and financial obligations. On
the other tables of Sources and Uses of Funds, negative numbers
also show this fact. Sel f
-generated funds accounting for 34.7 in
1980 had to be covered by Other Resources from Government
Allocation to offset the lack of Net Sel f-Generated resources to
pay for current personnel and supplies expenditures. The most
troublesome year was 1983 when 45.5 percent of expenditures were
covered by Government Allocation.
Eletrobras action dwindled as loans dried up,
reflecting the deep-rooted crisis of the economy. The most
important state sector during the 1970s diminished its
investments reaching a crucial low point in the 1980s. As an
Eletrobras official stated
From the financial point of view the present situation
of the electric energy sector is that of a firm going
out-of-business
.
62
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TABLE 4.5
BRAZIL
ELETROBRAS
SOURCES 1980 1981 1982 1983 1984 1985 1986
SELF-GRTD
NSG
OtRes
38
34
4
9
7
2
39.
-16.
56
3
9
3
33
.
-25.
58 .
0
2
2
37 .
-45.
83 .
6
5
2
5.
-42
.
47 .
2
6
8
15.
-22
.
38
7
5
3
29
-11
40
7
2
9
GVT TRSRY 6 9 14 4 5 . 2 4 . 0 1
.
1 0 9 16 2
CRDT OPTS
Int
54 1 46
3
3
9
61.
4 .
8
1
58 .
10.
4
2
93 .
2 .
7
3
83
5
3
7
54
1
0
4Ext 42 4 57 7 48 2 91 4 77 6 52 6
USES
CAP EXPTS 100
. 0 100 0 100 0 100 0 100 0 100 0 100 0
*invst 64 2 60 1 58 . 4 57 5 57 . 3 47 3 34 0
*amtzn 14 1 14 3 15 .4 27 6 22 2 31 9 45 2
Int 6 0 2 . 6 6 . 5 1 .9 5 4 9 5
Ext 8 . 3 12 . 8 21 . 1 20 . 3 26 5 35 7
*other 21 . 7 25 . 6 26 . 2 14 .9 17 . 5 20 . 8 20 8
Source: SEST, Relatorio
. various years
Eletrobras, Relatorio
. various years
Percentage from Total Resources.
GLOSSARY:
SELF-GRTD
NSG
OtRes
GVT TRSRY
CRDT OPTS
Int
Ext
CAP EXPTS
*invst
*amtzn
Int
Ext
Self-Generated Resources = NSG+OtRes
Net Self-Generated/Total Resources
Other Resources (Reserves, Govt allocation)/Total Resource
Funds allocated from Federal, State or Municipal
Government/Total Resources
Funds allocated from Credit Operations/Total Resources
Credit institutions within Brazil
Credit institutions abroad
Capital Expenditures = invst+amtzn
Investments as percentage of Capital Expenditures
Amortization as percentage of Capital Expenditures
To credit institutions within Brazil
To Credit institutions abroad
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OBSERVATION
from SEST and Scate^ntrprlsfReports
63 HTcT Calculatedfrom where it was calculated is: accounting equation
minus
equal
plus
equal
plus
plus
equal
minus
equal
Resources Self-Generated
Current Expenditures
Net Self-Generated Resources
Other Resources
Own Resources for Investment
Treasury Resources
Credit Operations
TOTAL RESOURCES
Capital Expenditures
investments
*amortization
*other
Variation of the Available
Resources
+
+
RSG
CE
NSG
OtRes
ORFI
Trsy
CrOp
TOTRES
CapExp
*inv
*amtz
*oth
VarAva
The negative percentage appearing in all tables referto u
l
e of Other Resources to offset the lack of own resources topay for current expenses (personnel, interests, etc.)
The values above 100 percent reflect amounts over and
above Total Resources taken to offset lack of financial
resources
.
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Although investment made during the 1960s and 1970s doubled
generating capacity every five years, in the absence of new
investment severe electric power shortages in the 1990s
areexpected. No new foreign loans were obtained since 1983 and
even a World Bank loan has been consistently denied in view of
environmental non-compliance on the part of Eletrobras projects,
contributing to the demise of the political and financial
autonomy it once enjoyed. 63
The political and financial autonomy of the nuclear
power sector varied along this decade. it enjoyed high degrees
of autonomy since most decisions were not subject to scrutiny and
the implementation process could count on vast resources, both
accountable and unaccountable. As political liberalization and
financial crisis hit, the nuclear policy lost much of its
autonomy. We will examine how this process took place.
Brazilian nuclear policy, which began in the 1950s, 64
gained momentum only in 1967 when the hard-line military regime
was in power. This regime freely maneuvered unaccountable funds,
in view of a silenced Congress. The military became convinced
that only through building a nuclear power plant could Brazil
reach nuclear capacity. By abstaining from signing the 1968 Non-
Proliferation Treaty, Brazil, together with twenty other
countries, signaled their intention of developing nuclear
technology free from abiding legislation, what coincided with
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hard-line military interests in purchasing a .'turn-key., reactor
from Westinghouse (Angra-I), to be built near Angra dos Reis, 100
miles south of Rio de Janeiro. This was a decision taken
independent from Eletrobras, essentially formed at the National
Nuclear Energy Council (CNEN) and the CBTA (Companhia Bj^sjleira
de Tecnologia Atomica
) , precursor of Nuclebras. 65
Despite this independent decision, the actual
autonomous development of nuclear capacity was endangered by the
United States
•» reluctance in supplying enriched uranium.
Brazilian scientists warned that dependence on the U.S. uranium
supply would make the whole nuclear development program
vulnerable to U.S. interests. 66 m 1971, a Brazil-U.S. agreement
on fuel supply was reached; after that, Westinghouse was awarded
the international bidding for Angra-I, a 625-MW plant budgeted at
US$ 304 million and to be built between 1972 and 1976, but only
finished in 1983. Furnas, the Eletrobras subsidiary, can only
operate it at 30 percent capacity due to technical flaws, making
the final cost of US$ 1.8 billion a very expensive US$ 10,000 per
kilowatt. 67
Brazil's definitive commitment to nuclear energy came
with the adoption of the Nuclear Program. Nuclebras ( Empresas
Nucleares Brasi leiras ) — which resulted from the transformation
of CBTA in 1974 — implemented the Nuclear Program based on the
Brazil-West Germany Accord. The Nuclear Program is seen as one
of the most typical examples of the grandiose PND II 's projects,
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since by mastering the nuclear cycle Brazil-s authoritarian
pclicy makers intended achieving the prestigious Emerging Power
status for the country.
Nuclebras was created as an autonomous jurisdiction,
separate from the energy bureaucracy of the Ministry of Mines and
Energy and Eletrobras, which opposed development of the nuclear
energy program. within the Brazilian government, the supporters
of the Nuclear Program were the National Security Council, the
President Geisel, the military, the Minister of Mines and Energy,
Shigeaki Ueki
,
and the diplomatic community. The diplomat Paulo
Nogueira Batista who had served in Bonn previously and was later
appointed the president of Nuclebras, was that Accord's main
negotiator. 68 The signing of the Teuton-Brazilian Accord in
June 1975 initiated this controversial program, whose original
cost was US$ 10 billion, and proposed the construction of eight
nuclear power plants generating 10,000 MW. Two of these — Angra
II and III — were expected to operate by 1982 and 1983,
respectively, while the others were to be phased in throughout
the 1990s. 69 This program spent several billion dollars over
the years but has not generated a single kilowatt. 70
Brazilian military nuclear supporters envisioned
dominating the full cycle of nuclear technology, from mining and
"yellow cake" conversion to enrichment and reprocessing of
irradiated fuel, from manufacturing eguipment to building nuclear
power plants. In 1975, the U.S. refused to supply a joint
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Brazilian-Argentine uranium reprocessing plant, even under
international supervision, thus raising Brazilian expectations
with respect to autonomous reprocessing . 7 1 Even though the
strategy of the Nuclear Program was formulated by the General
Secretariat of the National Security Council viewing electric
power and military applications , 72 Nuclebras officials and the
military believed that its implementation would provide enough
kn°W h °W for Brazil to ^ve the capacity to build a technically
sound reactor and a commercially competitive power plants for
domestic and foreign markets. This is why the military spillover
was crucial: the military gave their political support to the
nuclear program in exchange for development of their own military
capacity. That was the nexus and the power blood-line that
continued allocating resources to the Program.
The euphoric climate at the signing of the Accord
overwhelmed criticism voiced by the Brazilian nuclear physicists
and researchers, concerned with the unproven "jet-nozzle" uranium
enrichment technology 73 and with the per kilowatt cost of
generating nuclear energy. Compared to Itaipu's cost (US$ 1,400
per kilowatt), the nuclear kilowatt would cost more than double
this, at US$ 2, 900. 74
Notwithstanding criticisms, resources allocations to
the Nuclear Program endured with a series of intentional and
errors and decoys. They were repeatedly made by the central
government -- which forced Eletrobras to modify its studies of
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potential energy developments
~, to justify nuclear policy, thus
reflecting the power and cohesion behind Brazilian nuclear
policy. Both when the Accord was signed and when the Piano 3 990
was drawn up by Eletrobras in !978 75., hydroelectric potential
was underestimated at lis million KW (Nuclear Accnr-H IP.., and
150 million KW (PJLano_JJ)90, 1978) while demand was bloated to
180-200 million KW.76 This demand forecast was re _evaluated tQ
115 million KW 77 with a hydropower potential Qf 213 minion ^
( Plan ° 2000
'
1982 )' considering the potential of the Amazon
Region, once the Nuclear Program and Nuclebras had lost primacy.
This manipulation of forecasts was noted and the whole program
came under fire at a 1978 Parliamentary Commission of Inquiry
which had no power to enforce its recommendations.
Furthermore, the tense dispute between American and
German nuclear manufacturers and the debate between U.S.
President, Jimmy Carter, and West Germany's Chancellor, Helmut
Schmidt, reflected the importance of the matter to the profits
and security interests of central countries. The Germans were
willing to carry Brazil to the "El Dorado of Nuclear
Sufficiency," provided Brazil guaranteed the supply of 20 percent
of the enriched uranium coming out of the Resende enrichment
plant to West German power plants. 78 In order to implement that
part of the program, West Germany transferred uranium mining
technology . 79 Besides Kraftwerk Union (KWU) and others in the
nuclear industry, West Germany's banks and financial firms were
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fond of Brazil as a client - a country eager to grow and be part
of the Atomic Club
-, and thus provided generous loans and
financing. That political autonomy vis-a-vis U.S. interests
developed into tense relations between Brazil and the U.S. 80
During the years 1976-79 period, the Nuclear Program's
announced autonomy effectively decreased. URENCO — a Dutch,
British, and German consortium supplying uranium enrichment
technology
— acceded to the Carter Administration demands of not
transferring it without safeguards. in addition, Germans and
Brazilians struggled to control decisions and substantive policy
at NUCLEN — the engineering subsidiary --, and at NUCLEP -- the
heavy equipment manufacturing plant. Germans severely limited
Brazilian power to decide the program's direction. 81
In addition to German hindrance on Nuclebras's
autonomy, the Brazilian private contractor, Construtora Norberto
Odebrecht
,
also influenced the implementation of the Nuclear
Program. First, Construtora Odebrecht
,
already on the site
constructing the Angra I for Furnas, was awarded the civil
construction without a formal bidding process with the argument
that its experience could not be matched. Second, this company
grew when Antonio Carlos Magalhaes was sequentially Mayor of
Salvador, Bahia (1966-70) and Governor of Bahia (1970-74);
therefore the company had a powerfull ally while A.C. Magalhaes
was Eletrobras's president, despite the rivalry between Nuclebras
and Eletrobras. An example of the low autonomy of the nuclear
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sector with respect to this private contractor is that despite
geological problems - a shifting bed-rock at the Itaorna Beach,
-- construction continued unabated. Construtora od*hr^h* added
240-additional foundation pilings to the construction, at a cost
of US$ 90 million dollars and a two year time overrun. 82
Nevertheless, in 1979 the Nuclear Program's autonomy
regained momentum when Figueiredo established the Parallel
Nuclear Program under the responsibility of the military. This
program, developed basically at the Technological Aerospace
Center (CTA, Centro Tecnoloaico Aeroes^acial ) , at the Nuclear
Energy and Research Institute (IPEN, Instituto de Pesguisag
Energeticas e Nucleares ) in Sao Paulo, and the Navy facility in
Ipero, SP, involved enrichment of uranium with a proven, economic
ultracentrifuge technology , 8 3 in contrast to the unproven
technology of the Accord.
As of 1979, nuclear cooperation with Argentina was
included as part of the Brazil-Argentina treaty on the different
heights of the hydro-power plants on the Parana River (see
chapter V). 84 For the first time, the two countries
participated amicably in the development of sensitive technology,
after mutual mistrust had marked relations between the two Armed
Forces. In November 1983 right before Raul Alfonsin came to
power, Argentina announced that enriched uranium at percentages
high enough to manufacture the bomb had been achieved, prompting
the Brazilian military to make a concerted effort to rush the
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Parallel Program forward. Although the Nuclear Program for
electric power generation was de-emphasized after 1982,
unaccountable expenditures continued to be made.B5 Nogueira
Batista's strong defense of the Program at the Superior School of
War, where the program could receive political support, further
revealed the military character of the Program. Clearly the
military, the National Security Council and the SNI exerted
hegemonic control over decisions concerning the nuclear area.
Nogueira Batista was so conscious of this hegemony that, when
asked in an interview at the end of a ESG conference whether or
not the bomb was going to be built, he replied
I am a civilian, a diplomat, and I work for Nuclebras
with peaceful ends. I cannot define whether the bombis going to be made. This is a military problem 86
As military hegemony over the program prevailed, the
"community of information," the hard-liners part of the
information systems in the Armed Forces and at SNI, became
involved in the administration of the SNI and the Parallel
Nuclear program. General Octavio Medeiros, the powerful head of
the SNI, appointed Colonel Francisco Araripe, a hard-liner linked
to the repressive apparatuses of the 1960s and 1970s, as the
"czar of the Parallel Nuclear Program," in a demonstration of the
political power played by the military in order to conduct the
secretive, militarized program.
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Despite all secrets, the results of the Parallel
Program seeded dismal to Brazilian physicists. Even though the
military announced that it was possible to make the bomb poor
results in enriching uranium were obtained. As stated by Borisas
CTimberis
,
found i\Ti
C
AelVi SST' nUClSar fUSi °n and Brazil hasr a a th rd way to the atom: nuclear fiction. 87
By 1984 the Brazilian nuclear endeavor was fully
committed to the mastery of nuclear technology while the
construction of Angra II and III power plants were temporarily
paralyzed for lack of resources. 88 with the improvement of long
distance transmission technology, transporting the Amazon hydro-
power potential became increasingly less expensive, thus denying
justification to the expensive Nuclear Program. 89
Demonstrating how premature any evaluation of Brazilian
nuclear policy was, despite the increasing scarcity of resources,
the Parallel Program continued untouched and the Armed Forces 's
announcement, in August 1987, that Brazilian could make the bomb
demonstrated the high political autonomy of the military in
respect to nuclear policy for military applications. On the
other hand, the Goiania cesium-accident only a month later,
showed Brazil's unreadiness in dealing with radioactive
materials. This concern was voiced by the president of the
Brazilian Society for the Progress of Science, Enio Candotti,
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an tttrZt megalomania"^ ^ ^J*™*' " would belaunched with slingshots
A\fomic bomb "nnot be
of submarines, rockets a nil
pr"uPP°ses the existence
attack and of response' " °? ° £ dete=tion, of
expenditures in'S^ange SWfflxSS'aSSW
We have seen how the military exerted their political
power to direct the Nuclear Program to fulfill military needs in
a higher degree than civilian uses of nuclear energy. We have
TABLE 4.6
BRAZIL
NUCLEBRAS
SOURCES AND USES OF FUNDS, (%)
SOURCES 1980 1981 1982 1983 1984 1985 1986
SELF-GRTD
NSG
OtRes
-57
. 9
-57
. 9
-20.2
-20.3
0.1
-24
. 7
-37
. 8
13 . 0
-43.9
-44
. 3
0.4
-71.1
-71.7
0.5
-86.9
-87
. 6
0.7
-73
. 3
-75
. 6
2 . 2
GVT TRSRY 54 . 7 67 . 7 47
. 6 32.4 21.9 10 . 7 22 . 9
CRDT OPTS 103 . 1 52 . 5 77
. 1 111 . 5 149
. 3 176. 3 150.4
Int
Ext
0.8
51 . 7
1 . 4
75.7
1 . 2
110.3
0.7
148 . 6
1.0
175. 3
0.1
150. 3
USES
CAP EXPTS
*invst
*amtzn
Int
Ext
87 . 6
12 . 4
86.4
13 . 4
9 . 9
3 . 5
94 . 5
5.2
1.3
3 . 9
93
. 4
6.5
0.7
5.8
82 . 7
17 . 1
0.3
16 . 8
75.8
24 . 2
0.4
23.8
51.9
48 . 1
0. 1
48 . 0
Source: SEST, Relatorio
,
various years. Nuclebras, Relatorio
. various
years. Percentage from Total Resources. See Glossary, p. 199
and Observation, p. 200 for explanation on negative numbers.
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seen how Nucleus's capacity to formulate and implement nuclear
policy was hindered by international and national private
interests. Future research on the Brazilian nuclear policy might
indicate
.ore detailed policy outco.es and the implications of
the political power surrounding the policy. with respect to the
available financial information we can conclude from Table 4.6
above that the great majority of the funds used by the Nuclear
Program came from borrowing abroad.
2
• Petroleum and Alcohol
During the 1974-85 decade, the Brazilian petroleum
sector was twice faced with oil price and supply problems. The
1974 and 1979 increases of oil prices caused a severe oil import
crisis which prompted Petrobras into shifting investments from
profitable petrochemicals, refining and distribution activities
to oil production. Petrobras 's share of investments in oil
production gradually rose to 70 percent in 1980 and reached 95
percent in 1984. 91
Petrobras financial autonomy continued high, mainly
because its prices were kept in line with reality, as shown in
Table 4. 7. 92 Despite capacity to generate surplus funding for
investment, Petrobras only committed itself to oil production
after oil prices caused panic and prompted Geisel to go on
national TV to announce the signing of risk contracts with
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foreign oil companies. in addition u, Petrobras needed knowledge
about potential off-shore fields," and, at the same time,
Petrobras could organize exploration abroad in oil-rich
countries. The Brazilian oil state enterprise also exchanged oil
production for development services and arms sales in the Middle
East countries through its trading subsidiary, Interbras. with
this action, Petrobras recognized that low cost oil was a thing
of the past and the fact that Brazil's transportation system
relied on petroleum by-products demanded new alternatives to
avoid the collapse of supply. 94
Petrobras political autonomy to decide its own policies
diminished as the second oil shock (1979-80) forced the
Figueiredo government to consider oil production among its
highest priorities. Diminishing the dependence on imported oil
was as crucial as exploring abroad. However, the negative
experience of Braspetro — Petrobras 's subsidiary for foreign
production activities — in Iraq provided enough incentive to
step-up domestic production. Braspetro began exploring for oil
in Iraq in 1976 and discovered Majnoon, a gigantic oil field,
shortly thereafter. Under the contract, Brazil could exchange
Majnoon oil at discount prices for development projects executed
there. However, Iraq unilaterally changed the contract to favor
its nationalist interest of guaranteeing oil revenue. In
addition, Iraq forced the exchange of oil for Brazilian weapons
and light armored vehicles. This arrangement worked out until
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TABLE 4.7
PRICE INDEXES
-
EVOLUTION OF REAL PRICES, 1978-1985
Eletrical
Petroleum Energy Steel
Railroad
Services Telephone
Postal
Services
1978
1979
1980
1981
1982
1983
1984
1985*
100
115
112
138
138
143
137
128
100
90
80
75
72
61
61
48
100
78
69
74
72
63
71
26
na
na
100
93
95
77
69
75
100
95
73
55
52
40
38
45
100
90
77
79
81
60
44
na
Source
:
fT
epla?' Proieto do I pnd d* NoVa Republica pQp*- 1QpfMNovember 1985, p. 37~ l^TcIIc^ted with data rf^' the
P^Sffi^^ Eletrobras, Siderbras , Zebras ,
Seplan
'
sLt
98
^!^ 031^^ f?OT Ind6X ° f Real ^ices/GDP
Ratals -
S
^ fiB UU^o do Desemp.nho da,
na - not available.
the Iran-Iraq war broke out after which the oil supply became
problematic. Iraq's oil supply to Brazil became even more
troublesome after the January 1980 Iraqi-Brazilian agreement for
the supply of natural and enriched uranium from Brazilian nuclear
facility to the French-supplied Iraqi nuclear power plant, in
return for an oil supply of 400,000-bbd during 13 years. When
the Iraq-Iran war broke out in September 1980 and the nuclear
plant was bombed by an Israeli raid, the commercial agreement
between Brazil-Iraq was broken.
214
The oil crisis forced Brazil to adopt risk contracts, a
commercial relationship between the state and multinational
companies different from the old concession system that offered
few guarantees, was inefficient and violated sovereignty
.
^
Caught between maintaining a monopoly or producing enough oil
domestically, Petrobras invited the multinational companies
reluctant to invest in Arab and other oil-rich nationalist
countries to sign risk contracts. Petrobras only granted risk
contracts to multinationals in potential areas where Petrobras
could not technologically explore. Petrobras made use of the
greater technological capacity of the multinationals in order to
learn more about Brazilian geology and triple production after
heavily investing in off-shore fields. 96
When Brazil spent US$ 10 billion importing oil in the
previous four years (Table 4.2), Figueiredo gave top priority to
oil production. When he entered office in 1979, Petrobras was
importing 1 million bbd and was was producing 171,000 bbd
domestically. In two years prices increased from US$ 18 to US$
31 per barrel, forcing Petrobras to invest in domestic oil
production
.
97
Petrobras autonomy contrasted with that of the Alcohol
Program. Petrobras kept the prices of oil and its by-products at
realistic levels, thus generating enough resources to maintain
its investment program in off-shore drilling and production, as
shown in Table 4.8. Most of Petrobras policy decisions were
taken with political autoncy vis-a-vis private interests.
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TABLE 4.8
BRAZIL
PETROBRAS
SOURCES AND USES OF FUNDS (*)
SOURCES 1980 1981 1982 1983 1984 1985 1986
SELF-GRTD
NSG
OtRes
81.1
80 . 5
0.6
71.1
68 . 5
2 . 6
97
. 9
79 . 2
18 . 8
41.1
37
. 0
4 . 1
103 . 5
101 . 1
2 . 4
99
. 1
79
. 0
20.0
109
. 2
100
. 4
8.8
GVT TRSRY 2 . 8 2 . 1 0.4 0.3 0.1 0.1 0.4
CRDT OPTS
Int
Ext
16. 1
3 . 5
12 . 6
26.8
5.6
21.1
1.6
0. 1
1
. 5
58
. 6
7
. 1
51.5
-3.5
-1
. 0
-2
. 5
0.8
0.1
0.7
-9
. 6
-0.4
-9
. 2
USES
CAP EXPTS
* invst
*amtzn
Int
Ext
*other
Source
:
100 . 0
88 . 1
3 . 9
8 . 0
100 . 0
88 . 9
4 .
1.
3 .
6 .
100. 0
88
. 8
5.3
1 . 2
4 . 1
5 . 9
100
. 0
83 . 2
11.2
2 . 9
8 . 3
5.6
100 . 0
77 . 0
17
3
13
6
100 . 0
76.6
17
3
14
6
SEST, Relatorio
.
various years. Petrobras,
Relat6rio
y various years. Percentage from Total
Resources, excluded current expenses. See Glossary,
p. 199 and Observation, p. 200 for explanation on
negative numbers.
100
76
14
3
11
9
Quite the opposite occurred with alcohol policy: the
interests of the Brazilian sugar cane industry were influential
in proposing sugar cane-based alcohol as a substitute for
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gasoline, despite increased internal oil production. The AJconol
Program (Pro^alcool)
- a program run by several institutions
instead of a single state enterprise - seemed an innovative
approach to a pressing problem. The political interests of the
sugar/alcohol sector were more important in the definition of the
program than just the technical decisions taken to substitute
gasoline for alcohol as fuel. 98
With changes in the international structure of sugar
production and of sugar consumption, prices plummeted, trapping
the Brazilian sugar cane planters and sugar and alcohol producers
in the middle of a crisis, after a two-year bonanza in 1974-5.
The first phase (1976-80) contained many intra-agency disputes
for preeminence on the Alcohol Program. The private interests,
clustered around the Sugar and Alcohol Institute (IAA) pressed
demands (subsidies and preferential tax treatment) in an old-
fashioned corporatist-like mechanism of interest representation.
In this manner, the channels of communication between the
centralized state and the agrarian interests began to operate on
the basis of electoral politics. The economic power of the sugar
cane growers ands their vote potential, especially those in the
Northeast, became a factor in the then upcoming elections.
Castro Santos identified the Ministries of Industry and
Commerce (MIC)
,
Mines and Energy (MME)
,
Finance, the Secretary of
Planning (Seplan)
, the National Energy Commission (CNE) , the
Industrial Development Council, the Central Bank, the Bank of
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Brazil, the Secretariat for Industrial Technology (STI) as the
public agents involved in the intrabureaucratic struggle for
dominance over the Alcohol Program. The MME/Petrobras disputed
territory against the MIC/IAA; the MIC faced off with the
National Petroleum Council over price control and fuel
distribution. These disputes forced Geisel to create a
centralized agency, the National Alcohol Commission (CENAL)
,
within the MIC. The creation of CENAL was a formal loss for
Petrobras and IAA, which wanted the program decentralized in
order to meet the interest of their specific clienteles, the
distributors and planters. Informally, real power in Pro-alcool
remained with IAA since it was a long-standing bureaucracy dating
to the 1930s, a resilient corporatist mechanism of interest
representation. One example of the internal struggle for control
of the program can be seen in Petrobras successful attempt to
control half of distribution in the State of Sao Paulo, which
accounted for a 40 percent share of the country's consumption in
1980."
In the first phase (1976-79), the decision-making
process was fragmented, though there was the single objective of
producing anhydrous ethanol to substitute for 20 percent of
gasoline. With no single hegemonic center in alcohol policy, the
Program's autonomy was curtailed: a) decisions about alcohol
production were made at MIC, the IAA, and the STI; b) the
National Petroleum Council centralized distribution policy; c)
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the National Monetary Council/Central Bank centralized financing
decisions. That multiplicity of decision sites contributed to
the lack of political autonomy.
This phase was superseded by a process of accommodation
when the objective turned to the production of 100 percent
hydrated alcohol running on modified engines. Distilleries,
automotive industry, distributors played crucial roles in the
growing Alcohol Program. 100 Nevertheless, was plagued with
technical, economic, and political problems.
Technically the problems concerned the resistance of
the auto-industry in finding adequate solutions for feeding
systems and materials, in view of alcohol volatility and the
adaptation of gasoline engines to the alcohol system. Only after
the Technological Aerospace Center (CTA) researched and developed
new intake systems in 1980 did auto-makers became involved in the
projects. Despite technological advances in the materials used,
the engines using alcohol consume 30-35 percent more than
gasoline engines. To offset this differential in consumption,
the price of alcohol was established at 35 percent less than the
price of gasoline. Costs of production were not covered by this
price, thus leading to an additional subsidy.
While technical problems were overcome, political
problems were not. When the CENAL was created in 1979, political
conflicts caused the National Energy Commission and the MME to
abandon the Program. Pro-alcool 1 s conflicts between CENAL and IAA
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were mediated by the new Minister of Industry and Commerce, Joao
Camilo Penna, supported by Vice-president Chaves.
Sugar cane producers, a historical corporative
clientele linked to the state, depended on subsidies and
incentives handed down through the IhhA 01 in this case, the
producers of alcohol were subsidized by IAA which also provided
incentives and export tax exemptions.
Northeast political interests were strongly linked to
the program. Northeast usineiros
. dominating local political
systems, especially in the States of Alagoas and Pernambuco, were
powerful enough to influence alcohol policy. Though sugar cane
4
planters of the States of Rio de Janeiro and of Sao Paulo had a
strong influence over alcohol policy, they had limited influence
over local politics.
Other alliances and interest articulation existed in
the Alcohol Program. Common interests were shared by the
Secretariat for Industrial Technology and the auto-makers in
developing the alcohol-powered engine. Another MIC agency, the
Council of Industrial Development (CDI) , became responsible for
the financing of the distilleries, while overall financing was
done through the Energy Commission within the Secretary of
Planning
.
In 1985, six years after from the inception of the
Second Phase of the Program, Brazilian society is paying the
burden of the program. 102 Gasoline consumers are paying a
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higher price in order to subsidize the Pro-alcool
, The
alternative of raising the price differential from 65 to 75
percent (or more) of the price of gasoline could reduce
subsidies, but it would decimate the program politically.
Consumers would feel frustrated and most of the distilleries
could not repay their debts with the Government. By 1985, the
Program, though an apparent success, did not solve the fuel
bottleneck of Brazil's transportation system. It has not solved
the producers dilemma, that is their income and profits.
Although the Program was economically and socially
unfeasible even before the decrease in oil prices in 1985, its
feasibility dropped even more when that occurred. Ronaldo Seroa
da Motta found the equivalent cost per barrel to be US$ 35 for
the efficient Sao Paulo production. In areas where the Program
expanded later (Center West states) these costs were calculated
to be US$ 50 per barrel of equivalent petroleum, while in
Pernambuco -- the traditional Northeastern sugar-cane state —
costs reached US$ 60 per barrel equivalent. 103 All three costs
were higher than the 1985 prices of oil.
In 1985, the decision-makers faced high fuel cost,
burdensome subsidies, and the disappearance of subsistence
agricultural land, as a result of the Program. However, the
program continued due to the high level political power of the
interest groups involved, which "are now the strongest lobby in
governmental programs."-1- 04 These groups postponed crucial
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decisions therefore limiting state autonomy in the Alcohol
Program. The 1975 crisis-management program, an optimistic
program by 1979-80, was left with few viable alternatives in
1985:
i)
- continue inefficient production via expanding
consumption; '
ii)
- alcohol industry will be made obsolete via reversal ofconsumption to gasoline consequent upon expandinqproduction. * y
3
.
- Transportation
In the field of transportation, PND's objectives were
concentrated on navigation with the creation of Portobras
. on
railroads and on implementation of the Rio and Sao Paulo Subway
Metro Systems. The Railroad Development Plan proposed to more
than double the sector's participation in cargo transport. 105
Symbolic of the megalomania of the PND II 's development projects
was the Steel Railroad ( Ferrovia do Acq ) — an electrified
railroad through Belo Horizonte-Sao Paulo-Barra Mansa-Jeceaba —
designed to link steel plants and iron ore mines. Minas Gerais
Governor Aureliano Chaves (1974-1978) devised this project to be
finished in 1,000 days. For Governor Chaves — a Geisel
protege, spokesman for the influential Minas Gerais's mining and
steel industry interests, and an example of the military regime's
fascination with technocrat-politician 106 -- the Steel Railway
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would decrease dependence on imported oil for transport ion of
both iron ore from the mines to the steel pUnts, and finished
products from the steel plants to the consumer centers in that
quadrilateral, passing by the new Acominas (Acos_Min^s_Gerai^A
)
and private mills in Minas Gerais.
Despite the euphoria with which the 1,000 day-
construction was announced, technical and financial problems
delayed the project. FerroviaJ^o was difficult to finance,
since its economic unsoundness and lack of technical feasibility
far outweighed the political strength Governor Aureliano had in
presenting the project to multilateral agencies. 107 Despite the
PND II objective of augmenting the role of railroads in
Brazilian infrastructure, the multinational automotive truck
industry was bullish in lobbying for their continuation as the
primary mean of transportation.
The sector's low political and financial autonomy was
clear. The construction of Ferrovia do Acq was paralysed in 1984
for lack of resources, after US$ 1.68 billion had been spent.
The project was restudied by the Federal Railway Network (RFFSA
,
Rede Ferroviaria Federal S.A. I and was scaled down to a single-
track system for diesel-operated trains, and combined use with
existing railways in the triangle Rio-Sao Paulo-Belo Horizonte.
Construction restarted in 1987 with about half of the US$ 136
million to be invested in the project coming from the private
sector. Mineracoes Brasileiras Reunidas anticipated US$ 70
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million in freights of iron ore and steel product
transportation. 108 The financial autonomy of the sector was
never high, as shown in Table 4.9. The combined Portobras-RFFSA
sources and uses of funds shows the decrease in self-generated
resources originating from low rates. Treasury allocation and
loans, especially from multilateral agencies continued to be the
main source of funds for the sector.
TABLE 4 .
9
BRAZIL
TRANSPORTATION SECTOR
SOURCES 1980 1981 1982 1983 1984 1985 198 6
SELF-GRTD
NSG
OtRes
-32
. 0
-33
. 7
1.7
-45.0
-47.8
2 . 8
-62
. 7
-78.7
15.9
-55. 7
-57
. 3
1.7
-48
. 4
-56.0
7 . 5
-61. 8
-62
. 0
0.2
-48
.
-50.
1
.
9
4
4
GVT TRSRY 86.7 106.2 126. 6 120. 6 121. 6 131. 5 124 . 7
CRDT OPTS
Int
Ext
45.3 39 . 1
16. 0
22 . 8
36.5
12 . 0
24 . 0
48 . 0
17 . 0
31.0
26.9
20.0
7.0
30.4
10.0
20.0
24 .
11
13 .
2
0
0
USES
CAP EXPTS
*invst
*amtzn
Int
Ext
74 . 2
22 . 9
80.3
19.7
3 . 0
17 .
1
81.8
18 .
1
3 . 0
15. 0
62 . 4
37 . 6
27 . 0
11. 0
50. 9
49.
1
34.0
15. 0
41.6
57 . 7
40. 0
18 . 0
43 .
55.
36.
20.
9
7
0
0
Source: SEST, Relatorio
. various years. Portobras, RFFSA,
Relatorios
. various years. Percentage from Total
Resources, excluded current expenses. See
Glossary, p. 199 and Observation, p. 200 for
explanation on negative numbers.
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C Industrial Policy and State Ani- onomy
The PND contained numerous policy decisions relating to
the new industrialization pattern designed by PND II. Although
it called for the participation of the private sector, the
government continued its direct action in the provision of basic
inputs. These policy must be analyzed from the point of view of
state autonomy with respect to the private sector in order to
comprehend the participation and influence of private interests
in the policy-making process. 109
In view of the private sector's unwillingness to invest
in non-ferrous metallurgy, specialty steel-making, fertilizers,
pulp and paper, petrochemicals and chemicals industries — all of
which are basic and intermediary inputs — most of these
activities were undertaken by expansion and diversification of
existing state industrial enterprises, such as Petrobras, CVRD,
and the state steel companies under the holding Siderbras
.
110
The changing pattern of the Brazilian industrial
economy demanded a strongly modified supply of basic inputs.
Although this policy focused on implanting large-scale projects
under the responsibility of the state enterprises, their
political and financial autonomy did not correspond to that task.
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The objectives of the National Steel Plan, II stage,
designed in 1972, initially targeted production of 20 million'
tons by 1980. The National Steel Plan was upgraded by the CDE in
1975 (beginning of the III stage), targeting 20 million tons by
1978, and 32 million by 1980. That objective contrasted with
total gross steel production for 1984 of 18.4 million tons, 111
indicating that problems influenced the autonomy of the sector,
both politically and financially.
In addition to increased output oriented to the
internal market, Siderbras engaged in export-led joint ventures,
such as Tubarao Steel Company (CST, Companhia sideruraica
Tubarao
) — in association with Kawasaki Steel of Japan and with
Finsider (Societa Finanzia ria SiderurgirM of Italy — to
produce and export 3 million tons of flat steel. CST's
implementation was plagued with financial and political
difficulties. The favorable international market for steel
production when the decision to build Tubarao was made in .1975
did not persist, resulting in the foreign partners re-evaluation
of the project. A cut-down in state purchases, in accordance
with the re-evaluation of the Steel Plan, made the private
Brazilian capital goods manufacturers to squirm and contest the
"megalomaniac political projects. 1 ' 112 When the scaled-down
Tubarao project began in 1979 its completion was expected for
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1983. By 1 982
,
US$ 2 . 12 billion had ^^ ^^ ^
still US $ 1.53 billion to be spent at the outset of the debt
crisis, what delayed beginning of operations to 1984.1"
Tubarao's initial operations in 1984 coincided with
import quotas imposed by the U.S. on Brazilian steel, spoiling
CST's intentions of primarily targeting U.S. market. What was
originally seen as an advantage turned to a nightmare since new
markets increased the volume exported but yielded fewer
dollars. H4 CST transferred financial burden to Siderbras as it
was unable to repay its debts.
As regards the non-flat products, Minas Gerais
Governor, Aureliano Chaves, planned filling in the voids of the
private sectors in 1974 by investing in that field, entirely
endorsed by Geisel's 1975 Message to Congress. H5 Continuing
yet another grandiose project Acominas was formed in 1975 — a
partnership with ownership divided among Siderbras (40%), CVRD
(20%), the Minas Gerais State Government (20%), and foreign
groups (20%). Siderbras's industrial policy was caught between
the need to substitute imported inputs and the private sector's
outcry about the state entering their domain of production. For
Paulo Villares, a leading capital goods and basic inputs
entrepreneur, it was necessary that "the government urgently
define the rules of the game," circumscribing where the state
enterprises and the private sector would function.
H
6
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Despite private sector complaints, the construction of
Acominas began in 1978, when Governor Aureliano was already Vice-
President-elect on the Figueiredo ticket. As Vice-president,
Aureliano could more effectively maintain Minas Gerais interests
pressuring politically the project. it was only due to his
political force combined with that of the Minister of Industry
and Commerce, Joao Camilo Penna, equally from Minas Gerais, that
investment resources were allocated to Acominas, despite the
world slump in non-flat steel demand. its construction suffered
numerous setbacks postponing projected 1985 completion by two and
half years. The Acominas was contested by the World Bank, whose
experts did not have confidence in the financial plans presented.
And they were partially correct, since the US$ 300 million
Acominas had in its 1979 budget were sidetracked to two
transportation agencies being returned only years later.
Acominas attempted to reduce imports with its non-flats products,
but that not achieved, since the unit cost of production was more
than two and half times that of imported products. 117
Briefly examining other basic inputs policies, CONSIDER
s changed to deal also with non-ferrous metals, since these
re an important component of the PND II. (Institutionally
CONSIDER became Conselho Nacional de Sideruraia e Nao Ferrosos .)
Of the goals stated in the National Program for the Development
of the Non-Ferrous Industry (PNDIMNF, Programa Nacional da
Industria de Minerals Nao Ferrosos ) . only a few were attained.
wa
we
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Most of the objeotives were net partially, aocording to the
oo.parison between goals and real output in 1985, as shown in the
Table 4.10 below.
TABLE 4.10
PNDIMNF 1 s objectives
for 1983
(a)
Primary Metal
Production 1985
(b)
Aluminum
Copper
Lead
Zinc
Tin
Nickel
1,315, 000
400 , 000
172 , 000
300, 000
21 , 000
24 , 000
517 ,734
92 ,319
29,497
114 , 841
23 , 046
13 ,210
Sources: a - Programa Nacional de Desenvol yj
m
ento da Industriede Metais Nao Ferrosos. CDE II (Brasilia:
~
Servicos Graficos do IBGE, 1978), p. 27.b
- CONSIDER, calculated from January-August 1985figures, by extrapolation.
Aluminum policy deserved the greatest attention since
international interests had their eyes on the Brazilian bauxite
reserves, unveiled in 1972. At the same time, large scale
manufacturers were keen on tapping Brazilian cheap inputs of
electric energy, which accounts for more than 50 percent of the
production cost of aluminum. Incentives and investment resources
were provided by Greater Carajas Program to mining projects on
the Eastern Amazon, and to hydroelectric power projects, both
needed to feed the industrial smelters of the region. An
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analysis of the aluminum policy in the Eastern Amazon will be
extended in conjunction with Tucurui case-study (Chapter VI).
Reflecting the chaotic situation of the state steel
sector and its use as gatherer of foreign currency to solve
balance of payments problems, Siderbras owed foreign creditors
US$ 7 billion and an additional US$ 5 billion to Brazilian
creditors by 1985. Just in interest and amortization payments on
the debt Siderbras annually disbursed US$ 5.5 billion recently,
contrasting with a sales revenues of US$ 3.7 billion. As the
president of Siderbras, Amaro Lanari Junior, stated
Only 9 percent of Siderbras 's investment were funded
out of the group's own resources in the 1970s. The restis borrowed money. The government did not put any moneyinto its steel industry. The companies just went out
and borrowed
.
11 °
Table 4.11 below shows how the sector used borrowing to
finance its projects, and how low steel prices effected poor
self-generated funds from sales of products. In addition to the
financial question, the Brazilian state steel sector relinquished
its political autonomy when it was forced to agree an US-
established, US$ 700 million per year-limit of imported Brazilian
steel. As a result of the accord, struck by the Minister of
Finance, Ernane Galveas, in 1984, the presidents of COSIPA,
Plinio Assmann, and of Acominas, Moacelio Mendes, were dismissed
because they frankly opposed those limits. As Plinio Assmann
stated,
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rltrii kT^ ° f the 9overmnent is not limited toCOSIPA, but also to the suppliers, clients, creditors
who do
G
nnV
and
^
crmUnity ' We have bothered tiose
'
Si? v ant 9 SH?59 and independent Braziliansteel-making sector. 119
TABLE 4.11
BRAZIL
SIDERBRAS
SOURCES AND USES OF FUNDS, (%)
SOURCES 1980 1981 1982 1983 1984 1985 1986
SELF-GRTD -10
. 6 -26. 2 -38 2 -18
. 3 -43 1 -51. 2 -43 2NSG
OtRes
-10
. 6 -31.
4 .
1
9
-57
19
8
5
-49
.
31.
8
5
-60
17
2
1
-54
.
3 .
8
6
-60
17
2
1
GVT TRSRY 15 . 0 16. 3 27 3 12 5 9 . 3 6 1 9 .3
CRDT OPTS 95 . 5% 109. 9 110 9 105. 8 133 8 145 0 133 8
Int 21. 2 36 2 48 7 28 .7 78 9 38 4
Ext 88 . 7 74 7 57 1 105 . 1 66 1 95 4
USES
CAP EXPTS
*invst 87 . 8% 79 . 3 71. 8 38 4 19 6 18 4 19 6
*amtzn 11. 3% 18.2 26. 3 60 4 78 9 72 . 4 78 9
Int 6.2 13 . 0 37 . 3 35 4 17 . 3 34 . 5
Ext 12 . 0 13 . 3 23 . 1 43 5 55. 1 44 . 4
Source: SEST, Relatorio
, various
years. Siderbras, Relatorio , various
years. Percentage from Total
Resources, excluded current
expenses. See Glossary, p. 199 and
Observation, p. 200 for explanation
on negative numbers.
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To resolve the question of insolvency, the steel sector
has carefully considered debt/equity swaps and privatization of
state steel-making firms as a way out of its financial quandary.
The concept of national security utilized in the 1940s to justify
production of steel by state-owned enterprises no longer holds
for this sector, but turning to privatization "can also mean its
demise. "120
D
.
Mining Policy and State Autonomy
Still other policy decisions worth analyzing in light
of the state autonomy variable are those relating to the mining
area. The new 1967 Mining Code had the effect of attracting
firms to explore for minerals in the Amazon and to make
multinational and Brazilian firms alike disclose the existence of
vast mineral deposits in the Amazon. In the first part of the
decade (1974-79) the PND II 's mining policy emphasized mineral
development of the Amazon combined with the implementation of
other sectoral program such as cattle raising, wood
industrialization, energy and energy-intensive metallurgy.
Specifically, the PND II projected the development of the Eastern
Amazon Minero-Metallurgical Complex, the Serra do Carajas-Port of
Itaqui railroad, steel-making in the vicinities of the Port of
Itaqui (pellets plants) , and the bauxite-alumina-aluminum Complex
of the Trombetas and Belem areas.
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Up to the mid-1980s there was an concentration of
multinational firms in the mining sector in Brazil. six
entrepreneurial groups (Shell-Billiton, Nippon Amazon, Alcan,
Alcoa, Bethlehem, US Steel) which, together with two state-owned
and two national private companies, dominated more than 40
percent of the total value of mineral production . 12 1 Mineral
rights were concentrated too: only fifteen large entrepreneurial
groups (six state-owned, four Brazilian private and five
multinational firms) controlled 38 percent of the total
prospection and research areas. 122 Fifty six percent of the
mining activity is geographically concentrated in the State of
Para. 123 In terms Qf capital and size
^ the economic power Qf
the companies is demonstrated by the fact that 89 percent of the
mining firms registered have capital smaller than US$ 173,500
and only 3.8 percent had capital higher than US$ 1.73 million.
Only with the Figueiredo sexenio (1979-85), did mining
policy achieve the highest priority among the governmental
policies and state enterprises action, as a result of the high
political cleavage in the development of Eastern Amazon. Mining
policy primarily involved CVRD extraction activities on the
Trombetas Region and in the Serra dos Carajas bauxite deposits in
association with national and multinational firms. The bauxite
mining policy is thoroughly discussed on Chapter VI.
But targeting the Trombetas bauxite component of the
mining policy was not nearly as important as privileging the
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Greater Carajas Program, in which the Figueiredo government
placed great expectations for solving the balance of payments
problems through exports of raw minerals and semi-processed
metallurgical products. More than just a chance to ameliorate
pressing macroeconomic problems, the Figueiredo government saw in
Greater Carajas a grandiose development project with high
political visibility and vast, manipulable resources that could
help Figueiredo sail through the longest presidential period
since Vargas's Estado Novo (1937-45). CVRD participated in the
major Carajas iron program in addition to ongoing iron-ore
mining projects in the South Central Region, totalling an output
of 63 million tons-year by 1980. 124
These CVRD's actions seemed minuscule in view of the
grandeur numbers of the Greater Carajas Program, shown below. Its
analysis helps understanding the process of loss of autonomy in
most of the development projects in the Amazon region. This
Program encompasses an area partially covered by the States of
Para, Goias, and Maranhao, limited by the Amazon, the Xingu and
the Parnaiba Rivers, an area rich in iron-ore, manganese, nickel,
copper, bauxite, gold, cassiterite, silicium, as shown in Map 6.1
(Chapter VI)
.
In 1980, the Greater Carajas Program grew out of the
original Iron-Carajas Project ( Proieto Ferro-Caraias ) , an iron-
ore mining project under sole CVRD responsibility. As it can be
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TABLE 4
. 12
THE GREATER CARAJAS PROGRAM
Proi ects
Value (US$ billion)
Mining and Metallurgy
Agriculture
Cattle raising
28 . 1
8.1
1.7
1.3
Sub-total
Housing
Other Infrastructure Systems
highways, ports.
.
.
)
39.2
14 . 6
(railroad,
7.9
Total 61.7
CVRD
,
Amazonia Oriental - \jm Proneto Nacionalde Exportacao (Rio de Janeiro, 1980) andCVRD
'
Amazonia Oriental - Piano Preliminar Hp
Desenvolvimento
r
(Rio de Janeiro, 1981)
Note: it does not include Tucurui constructi
transmission and distribution costs.
observed in the chart above, the iron-ore program turned into a
full-scale regional development program with a specific purpose
of exporting primary mineral and processed metallurgical
products. According to Delfim Netto, the greatest national
chance to alleviate the problem of the external debt was Caraja
Program since,
When Carajas comes on line at full capacity, it will
represent an export value of US$ 9-10 billion per year.
It is a plus over normal export. This means that the
export curve is going to be moved upward and make up a
space between the imports and the exports, thus
contributing to the trade balance. It is this surplus
that will allow us to diminish our deficit in current
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tne relative importance of the external debt. 12 ^
Delfim's predictions were too optimistic. The original
Iron-Carajas project under CVRD aegis aimed at extracting
15/25/35 million tons-year by the years 1985/86/87 respectively,
and was valued at US$ 5.365 billion. 12 6 By 1985, US$ 1.9
billion had been spent in the project which began exporting in 12
million tons in 1985. This iron-ore project originated from the
discovery of iron deposits in the Serra dos Carajas by the
Companhia Meridional de Mineracao
, a US Steel subsidiary, with an
estimated reserve of 45 billion tons of ore. 127 But the
existence of ore was repeatedly denied and US Steel submitted
several research requests under Meridional's name and several
other trusted employees, to circumvent the Mining Code bylaws,
which before 1967 prohibited foreign companies to explore
Brazilian minerals. Iron ore was known to have existed all
along, but the multinational corporation wanted to avoid
competition and keep the site as a strategic reserve. 128
CVRD depended heavily on Iron-Carajas for its expansion
and survival as an iron-ore exporter. Minister Antonio Dias
Leite, of Mines and Energy, just before leaving the presidency of
CVRD (1967-69), negotiated the firm's association with Meridional
constituting AMZA (Amazonia Mineracao S.A. ) in 1970, enthusiastic
with the reserve estimates showing 18 billion tons of high grade
ore. Initial projections indicated production beginning in 1978
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reaching 44 million ton-year by 1985. The site was considered as
one of the best mines in the world for its grade, location and
position with respect world markets, in particular the United
States'*. Despite CVRD being the majority stockholder in the
joint-venture AMZA, US Steel controlled the implementation pace
and the technology used. Confrontations soon arose between CVRD
and US Steel about the means of transporting iron ore, with US
Steel preferring railroad — so it could supply rails — over a
barge system on the Tocantins River preferred by CVRD, as part of
its diversification program ( DOCENAVE)
.
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CVRD and other Brazilian interests, linked to ports,
ship construction and capital goods industries, challenged US
Steel at a moment in which it (US Steel) was already losing
interest in the undertaking as a result of the worldwide
recession and decrease in steel sales. The American firm stalled
decisions prompting a reaction by President Geisel, who stated
that the private sector, apparently responsible for implementing
the basic inputs projects, would receive governmental support
only
...as long as it did not systematic [ ally
]
procrastinat [e] for long years, the use of known
reserves of certain minerals of high national interest,
because interested groups are undefined, looking for an
adequate managerial solution through association
between private and government firms, if necessary. 130
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The confrontation between CVRD and US Steel worsened,
causing US Steel to withdraw from AMZA in 1977, receiving US$
50.3 million in compensation, although its actual investment had
been only US$ 35 million. 131 Being an inelastic product, that
is, price reduction will not promptly increase the consumption of
iron ore, it is hard to understand why CVRD would spend US$ 5.3
billion on a project if it were not to give incentives to private
capital to invest heavily in the middle of a particularly
unfavorable conjuncture for long range investment decisions. It
means that when confronted with a situation of high uncertainties
the Brazilian government offered investors the possibility of
transferring a priori to the tax payer the possible losses
incurred from investment in Carajas, a typical case of
socialization of losses and privatization of benefits. 132
In view of the US Steel withdrawal and since Carajas
was crucial to CVRD survival, CVRD strived to make the project
viable. Carajas was scaled down and its duration extended. As a
result of the re-evaluation of the Iron-Carajas Program and as a
result of Delfim's economic policy, 133 CVRD elaborated the
Greater Carajas Program, privileging infrastructure,
transportation, energy investment and incentives as a catalyst
for other investment in the region. 134
Carajas' s dependence on the private sector's interests
was so great, that even a request to the World Bank
(International Reconstruction and Development Bank) for a US$
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ion
304 million loan to finance Ferr^rajas was only granted with
the provision that CVRD would issue "no less than US$ 250 mill
in debentures in the stock market." The issuance of that stock
was done in lots, since only 15 percent of the CVRD was in
private hands. The first issue, equivalent to US$ 80 million,
corresponded to 17 percent of CVRD
• s capital. The second issue,
in 1982, totalled US$ 80 million, which served, according to the
president of CVRD, Eliezer Batista, "to substitute the loss of
revenues equivalent to the sale of 10 million tons at that
critical juncture of low prices.
"
13 5 immediately after the
third issuance of stock, when total revenues had reached US$ 181
million, the operation was called off since the risk of losing
control was imminent. However that stock market operation
meant more than just gathering money to investment: in May 1984,
the CVRD Vice-president Euclides Triches, then acting president,
wrote a memo to the Minister of Finance asking for an emergency
US$ 20-million-purchase of CVRD stock by the Treasury, which was
dangerously reaching the 50 percent mark in private hands. By
analogy if the 80 million corresponded to 17 percent of the
CVRD's capital then US$ 250 million corresponded to 53 1/8
percent, which would have caused the privatization of the state
mining company. This issue was taken up by a Joint Senate-
Chamber Investigating Committee in 1985. The controversy on the
issue of CVRD stock sales originated in the fact that the US$ 25C
million that would have been received from the sale of stock
accounted for 5 percent of the P^rrp^Caraias Project. How then
could the firm transfer 17 percent of the company in exchange fo
5 percent of a single project ? CVRD is worth much more
considering its mines, railroads, port facilities, ships, and
dozens of subsidiaries in varied areas. its investigation was
continuously stalled by its president, the former Minister Cesar
Cals then completing his Senatorial term. It could however be
detected that the stock market operations had benefitted the
buyers. The US$ 160 million in 1982 was worth US$ 700 million b
the end of 1985, with more than half a billion dollars in profit
with no risk. It seems that the scheme functioned well, since
the dividends distributed to the stockholders increased seven
times from US$ 6 million in 1980 to US$ 44 million in 1984, in a
period marked by desperate search for funds. 136
Under adverse crisis conditions the Greater Carajas
Program was given the full support of the government and foreign
lenders, including the multilateral World Bank due to the high
potential of controlling immense mineral resources in a strategi
area of the world. In the absence of a PND Il-type of grandiose
project, the Carajas Program was the Figueiredo government's
"national, grandiose and systemic project." 137 Demonstrating
the intention of transferring Carajas to the private sector, the
Inter-Ministerial Council of the Greater Carajas Program,
presented a Minister Delfim Netto-signed Resolution obligating
CVRD to furnish "the terms and conditions for the sale of its
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rights over the copper, nickel and manganese mines, in the are
of the Greater Carajas Program so they could be developed by
private enterprise "138 mu Q m^*-j. The National Security Council stopped
the implementation of that Resolution by informing CVRD that the
mining of those minerals could not be privatized since they
served national security interest.
Greater Carajas was the principal program of the
Ministries of Mines and Energy and of Planning during the
Figueiredo term, on a par with the petroleum exploration program.
The Minister of Mines and Energy, Cesar Cals, expected that this
"most charming project- would need expenditures totalling US$ 60
billion in 20 years, with the Brazilian state's provision of
infrastructure for production.
All these developments were possible with the
completion of infrastructure projects: i) - the port facilities
at Vila do Conde (Belem, PA) and at Ponta da Madeira/Itaqui
,
MA;
ii)
- the 550-mile railroad Cara jas-Ponta da Madeira/Itaqui; and
iii) - the Tucurui Hydroelectric Plant. In spite of all these
developments no real action has been taken to curb or to control
mining on Native Indian Reserves. The Congress will increasingly
fill this gap with debates over this mounting problem — an
important item in the agenda from the late 1980s on. 139
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TABLE 4.13
BRAZIL
CVRD
SOURCES AND USES OF FUNDS, (%)
SOURCES
-L _7 O KJ ±y o i 1982 1983 1984 1985 1986
SELF-GRTD
NSG
OtRes
72 . 9
72.9
56. 6
52.4
4.2
68 . 4
33 . 4
34 . 9
44 . 5
28.3
16.
1
71.7
61.4
11.2
62 . 9
49 . 7
13 . 1
74
. 6
57
. 8
16 . 8
GVT TRSRY 2 . 1 3.9 2 . 9 4.2 3 . 6 4 . 9
CRDT OPTS
Int
Ext
27.1 41.2
16. 1
25.1
27
. 7
14 . 5
13 . 2
52 . 6
18.4
34 . 2
23 . 1
8.7
14 . 4
33 . 5
7.8
25. 7
20 . 4
9.2
11.2
USES
CAP EXPTS
*invst 66.4
*amtzn 20.7
Int
* Ext
90 . 9
4 . 9
0.5
4.4
88 . 4
7.9
2 . 8
5.1
81.5
12 . 5
5.2
7 . 3
88 . 0
15.6
7.8
7.8
75.1
18.9
4 . 6
14 . 3
55. 8
16 . 5
1.4
15. 1
Source SEST, Relatorio, various years. CVRD,
Relatorio, various years. Percentage
' from
Total Resources, excluded current expenses.
See Glossary, p. 199 and Observation, p. 200for explanation on negative numbers.
E. Implications and Conclusions
The period of 1974-1985 was undoubtedly marked by the
attempt to implement grandiose development projects in the areas
analyzed above based on empirical data. The importance of each
state sector varied in terms of both political and financial
autonomy, the variables proposed for analysis.
The energy sector, including electric energy, nuclear
and petroleum, was in those years of growth cum debt the most
important, both in political and economic terms: it absorbed
more than 50 percent of all state investment in the period of
1974-85, and reached the impressive mark of three out of every
four dollars spent by the state, in 1976.
The growth of all state enterprises during the growth
cum repression years, their political insulation and their
financial capabilities have allowed their use as providers of 1
cost inputs for the good performance of the consumer and durabl
goods industries, and therefore for the advancement of a form of
associated capitalism in Brazil. Policy-making in that period
was more autonomous vis-a-vis societal interests and demands.
In contrast, during the growth cum debt period, having
accepted the role of policy instruments — by being incited to
pursue grandiose developments objectives and at the same time to
serve as "captors of foreign savings" (using the official jargon)
,
state enterprises, with some exceptions, incurred in the
error of relinquishing their financial autonomy to those
responsible for administering the economy — the Ministry of
Finance and the Secretary of Planning — and to credit
institutions within Brazil and abroad.
ow
e
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TABLE 4.14
DISTRIBUTION OF STATE ENTERPRISE INVESTMENT
Selected Years f%)
Enterprises 1976 1980 1985
Eletrobras/Itaipu
Petrobras
Siderbras
Telebras
CVRD
Transportation
47.7
25.9
12 . 5
3.5
7.6
2 . 1
25.5/7.9
19 . 2
18.5
9.0
4 . 3
14 . 3
22.4
29 . 5
4 . 6
12 . 8
12 . 6
5.3
m v.i . i iiivebuient calculated fTable 4.3 - State Entrepreneurial Groupinvestment; and SEST, Relatorio d* Avaliar.An
1 y o 5 ~ 6 .
On the other hand, political power continued virtually
unchanged, though not evenly distributed through the state
enterprises. While energy state enterprises took on a new
dimension in the Brazilian political structure, their interests
were heavily articulated with the services and equipment supplied
by the private sector or linked to military objectives, such as
in the case of nuclear energy and Itaipu, state enterprises in
the transportation, steel-making or even mining sectors
continuously lost their political autonomy, as we have seen.
Even if that articulation meant mutual reinforcing of political
power, the state enterprises of the energy sector have seen their
autonomy ultimately cut short.
In the years between 1975 and 1979 all state companies
experienced growth, not uniformly distributed as it can be seen
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in Tables 4 . 3 and 4 . 4 . Between 1979 and 1982, despite signs of
deep macroeconomic imbalances, expenditures of some sectors
continued growing above the limits imposed by SEST, mainly
because of the state sector's "anxious desire to spend" and the
inability of the central government to control their autonomy in
spending. 140 state sectors continued to import equipment and
were forced by the central state to take loans in the
international financial community to solve balance of payments
problems in critical periods during the 1974-1984 period, as
mentioned before. Therefore, their investments in development
projects have remained in a peculiar "spinning wheel"-situation
as "new investments are needed every year and the projects seem
to remain in the same stage as the year before," as was stated by
a high official. 141
The crisis of the state enterprises, their
indebtedness, their financial quandaries and their administrative
disarray coexisted with the crisis of the authoritarian-
exclusionary regime. By 1982 the central question was how to
enforce control over the spending of the state enterprises --
over both uses and sources. As Luiz Gonzaga Belluzzo stated,
When formulating their expansion programs, public
enterprises try to take into account, naturally, their
private objectives. Thus, for example, in placing
equipment orders there is no preoccupation with
directing purchases to the internal market to stimulate
the development of firms in the capital goods sector or
to save foreign exchange in the face of the grave
situation of the Balance of Payments. In this sense,
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the more modern firms of thp n . . ,
secto^escape from the poSSiSl^^
State autonomy thus, has a dual component. When the
central state tries to control its own agencies, limiting their
autonomy in deciding policies, programs and projects ~ which
includes both political and managerial autonomy - we have one
type of state autonomy which may be depicted as internal state
autonomy
.
On the other hand, when the forces of society —
private entrepreneurs, commercial banks, labor, political parties
and other social groups — influence the policy-making process
to convey their idiosyncratic interests — we confront the
external state autonomy type. With respect to the first, Baer
argued that
. . . issues of control suggest that central government
use of state firms for macroeconomic programs even if
such uses are well conceived, is likely to be
foredoomed. 143
The political component seems to have been equally
important, to say the least. The largest number of the grandiose
projects in execution by 1985 were planned and initiated in
earlier military presidential terms. Having in mind that the
transition from one military presidential term to another was
supposedly a natural process, without abrupt changes, the new
governments were repeatedly cautious as to where and how to cut
spending on these grandiose development projects, in order to
maintain political support for its own projects. At the same
time the international dimension also played an important role:
m°St
°
f thS lo^-^™> large-scale development projects were the
result of schemes involving powerful financial institutions
abroad, bilateral agreements between governments and supply
contracts with multinational firms. All of these contracts were
very difficult to dishonor.
Therefore, considering that the syndrome of "Brazil -
Emerging Power" is a malaise transmitted along with the
presidential ribbon, in such a way that the general-president
in power could, even if they unwillingly inherited an impressive
legacy of development projects, find resources and find specific
areas in which new, politically highly visible, grandiose
projects were started. The Rio and Sao Paulo Metro Systems, and
Angra I were planned in Costa e Silva's period, but began
operating partially in Figueiredo' s period. Geisel received fro
Medici the responsibility to implement Itaipu — which resulted
from a convoluted military/diplomatic agreement between Brazil
and Paraguay — and the Steel Railway, which he passed along to
Figueiredo added to Tucurui, the Nuclear Program, the Stage III
of the Steel Plan plus Acominas and Tubarao. Figueiredo, despit
being empowered in a juncture of economic crisis and having to
maintain investments in Itaipu and Tucurui, did not fail the
tradition inherited from his predecessors. Figueiredo left the
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government with a Telecommunications Program costing US$ 6.6
billion, the continued Nuclear Program (Angra III and
Peruibe/lguape I), the Parallel Nuclear Program,
Albras/Alunorte, the Petroleum Off-Shore Program costing US$ 7.7
billion, and the installation of equipment at Itaipu and Tucurui.
It was, indeed, very difficult to control the "anxious
desire to spend." By 1983, the National Information Service
(SNI) was called in to control state enterprise spending
but to no avail. Not even the SNI could force the abandonment
of unnecessary projects at the half-way point. As was stated by
a Seplan official,
The shot can backfire [referring to SNI control] Theagent designated can become its ally, as happened withmany trusted comptrollers placed by Delfim. 144
Although state enterprises have maintained a certain
degree of relative state autonomy in the political arena, in
general, their managerial-financial autonomy was gradually eroded
by the progressive need to borrow to finance projects and to
cover balance of payment holes, by the use of certain prices and
tariffs to stem inflation (see Table 4.7), by the gradual
implanting of control mechanism over financial resources and
investment plans, and by contracts requiring imported equipment.
The creation of SEST in 1979 has contributed to the
question of control. SEST's concern with reducing the budget
deficit was politically
.ore successful with the agencies
performing "typical" government functions (social security,
medical assistance, health, education, food supply) during^e
first half of the 1980s than it was with the so-called productive
state enterprises we have analyzed. Even if created to control
them, BEST'S political power was insufficient to extract reliable
and accurate information from the productive state enterprises.
In summary, the decade was characterized by a gradual
lessening of security concerns and a gradual striving to overcome
underdevelopment. That is, less people in prison for political
reasons, amnesty, elections of governors, a "new syndicalism,"
creation of new political parties, transition to a less
authoritarian (or to a democratic possibility) occupied the
political scene of the decade. On the distribution question,
labor and the Brazilian private sector continuously voiced their
discontent as regards the policies pursued and raised demands of
their own.
While Geisel began his term with the motto "a maximum
of development with a minimum of security," — what seemed an
apparent continuation of the high relative state autonomy and
insulation of the preceding terms --, in the eleven years that
followed what could be observed was an increasing loss of
relative state autonomy. Against the background of increasing
demands from various groups in society (labor unions, private
entrepreneurs, parties, hard-line military), the authoritarian
regime gradually lost its control over political power to a
moderate civilian coalition, under the leadership of Tancredo
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Neves
.
The question of control of development projects and
state sector policy was not, as of the early 1980s, one of
controlling but rather the government's inability or
unwillingness to reconcile internal political variables with
international economic variables, the combined effect of which
provoked an unprecedented crisis. within the state, part of the
technocracy withdrew their support to the military regime,
resulting in the contradictory effect of using state enterprises
as policy instruments for government objectives. in the first
place, the state enterprises resisted government directives on
price controls; secondly, the use of state enterprises to obtain
loans abroad to "roll-over" interests and principal was always
denounced. The outcome of this government policy was that state
enterprises tended to behave as private companies, due to their
structural dual nature, in particular those with politically
highly visible and financially salient projects such as Itaipu
Binacional and Eletrobras/Eletronorte s Tucurui, which we analyze
in the next chapters.
TABLE 4.15
BRAZIL
ALL STATE ENTERPRISES
USES AND SOURCES OF FUNDS, PERCENTAGES
SOURCES
CREDIT OPERATIONS
INTERNAL 15
USES
Ext .Op. &Res. 63 70 75
CURRENTS EXPENSES
FINANCE CHARGES
Int. Op. 31 2 7
Ext. Op. &Res. 63 69 73
1981 1982 1983 1984 1985 1986
29 36 21 34 20
EXTL & RES. 63 114* 71 64 81 66 80
CAPITAL EXPENDITURES "
AMORTIZATIONS
Int
'°P- 25 25 42 33 21 m
58 67 77 68
26 19 22 25
74 81 66 75
Sources: SEST Relatorios, various years. State EnterprisesReports, various years.* Overborrowing, Cf. BancoCentral do Brasil, Boletim AnuaJ
f 1981.
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CHAPTER V
mt^1 BINATI0NAL ITAIPU HYDRO-POWER PROJECT
•
MILITARY POLITICAL POWER, DEVELOPMENT POLICYAND INSULATED POLICY-MAKING
Having analyzed the energy, industrial and mining
policies for the decade 1974-1985, we now turn to the first of
the two specific case-studies. This study reconstructs the basic
pattern of interest articulation that has marked the formation,
decision and adoption of this development project. The analysis
focuses on the specific political mechanisms through which
bureaucratic and military power were translated into political
power and control of policy-making in this specific development
endeavor: the binational Itaipu Hydro-power Project.
As seen in Chapter II, policy-making efforts in semi-
peripheral societies like Brazil are characterized by imperatives
of capitalist development and by particular categories of
political domination. This study is a case of the development of
capitalism and of state intervention in the sphere of the
economy, as well as demonstrating some characteristic patterns of
behavior on the part of the bloc-in-power and state bureaucracy.
The decision to build Itaipu was taken by authoritarian regimes
of both Brazil and Paraguay which favored specific fragments of
the dominant classes of both countries. Brazilian and Paraguayan
ruling elites shared common beliefs, socialization 1 and strived
to weave the same affinities between the authoritarian-
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bureaucratic regime and dominant classes. The Itaipu case-study
is a policy-making and implementation show-case for the internal
political and economic dynamics of the two countries involved and
it has an international dimension as well. As seen in Chapter
II, the central variable state autonomy is to be investigated
not only within the confines of national boundaries. As also
mentioned on Chapter II, the political contexts within which the
policy-making process takes place involve the agency-sonify
context (electrical sector agencies, actors, interests), the
politico-institutional context (an insulated, repressive regime,
or a more liberalized one), and the international relations
context (Brazil's political, economic and strategic position with
respect to other Southern Cone countries)
.
A-s The Background of the Binational Project
1
•
Economic and Technical Aspects
The River Plate Basin, formed by the Parana River, is
among the five largest river basins in the world, and is the
second largest in the Western Hemisphere, after the Amazon
Basin. 2 The Basin covers an area of 5.18 million square
kilometers (1.98 million square miles) involving five countries,
Argentina, Bolivia, Brazil, Paraguay and Uruguay. The most
developed economically in South America, this region contains a
MAP 5 .
1
PARANA RIVER BASIN REGION
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population of 178.12 million, according to a 1985 estimate.
Forty six percent of the Basin is in Brazilian territory, 31
percent in Argentina, 13 percent is Paraguayan, and the remainder
is equally divided between Bolivia and Uruguay. The Brazilian
portion of the Basin is comprised by the more industrialized
states of Sao Paulo, Minas Gerais, Rio de Janeiro and Parana and
by the Center-West and South regions. in Argentina, the Parana
river cuts across Misiones, Corrientes, Santa Fe and Buenos Aires
provinces where 60 percent of Argentineans live. These four
provinces account for 85 percent the economic activity of
Argentina. 3 Paraguay's population is concentrated to the West
around the capital, Asuncion, at the margins of the Paraguay
River. Table 5.1 contrasts the Basin's countries, in terms of
showing the overwhelming strength of Brazil and Argentina over
more modest neighbors.
From the source of its largest tributary (see map 5.1)
the Parana River flows 4,500 kilometers (2,800 miles)
southwesterly before joining the Uruguay River, forming the
estuary River Plate between Argentina and Uruguay. Its principal
tributaries in Brazil — Grande, Paranaiba, Tiete, Paranapanema
,
Iguacu — flow East to West. The Parana River flows South to
where Paraguay and the Brazilian States of Mato Grosso do Sul and
Parana meet, forming the 200 kilometers of the Brazil-Paraguay
border, from Salto Grande de Guaira to Foz do Iguacu. In this
Guaira Canyon, with deep embankments, the Parana dropped more
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TABLE 5.1
PARANA BASIN COUNTRIES
ECONOMIC INDICATORS, 1985
Population
million
GDP
US$ 1,000
GDP/capita
US$
Energy
Consumption *
Argentina 30.56 60, 251 1971 49.2
Bolivia 6.43 5,403 840 1.8
Brazil 134 . 51 249, 137 1852 93 . 6
Paraguay 3 . 69 6, 559 1777 0.6
Uruguay 2 .93 6, 473 2208 2.7
TOTALS 178 . 12 327823 1840
Source: GDP, GDP per capita: IDB, Economic and Social Progress
in Latin America
. 1986 Report, Table 3, p. 394.
Energy Consumption: UN Statistical Yearbook
. 1980;
* - in million metric tons of coal eguivalent.
Population: IDB, 1986 Report
. Country Summaries.
than 120 meters in 170 kilometers and formed the huge hydro-
power potential where it is joined by Acaray River from Paraguay
in the West and Iguacu River from Brazil in the eastern side.
From there, the Parana River flows between Paraguay and Argentina
until it meets with Paraguay River — a river also originated in
the Brazilian State of Mato Grosso. After that point the Parana
flows entirely in Argentine territory until it meets, at the
delta, with the Uruguay River forming the River Plate Estuary.
The Uruguay River also has its source in the Brazilian State of
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Santa Catarina and flows southwesterly successively forming
Brazil-Argentina and Uruguay-Argentina borders.
The Parana River Basin hydro-power potential is
estimated to be 40,000 MW (or three and half times the Itaipu
output), upstream of and downstream from Itaipu. Map 5.2 shows
the existing power plants above Itaipu. Geography and historical
facts combined to create a growing concern with the role that
hydropower potential could play in the regional economy of the
Basin's countries. Paraguay, although capable of absorbing only
a small fraction that potential, became the principal beneficiary
from the huge potential of the Parana River. Paraguay benefitted
from the indivisible nature of water as a resource — a common-
pool public good. Paraguay and Brazil jointly built the Itaipu
plant and Paraguay and Argentina are building Yacyreta and Corpus
power plants.
By 1987 Itaipu Hydro-power plant was generating half of
its 12,600 MW (or 72,000 GWhour/year4 ) , with its completion
planned for 1991, when the last of the eighteen 700 MW-turbines
will be installed. Itaipu, constructed between 1973 and 1985,
is the largest hydropower plant in the world followed by Grand
Coulee (USA) , Guri (Venezuela) , Tucurui (Brazil)
,
Krasnoyarsk
(USSR) , Churchill Falls (Canada) , Paulo Afonso and Ilha Solteira
Complex (Brazil), Asswan (Egypt). From Guaira, where the
magnificent Sete Quedas Falls are now submerged, to Itaipu, the
Parana River drops 120 meters in just 170 kilometers, which makes
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possible such a potency (see Figure 5.3). The dam was built on
Itaipu Island ("the stone that sings" in Tupi-Guarany ) located 20
kilometers (12 miles) from the Argentine border and 14
kilometers (8 miles) from the Friendship Bridge, on the road
linking Asuncion to Paranagua, a port on the Atlantic Ocean. The
construction consumed around US$ 20 billion — there included
direct investment, interest, and transmission lines and a few
billion more in other expenses in the region. It is by far the
most expensive single project in Latin America. 5
The Paraguayan-Argentine Yacyreta, near Encarnacion,
will operate with thirty turbines of 135 MW producing 4,050 MW
and an annual generation of 19,000 GWhour/year when finished in
1994. 6 Although in the initial planning phase due to persisting
financial quandaries of the 1980s, Corpus is estimated to
generate 4,400 MW. Other binational dams in the Uruguay River
are Salto Grande Hydro-power Plant — an Argentine-Uruguayan
project --, and Garabi, a medium size power plant under joint
Argentine-Brazil ian construction
.
Because Brazil's energy frequency is sixty cycles per
second and Paraguay's fifty -- as the rest of South America —
nine turbines will generate at 50 and nine at 60 cycles. Since
Paraguay now only uses about 2 percent of Itaipu 's energy, the
surplus energy is sold back to Brazil through a 50-Hz direct
current circuit which is transformed to 60 cycles (alternate
current) near Sao Paulo, where it enters in the regional grid.
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Itaipu's energy supplied 20 percent of electric power consumption
needs in 1987 (residential, industrial, commercial use) in the
South, Southeast and Center-West Regions, where more than 70
percent of Brazilian GDP is produced and more than 60 percent of
the population, and 81.5 percent of total energy consumption in
Brazil. 7 Table 5.2 depicts regional disparities of the
Brazilian energy market
.
TABLE 5 .
2
ELECTRIC ENERGY CONSUMPTION
BRAZILIAN MARKET, 1986 (GW-HOUR)
Regions
Consumption
North Northeast Southeast/
Center-West/
South
BRAZIL
Residential
Industrial
Other*
1, 517
5, 865
1,811
4
,
399
12 , 998
5,754
29 , 148
79, 553
34 , 639
35 , 064
98,417
42 , 204
TOTAL 9, 194 23 , 151 143
,
340 175, 685
Source: Estimates used in the Eletrobras, Piano de
Recuperacao do Setor de Enerqia
Eletrica . 1985.
* Obs. includes commercial, rural, public street
ilumination, use for water and sewage treatment,
temporary use on construction site, irrigation.
2 . Political and Diplomatic Background
General issimo Alfredo Stroessner has ruled Paraguay
since 1954, when he seized power in a coup d'etat. Every five
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years he is re-elected in an election that resembles the caudillo
rule of his Latin American predecessors. in a few years he
gained political control of the Army and the Colorado Party, thus
assuring that all positions of command and of political power
were appointed by him, and dominating these two powerful
bureaucracies. 8 His regime is based on a system of personal
rule, distributing privileges and deriving power and support from
different groups. The military are deeply involved in the
smuggling of whiskey, electronic equipment, cattle, vehicles
(180,000 cars, trucks and pick-ups are stolen yearly in Brazil
and taken to Paraguay, according to the Contraband Control Agency
of Brazil's Ministry of Finance). Stroessner rule created a
class of powerful, Mafia-like businessmen who arbitrate import
and export licenses among themselves and the military in a
country with a virtually non-existent middle class. Small
farmers and peasants have gained little under Stroessner, except
from the fact that he manipulates on specific occasions their
nationalist support. Civil servants are corrupt and incompetent
in general.
Brazilian President Kubistchek and Alfredo Stroessner
were responsible for the rapprochement of both countries, whose
relations were soured by the Triple Alliance War (1865-1870) 9
and by decades of Paraguay's economic and cultural dependence on
Argentina. Stroessner had been trained in Brazilian military
schools beginning in 1943, and his training included the Superior
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School of War later. Even before he seized power, Stroessner
criticized Paraguay's dependence on Argentina, and to change
that, after he seized power, he named Paraguay's Ambassador to
Brazil, Raul Sapena Pastor, as his Foreign Relations Minister
with the specific task of opening "a new Brazilian economic lung"
through which Paraguay could breathe economically.
In the early 1960s, in view of the rapidly
industrializing Southeast/South regions 's demand for energy,
Brazil's pressing needs for energy forced it to come close to
Paraguay. The Urubupunga Complex on the Parana River (Jupia,
Ilha Solteira and Tres Irmaos dams, finished in 1973) was started
during Janio Quadros's term as Governor of Sao Paulo (1955-59),
and in Quadros's scant 7-month presidency (1961) future studies
were recommended by the newly created electric power agencies,
the Ministry of Mines and Energy (MME) and Eletrobras. Later
under the Goulart presidency (1961-1964), the consulting firm of
Octavio Marcondes Ferraz was hired to perform a study of the
Parana's potential. Marcondes Ferraz recommended a 60-kilometer
channel before the Sete Quedas which would divert the river into
Brazilian territory, making possible the construction of a
totally Brazilian hydropower plant, thus avoiding the problems
lingering from limits demarcated by the 1872 Treaty, re-examined
in 1927. After Goulart' s Minister of Mines and Energy, Oliveira
Brito, went to Asuncion stirring protests by the Paraguayan
elites Brazilians came to realize that the river could only be
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used to mutual advantage and with previous consent. 10
Paraguayans fears were meaningless since Goulart was overthrown a
few months after and Brazil-Paraguay relation with respect to
Itaipu changed substantially.
In 1965, fears of Brazilian imperialism in the region
were exacerbated when a Brazilian platoon occupied a small strip
of land near the Sete Quedas Falls, which previous treaties had
not defined, and which was a source of diplomatic problems,
influencing the very use of the hydroelectric potential of the
river. 11 Brazil's awareness of the wealth in the waters of the
Parana River in the Guaira Canyon and of its importance for the
country's development, made the military regime stage that
muscle-flexing exercise. Although the question of limits had
already been settled by the Goulart-Stroessner January 1964
meeting in the State of Mato Grosso, the new military regime
acted as if it was overlooking that diplomatic agreement between
two heads of state.
Even though the study commissioned by Quadros '
s
Minister of Mines and Energy, Joao Agripino, and the Octavio
Marcondes Ferraz study commissioned by Goulart 's Mines and Energy
Minister, Oliveira Brito, spoke of more than 10,000 MW potential
with the lowest cost of hydroelectric energy ever achieved in the
world, 12 the Paraguayans insisted that nothing be done until
final demarcation of the most important of the seven falls (the
fifth) . Therefore the military muscle flexing in fact weakened
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the Brazilian position, only demonstrating that there were
problems of limits." The impasse was set: Brazilians were
convinced of the ownership of Sete Quedas while Paraguay insisted
on a definitive demarcation of the area before anything was
decided.
Apparently the incident of the occupation was
unimportant, just serving to see how far Paraguay would go in the
case of a military solution.
Counterattacking, the Paraguayan rhetoric increased.
Stroessner's 1 April 1965 speech in the Assembly, though
reinforcing Paraguayan will to negotiate, inflamed spirits even
further. The Brazilian Embassy was attacked, a Brazilian flag
burned and students demanded the Brazilian Military and Cultural
Mission to leave Asuncion. That year of 1965 was particularly
meaningful to the Paraguayans as the centennial of the National
Epic Journey ( Epopeva Nacional — the Triple Alliance War against
Paraguay) was being celebrated, so that the invasion stirred
deep-rooted sentiments.
In late 1965, General Golbery do Couto e Silva, then
head of the SNI, went to Asuncion to meet Stroessner about the
Sete Quedas issue, a question he mastered as he had been a
skilled strategist for the military and taught it at the Superior
School of War and written a book on the issue. 14 The special
envoy of the Brazilian government tried to change the bad image
left by the military occupation and the foreign policy towards
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Paraguay implemented by the Brazilian Ministry of Foreign
Relations
( Itamaraty ) , then headed by General Juraci Magalhaes.
Golbery tried to negotiate a settlement of joint development of
the Parana river if Paraguay would accept Brazil's rights to the
Sete Quedas.15 Evidently the Paraguayans denied the Brazilian
claim to Sete Quedas or to the Salto Grande de Guaira, arguing
that historically the Luzo-Braz il ians had always played
cartographic expansionism. 16 The fact that Brazil and Paraguay
sent troops to the Dominican Republic in 1965 did not contribute
to remove the basic diplomatic, economic, and political deadlock:
the tremendous importance of the water in the Guaira Canyon. For
the Brazilian strategic and diplomatic interests, the solution to
the Sete Quedas question represented a steady source of much
needed renewable energy for the Southeast/South regions. For
Paraguay, above and beyond the decisive economic meaning of
generating considerable income from the sale of energy, it could
also benefit Stroessner politically as he could maneuver the
impoverished peasants for nationalist causes against the
imperialistic Brazilian stances discharging their frustrations
not against the local oligarchy but rather on a foreign aggressor
responsible for their plight.
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B The Itaipu Decision: AcnnminnHatina P.r.g.Mv.n,
Argentine a nd_JjmLmj^nti^^
Strategic Int.prp^ c
The decision-making process about the tapping of the
Parana potential took several more years to materialize, roughly
from 1966 to 1973 and it involved the participation of several
actors, namely the ruling military forces of Brazil, Paraguay,
and Argentina, (all three under military-authoritarian regimes
during that period)
,
the diplomatic circles and the economic
elites
.
1- Paraguayan-Brazilian Joint Decision-Maki
In June 1966, the Brazilian and Paraguayan Ministers of
Foreign Relations met and signed the Accord of the Cataracts
(Ata das Cataratas or Acta de Iguazu ) whose main accomplishment
was the establishment of the common property of the waters
between Guaira and Foz do Iguacu and the equal division of the
electric energy, including the preferential right to buy back the
same energy for a fair price. 17
Although conceding to Argentina's interest "to study
the common problems of the region" 18 in the upcoming Meeting of
Chancellors of the Plate Basin Countries, Brazil and Paraguay in
fact alienated Argentine support for the endeavor by adding, in a
separate note, that the excess energy would be first offered to
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the other signatory before being offered to any other country.
In this way the dispute over limits seemed superseded
by the recognition of the Parana River waters as a common-pool
resource, what contributed to the completion of the Itaipu
Treaty. The situation required a novel solution to common-pool
goods in which a less efficient use of the Parana River or a use
which encroached on second or third-party rights were to be
avoided
.
In the following act, then Brazilian Ambassador to
Asuncion, Gibson Barbosa, and Chancellor Sapena Pastor
established a Joint Technical Commission ( Comissao Mista Tecnica
Brasileiro-Paraguaia ) to study the economic, technical and legal
feasibility of the endeavor. Although the Commission was staffed
in May 1967, it was not until the early 1970s that serious
studies began. The Brazilian representative was General Amyr
Borges Fortes, later nominated for the Administrative Council of
Itaipu Binacional company, and the Paraguayan representative was
the president of ANDE (Administracion Nacional de Electricidad
^
,
Engineer Enzo Debernardi, (together with three other specialists
from each country)
, which demonstrated the Brazilian military
preoccupation with security and development.
However only after Medici took office (in October 1969)
did the project take off. Medici nominated Gibson Barbosa as his
Minister of Foreign Relations and Jose Costa Cavalcanti was
shifted form the Ministry of Mines and Energy (1967-1970) to be
283
Medici Minister of the Interior - the agency in charge of
regional and frontiers development, to which. Itaipu fit
perfectly. Only then Eletrobras and ANDE signed a protocol
designating an Executive Committee with powers to contract
feasibility studies with foreign engineering consulting firms. ^
The 1971 Partial Report showed that more than 50 sites
in the Canyon were feasible for the construction of the project.
One of the two main alternatives considered building a single dam
at the Itaipu site, while the second recommended the building of
two dams — one at the Santa Maria Rapids, using the 60 meters
fall from the Sete Quedas Falls, and a second dam near Itaipu,
with another 60 meter fall. 20
According to an electric power sector official, one of
the technical staff at the Treaty of Itaipu, the second
alternative, though providing more output per unit cost, had the
political disadvantage of dispersing resources. This
alternative would require more firms executing the civil works,
and contractors were not willing to transfer part of their
potential profits to other firms. Since the engineers at the
Executive Committee and their counterparts in the private sector
(mainly the engineers within it) wanted Itaipu to be the "project
of the century" the single dam alternative was chosen. "The
engineers bunch wanted it!" ("A enqenheirada quis!" ) was
mentioned by an electric sector official used to mean not only
that the technical aspects were considered but the financial and
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technical aspects as well of performing a grandiose project.
With two power plants the contractors
' s profits would have been
smaller. 2
1
2
* Argentina-Brazil Relations and Itaipu Decision-Making. 19f^-
Brazil and Argentina have historically been rivals in
the Parana Basin. Their Armed Forces have been suspicious and
tried to outwit each other for decades. In the 1960s, when
Argentina's economy lost its primacy to the Brazilian economy the
relations between them soured. Brazil came to replace Argentina
as the supplier of economic, cultural and military assistance to
the smaller countries of the area.
The Itaipu project only exacerbated that trend.
Increased Brazilian activism in the region, specifically with the
common-pool waters of the Parana River fueled Argentina protests
and suspicions of Brazil's strategic interest in the area, namely
to secure Paraguayan and Bolivian (and to a lesser extent,
Uruguayan) markets for Brazilian manufactured goods and services,
as well as aiding their Armed Forces with training and
equipment
.
22
Right after the Foreign Relations Ministers 's Meeting
in Buenos Aires in February 1967, Argentina repeatedly diverged
with respect the use of the Parana waters. As the downstream
country, Argentina proposed the establishment of certain
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principles by which Argentine rights would be secured. Argentina
has favored the attainment of a global solution, that is, a
tripartite accord reconciling the interests of Brazil, Paraguay
and Argentina. Argentina's main concern, right after the
signature of the Ata da Cataratas was better depicted as being a
protective move against eventual unilateral utilization
of those resources by Brazil which could impair its ownuse [Argentina's] ."23
Despite public protest and enraged attacks by
extremist reactionary Admiral Isaac Rojas and newspapers staging
a public anti-Brazilian campaign; EL Clarin (30 September 1968)
mentioned that the river navigation would be seriously affected,
water pollution from factories installed along the river would
reach Buenos Aires, the Port of Rosario would have to stop its
activities and even the waves from the turbines would affect
Argentina, probably flooding would occur. Argentine diplomacy
worked with more reasonable arguments. They defended the
principle of prior consultation in order to evaluate possible
inadvertent flooding on another riparian country. In the Salto
Grande Accord (the hydropower plant built on the Uruguay River
between Argentina and Uruguay) , Brazil was brought in to agree to
prior consultation with those downstream countries in cases which
might cause severe damages. 24
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Such was not the case with Parana River, however.
Brazil was opposed to the principle of prior consultation because
Brazil was pressed to use this energy source (93 percent of the
electric power generated is hydraulic 2 *) in order to meet a
growing demand derived from rapid industrialization. Moreover
the military strategic interest of security and eventually
making Paraguay a buffer zone — likewise Uruguay — was
paramount
.
26
For Brazil the principle of indivisibility of water
resources existed only for countries sharing common border-
waters, as was the case between Brazil and Paraguay, Argentina
and Paraguay in the Parana River, and Argentina and Uruguay in
the Uruguay River. If Brazil had accepted the principle of
indivisibility of shared resources and prior consultation, Brazil
would have relinquished its sovereignty and granted Argentina a
veto power over any Brazilian action with respect that resource,
over and above the cases of negative spillovers. The fact of a
sudden drop in the volume of waters in the Iguacu Falls caused by
the diversion of the river to build Jupia and Ilha Solteira in
1968, prompted the Argentineans to press their case further.
Between 1969 and 1973 a convoluted diplomatic and legal
dispute over the controversial issue took place. 27 Stroessner
continued to play his pendulum diplomacy28 having been to Buenos
Aires to talk with Argentine president Alejandro Lanusse about
Yacyreta and Corpus, which provoked even further Argentine
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resentment. At stake was Argentina's historical influence over
Paraguay and a struggle over hegemony in the region. itaipu (or
a dan to be built between Brazil and Paraguay as it was not yet
decided) represented the way in which Brazil asserted its
hegemonic ambitions. 29
The 1971 Declaration of Asuncion and additional
documents of the Coordinating Committee, signed by the
Chancellors of the Parana Basin Countries reinforced Brazilian
positions of applying the principle of prior consultation only
for contiguous jurisdiction cases and the principle of avoiding
"sensible prejudice to the other states of the Plate system- in
the case of consecutive jurisdiction. 30
However, internal strife in Argentina led Lanusse to
make concessions to the Peronists, who were staging a comeback by
1972, which deeply concerned the repressive, exclusionary
military regime of Brazil. Due to continued disagreement over
the use of common-pool resource, the Argentineans took their case
to the June 1972 United Nations Conference on Human Environment,
in Stockholm where an agreement could not be reached by both
parties, who then referred that draft about the principle of
mutually sharing information on the use of the natural resources
to the UN General Assembly which met later that year.
Symptomatically , the Brazilian delegation was headed by Interior
Minister, Jose Costa Cavalcanti.
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But before the General Assembly met, both parties
agreed to the principle of prior consultation only between
contiguous countries and, in the case of severe damages, for
countries with successive jurisdictions. 31
3
*
The Treaty of I ta ipu and the Political Pnntov^
The signature of the Treaty of Itaipu was expedited by
the election of the Peronist candidate Hector Campora in the
Argentine 1972 presidential elections, an important event in the
decision-making process for Itaipu Project. The Treaty was
signed on 26 April 1973 by Stroessner and Medici in Brasilia, one
month before Campora 1 s inauguration in Buenos Aires. Most
diplomats and state officials believe this did not occur simply
coincidentally. 32 The Argentine Ambassador in Brasilia was
recalled to Buenos Aires as a protest, and even before Campora
took office, Argentina denounced the "shameful New York Accord"
as detrimental to its interests as a user of common-pool waters
and "submitting Argentina to accept the demands of continental
subimperialism.
"
33 Argentina feared losing the river as a vital
means of transportation between the Northeast Provinces (or
Paraguay for that matter) and Buenos Aires, and that the Itaipu
construction would hinder the construction of its own power
plants in the Parana River (Corpus and Yacyreta) .
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The good relations between Brazil and Paraguay were not
restricted to the construction of Itaipu or building bridges or
smuggling of luxury items in and out of the country. Medici's
Minister of the Army, Orlando Geisel (brother of president-to-be
Ernesto Geisel) promised military help in case Paraguay suffered
an external aggression34 since both regimes were anti-
Communist, repressive, exclusionary and against the Leftist trend
sweeping Chile (Unidad Popular)
,
Uruguay (Frente Amplio) and
principally Argentina (Peronist Party)
. One week later, Allende
was ousted in Chile with the involvement of Brazilian security
forces not only during the overthrow but also in the following
harshly repressive years.
The signing of the treaty, however, was viewed as a
confrontation by Argentina. The Peronists, resolved to reinstate
their previous influence with the smaller countries of the Basin
area, pushed for an autonomous foreign policy, non-alignment with
United States' foreign policy and the adoption of a pro-Third
World posture. Argentina took its complaints against the Treaty
of Itaipu to the 1973 Algiers Conference of the Non-Aligned
Countries and to the 1973 UN General Assembly, having approved in
both fora, resolutions which called for cooperation between
countries sharing natural resources, systematically conducted by
prior consultation and mutual sharing of information. This was
viewed by Brazil as another attempt to hinder the construction of
Itaipu
.
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However, Brazil was in an advantageous position with
respect to the Parana River, and Brazil's historical concern for
a Spanish-speaking alliance in the Southern Cone influenced the
military regime's concern for security and sovereignty in the
area. Brazil's military regime took advantage of its ideological
continuities with Stroessner's government and projected its
economic supremacy by embarking on the largest single Latin
American project, roughly estimated at US$ 3 billion at that
time. In spite of Third World and UN fora support of the
Argentina's grievances, the latter were ineffectual as Argentina
failed to obtain Paraguayan support of its views.
The novel binational entity — Entidade itaipu
Binacional —was created in May 1974, with its capital equally
divided between Brazilian Eletrobras and Paraguayan ANDE
(Administracion Nacional de Electricidad ) . Because of Paraguay's
inability to raise US$50 million in its capital market, Brazil
lent the Paraguayan share in the enterprise. The additional
investment capital needed would come almost exclusively from
Brazil, both from its domestic capital market and from
international commercial loans. No loans came from the World
Bank or the Inter-American Development Bank for the project.
Itaipu Binacional is managed by a council and an
executive board of directors made up by an equal number of
representatives from both countries. The bylaws devised a system
of rotation between Brazilian and Paraguayans directors in such a
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way that neither would have greater control over the other.
However, since its inception, Itaipu's Director-General has been
Brazilian, either General Jose Costa Cavalcanti (retired) (May
1974-May 1985) or General Ney Braga (retired) (1985+) with
Engineer Enzo Debernardi as Deputy Director-General since 1974.
Furthermore, Brazilians occupied the most influential positions
in the Administrative Council, and the Technical, Financial and
Coordinating executive directorships, "the most important ones in
the phase of implantation of the project." 35
The years of 1974-75 represented a watershed in the
Itaipu policy-making process. The decisional phase of the Itaipu
development project had ended — although the cycles and height
decisions were still to come.
The variable of relative state autonomy in this phase
of the process refers to the international relations content.
referred to in the beginning of this chapter. Brazilian
diplomatic and military interests were critical and determined
the policy output. Itaipu could have been more than just a
project contemplating, on the one hand, national security and
regional hegemony, and, on the other, technical or economic
demand: this project could have facilitated political
integration for the Basin countries. Instead the project,
derailed by ideological and geopolitical character of the
National Security Doctrine, only awakened "rivalry and
mistrust. Il36
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C implementation of Ttaipu: Interest Accoinmodation gynongBasin Countries and the influence of rnn^ ruction and
g
Capital Goods Industries
1
' National Interests Accommodation
—
Brazil
-Paraquay and the Questi on of Cyrils. The Treaty
of Itaipu and the Itaipu Binacional were just the initial act of
the implementation of Itaipu. However there were still national
interests to be reconciled. The Treaty of Itaipu stipulated the
distribution of energy but it did not mention anything on how the
energy would be generated and/or delivered by Itaipu to each of
the two national electric power utilities, Eletrobras and ANDE.
Moreover, no mention was made about the fact that Brazil and
Paraguay consumed energy at different frequencies nor mentioned
in what frequencies would Itaipu generators produce electric
power. This was in all likelihood premeditated on the part of
Brazil. The foreign-owned LIGHT converted 50 cycle-to-60 cycle
in the city of Rio de Janeiro (1965), which at the time had
approximately the same power demand as Paraguay in 1975. 37
Brazil expected to raise the issue when it would be more
beneficial for its own interests and expected to convince
Paraguay to change over its frequency adopting the Brazilian 60
cycles. In such way, Brazilians expected to use a technical
solution to its advantage by creating a market for Brazilian
equipment and manufactured products. 38
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Stroessner and the Paraguayan elite viewed Itaipu "not
[as] a business but an opportunity for the development of
Paraguay" so the distribution question was not raised at the
talks once Paraguay lacked the technical expertise and the sharp
difference on industrialization level dissuaded any competition.
Stroessner also let the question linger as he could use it to
Paraguay's advantage at the negotiating table with Argentina and
Brazil. 39 it was following up on that strategy, that Paraguay
signed the Yacyreta Treaty in December 1973 with Argentina, a few
months after the Treaty of Itaipu was signed, and drew heavily on
the latter as a path-breaking legal instrument.
Brazil and Paraguay then agreed to build the 18-
turbines, 700-MW generators, nine on the Paraguayan side of the
river and 9 on the Brazilian side of the river. According to an
official who was instrumental in the signing of the Treaty,
Itaipu Project had the unique feature of,
whatever was done in the Brazilian side, and was
necessary, was unnecessarily repeated on the Paraguayan
side. 40
Annex C of the Itaipu Treaty mandated Itaipu Binacional to sell
one half of the energy generated to ANDE and half to Eletrobras's
regional subsidiaries, Furnas and Eletrosul ( Centrais Eletricas
do Sul do Brasil ) . The first US$ 3.5 billion credit line was
opened from Eletrobras to Itaipu Binacional when Geisel visited
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Asuncion on December 1975 to sign the Treaty of Friendship and
Cooperation (Tratado de Amizad^ e CooBeragao) 4 * A special
credit line was opened at the Banco do Brasil in Asuncion for
Paraguayan industries to buy Brazilian industrial products and
improvement of the roads of the neighboring States of Parana and
Mato Grosso do Sul was also included in that Treaty. 42
As a result of this agreement, Brazil asked Paraguay to
change its frequency to 60 cycles for which Brazil would
compensate Paraguay. This solution seemed the most economical to
Brazil, as the Brazilian government was prepared to pay US$ 130-
150 million in cash and provide financial and supplier's credits.
Stroessner played the pendulum diplomacy once more. At his
request, he met with President Geisel (11 April 1977) and
demanded a compensation of US$ 300 million cash, financial and
technical assistance to explore hydropower from the Monday River
near Itaipu for its own use and military hardware and
training. 43 The Brazilian government perceived that this was
another of Stroessner' s double-dealing, since, if Brazil did not
agree to the deal, Paraguay would be free to sell the surplus of
its share to Argentina, using the same 50 cycles frequency.
In the final analysis, this meeting ended laconically
and no decision was taken. The Paraguayan Union of Industries
manifested its discontent with the proposed change to 60 cycles
because it would mean their complete surrender of political and
economic sovereignty to Brazil. That was the insinuation needed
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by Stroessner to rally around the internal nationalist
discourse. 44 Soon after General Rafael Videla, Argentina's
strongman, visited Stroessner and a note was issued stating that
the change of Paraguayan cycles would hinder joint Paraguayan-
Argentine projects in the Parana River. 45 Brazil had emphasized
the conversion to 60 cycles but expected a nationalist reaction,
as in fact occurred. 46
In November 1977 Antonio Carlos Magalhaes, Eletrobras
president announced that Brazil would adopt a dual system for
transmission of Itaipu energy, in view of new technology in
transmitting bulk, high-voltage direct current through long
distance lines. In all probability resources from European banks
(including the French agreement for Tucurui and for Northeastern
power plants, as discussed in Chapter VI) were involved since
Eletrobras procured foreign loans in whichever way in order to
fulfill government macroeconomic needs. Geisel finally decided
against conceding to Stroessner demands because: i) that
technology would help in the development of know-how for future
transmission lines from the Amazon Region, where a 100,000 MW
potential was waiting; ii) he disliked Stroessner's proposal of
building a dam for Paraguay's own use near Itaipu. 47 The costs
for this system were much higher than what Stroessner had asked.
The bid, won by a consortium of a Swedish firm (ASEA) and its
Brazilian subsidiary together with the Brazilian Promon which
would build the civil works of the lines, was originally tendered
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at US$ 850 million, but that cost has escalated to US$ 3.5
billion, of which US$ 2 billion were already spent by 1987.
This decision, although based on American, Swedish, Canadian and
Soviet prior experiences, was the first to utilize super-high-
voltage (625 kilovolts) on a 84 0-kilometers distance. 48
Brazil-Argenti na a nd Height Tssup
,
Brazilian-Argentine
relations had not improved since the beginning of the civil works
at Itaipu site and deteriorated with the return of the military,
by means of a coup d'etat against Isabelita Peron in March 1976.
Argentina advocated that the height of Itaipu dam would hinder
its development of the Corpus hydro-power plant. At root was the
issue of a geopolitical rather than a technical nature . Brazil ian-
Argentine relations only improved after President Geisel and
Brazilian Minister of Foreign Relations Antonio Azeredo da
Silveira left office in March 1979.
Although Brazil and Paraguay largely ignored Argentine
protests with respect to Corpus, Paraguay and Argentina had
signed the Treaty of Yacyreta in December 1973. The upcoming
decision on the generators imposed a tripartite solution — a
technical solution contained within a larger political solution.
With the beginning of Itaipu works, a few basic
technical decisions had to be made -- number of turbines,
generators' frequency, specifications of complimentary equipment
— , which made Argentine-Brazilian confrontations more evident.
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Itaipu and Corpus interdependence naturally raised the question
of the maximum height which would entail the most efficient use
of the common-pool resource. The potential energy of a hydro-
power plant depends on the fall measured by the difference
between the levels of water above and below the dam and on the
volume of water that flows through the river. In Itaipu, Brazil
and Paraguay agreed to build the dam at the point where the fall
was 120 meters above sea level. ^ That limited Corpus height to
100 meters above sea level, what caused Corpus to loose 1,900
MW, or 1/3 of its power capacity. 5 ° Considering that the level
of water which provided Yacyreta with its maximum output (4,050
MW) was 82 meters above sea level then the fall of Corpus could
not be more than 18 meters. Feasibility studies done by
Argentina indicated that the maximum efficient use of the waters
would be an upstream level of 120-130 meters and a downstream
level of 100 meters, giving Corpus its maximum capacity of 6,400
MW. The optimal solution for Argentina, then, was to raise the
level between Itaipu and Corpus to 130 meters what would have
made Corpus even more feasible. However, that would cause the
flooding of Itaipu' s turbines since they were already defined in
a specified master executive engineering project, in addition to
flooding fertile Brazilian and Paraguayan lands, and hindering
the use of power plants in nearby rivers. Therefore this
interdependency required a tripartite negotiation among the three
countries
.
51
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Negotiations on the trilateral accord began in
September 1977 in Asuncion at the Meeting of Foreign Relations
Ministers and they ended with the signing of the Accord Itaipu-
Corpus in Ciudad Presidente Stroessner, at the meeting point of
the three countries on 19 October 1979, when Figueiredo had
already taken office in Brazil. The most feasible height to
Itaipu and Corpus was 105 meters above sea level which caused the
smallest reduction of Itaipu' s output. 52
Argentineans were particularly worried about what would
happen when the sluices of Itaipu were closed to fill up the lake
in 1982. They were concerned that the water level would lower so
much that the ports of Rosario and Corrientes would have to close
down. Moreover the whole navigation on the river would be
endangered. The Accord of the Heights ( Acuerdo de las Alturas de
Itaipu y Corpus) addressed this responsibility question.
Notwithstanding the political solution to a technical problem,
what was truly important to an Argentine high official was the
new standing on which Brazilian-Argentine relations rested. As
he stated,
More than the definition of the heights, indubitably
important, the 1979 Treaty represented a new beginning
of cooperation on the nuclear field, in the exploration
of the Antarctica, and on economic integration. The
tripartite accord created the climate of exchange. 53
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That was a fundamental change from confrontation to
cooperation, a qualitative improvement in the relations between
Argentina and Brazil. That was followed by a May 1980
intergovernmental accord in areas of nuclear cooperation, and
mutual consultation on joint development of the Uruguay River;
interconnection of electrical system; building of a bridge over
Iguacii River directly to Argentina; cooperation between both
state steel-making companies, military hardware and the forming
of a permanent consulting body between chancellors. It should be
noted the difference of style between Geisel's Minister of
Foreign Relations, Ambassador Antonio Azeredo da Silveira — who
served in Buenos Aires during the early 1970s and was aggressive
towards Argentina — and his successor during the Figueiredo
Administration, Ambassador Ramiro Saraiva Guerreiro, who was more
amicable to Argentineans and implemented a more cooperative
policy, 54 although difficulties are always recognized.
2
.
Capitalist Development and Brazilian, Paraguayan and
International Interests
The construction phase in the Itaipu Project began in
1974 and is to finish in 1991 when the last turbine will be
installed. In 1986 Itaipu was almost four years behind its 1975
original schedule which stipulated the last turbine to go on line
by 1988. Political and financial problems repeatedly delayed the
construction, in spite of Itaipu being a priority project. 55
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The comparison between the 1975 planned costs and the 1987 debts
is illustrative of the dimension of the project and of the
interest it provoked among many groups and actors in the economic
sphere. As Table 5.3 shows, at the outset of the Itaipu Project
its cost was estimated to be US$ 4.24 billion, including
interests during construction. Thirteen years later that cost
soared to US$ 21.3 billion.
TABLE 5.3
ITAIPU BINATIONAL PROJECT
COST ESTIMATES AND DEBT
US$ billion
ITEMS
COST ESTIMATES DEBT
June 1974 January 1976 1987
Total Direct Cost
Engr. works, technical
supervision and ad-
ministrative 2.87 3.47 8.5
Financial Cost during
construction 1.37 1.66 6.8
Transmission Lines* 3.5
Investment Necessary to
complete the project** 2 . 5
TOTAL 4.24 5.13 21.3
Source: Itaipu Binacional, Relatorio . various years. 1987
Financial Statements.
* Including interests.
** As of 1986.
In current US$.
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This amount of resources stirred interest not only in
both countries but also worldwide. As Minister Dias Leite
stated
,
After the Treaty of Itaipu was signed it seemed thatthe representatives of the international banks crawledfrom under my bed offering money. 56
From the start, the Itaipu project used international
consulting, financial, and industrial goods and services. The
feasibility study was conducted by the International Engineering
Company
-Electroconsult consortium and it involved four Brazilian
and six Paraguayan firms. 57
Internal and international capital goods and financial
institutions involved in this project have been negotiating
since 1976. Technical decisions on the number and freguency of
the turbines and generators were freguently influenced by the
political and diplomatic decision-making process. The process
slowly evolved in search of a solution which would converge
demands and conditions imposed by Brazil and Paraguay as well as
the dynamic of internal interests to the two countries.
In view of the worldwide 1976-1978 recession, the
international capital goods industry was avid for orders, and
Itaipu seemed a project which would meet that need. The
international capital goods manufacturers and their national
subsidiaries formed pools for supplying the machines and
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equipment needed by Itaipu, in a model similar to what was
examined by Newfarmer. 5 ® The Itaipu Electromechanical
Consortium (CIEM, Consorcio Ttaipu Eletromecanico) a pool of
Paraguayan, Brazilian, and European firms (see Figure 5.4) was
responsible for manufacturing, delivering and supervising the
assembly of the 18 turbines and generators, plus complementary
equipment. The Brazilian capital goods industry, probably the
most impacted by the Itaipu project, was transformed as a result
of the Itaipu project, both in organizational and technological
terms
.
59
An amount of US$ 1.55 billion was estimated in 1978 as
the total needs of the equipment excluding engineering project
costs and other complementary expenses. 60 Since there are still
US$ 2.5 billion to be spent on Itaipu until the last machine goes
on line that was a conservative estimate, even considering
devaluation of the dollar. At the signing of the contract, in 20
October 1978, this represented the finalization of a long,
protracted process in which political and economic interests had
to be reconciled among the companies that fashioned the
consortium. 61 To demonstrate how politically important were the
negotiations of the Itaipu Project, sixteen executive meetings
between Itaipu Binacional and CIEM were held between February and
October 1978. The Executive directorships of Itaipu
participated directly in price negotiations, conditions of
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BRAZIL:
- Mecanica Pesada (leader)
- Bardella SA Indiistria Mecanica
- BSI Indiistrias Mecanicas
- Indiistria Eletrica Brown Boveri SA
- Siemens SA
- Voith do Brasil SA - Maquinas e Equipamentos
PARAGUAY
:
- Consorcio de Inqenieria Electromecanica (CIE) - assembly of
components manufactured abroad; at times just handlinq; amountedto 10 percent of the total operation.
EUROPE
:
- Brown Boveri & Cie. Ltd. (Baden-Switzerland)
"
" " A.G. (Mannheim-West Germany)
- Siemens (Aktienqesselschaft A.G.) (West Germany)
- J M Voith Gmbh (West Germany)
- Creusot-Loire/Neyrpic (France)
- Alsthom Atlantique (France)
Source: Itaipu Binacional, Relatorio
. 1978, p. 44.
FIGURE 5.2
LIST OF FIRMS
ITAIPU ELECTROMECHANICAL EQUIPMENT CONSORTIUM - CIEM
payment and financinq dealinqs directly with the Brazilian,
Paraquayan and international directors of the consortium.
The CIEM consortium received a total of US$ 930 million
(1978 US$) of which US$ 750 million were paid to Brazilian firms
or to the subsidiaries of the multinational firms. Between 1978
and 1982 Itaipu alone was responsible for 40-to-50 percent of the
utilization of productive capacity of the capital qoods
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industries located in Brazil. 62 But it was only after Brazil-
Argentina negotiations were well underway that the number of
turbines was defined (18 plus 2 reserve to be operated during
maintenance). The "index of nationalization," that is,
proportion of a unit which is produced domestically, was
as high as 85 percent for generators, but averaged 75 percent. 63
The civil construction part of the process involved
Brazilian and Paraguayan firms only, although several
international firms were interested; after all, it involved
heavy engineering works from which large profits could be made.
In 1973-74, at the outset of the bidding process, five
large consortia of Brazilian and Paraguayan firms were pre-
selected, considering their technical and financial capacity and
from the juridical viewpoint.
The first hurdle the companies had to surpass was to
gain Stroessner's political approval. In 1973, Stroessner called
for a meeting with officials of the largest Brazilian civil
construction companies previously selected ( Cetenco . CBPO,
Andrade Gutierrez , and Mendes Junior ) . Upon realizing that "Don
Sebastian," as he called Sebastiao Camargo, the owner of
Construtora Camarqo Correa — the largest Brazilian construction
company — , was not among them he adjourned the meeting until
that company was included among them. 64 This episode
illustrates the collusion between the construction companies and
Stroessner military regime in Paraguay. The Brazilian firms in a
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series of meetings acquiesced in letting part of the civil works
— especially those on the Paraguayan side — be accomplished by
Paraguayan firms, united under CONEMPA.
In order to legitimize the bidding process, in 1975
Itaipu Binacional opened all tenders presented to the excavation
of the channel through which the river would pass while the dam
was under construction (Phase I, 1976-78). Since no single firm
was able to satisfy Itaipu Binacional 's standards, then Itaipu
Binacional invited all bidders to form a sole, solidary
consortium for the construction. 65
Itaipu Binacional' s rationale for the unified
construction considered: i) the size and volume of the works in
the first stage, to which no Brazilian company alone was able to
undertake, despite their two previous decades experience in large
scale engineering projects; 66 ii) Eletrobras' credit of US$
3.5 billion for this required complex administrative and logistic
systems, all of which conduced to the formation of a consortium.
Two consortia were formed in Brazil (UNICON) and in
Paraguay (CONEMPA) . Since many of the of the works programmed
for the second stage entailed similar services to those up to bid
in the first stage, then Itaipu Binacional decided to augment the
civil works
which were object of the first contract in such a way
as to eliminate the need for another bidding process in
a short period of time [1978]. 67
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This proposal was promptly accepted, and the following
Brazilian and Paraguayan firms formed the two consortia.
In December 1975 the Paraguayan firms constituted in
December 1975 the Paraguayan Consortium of Construction Companies
(C0NEMPA
" Consorcio de Empresas Constructors Paraguayan srl)
,
while the Brazilians formed the Union of Constructors (UNICON -
Uniao de Construtoras T.tda . )
The Paraguayans were probably the most benefitted from
the works. The civil construction sector reached growth rates
above 30 percent between 1978 and 1982, reaching 32 percent in
1981. Itaipu helped the Paraguayan companies to increase
their technological level. CONEMPA participated in all phases of
the construction but initially it had to invest US$ 5 million in
the purchase of equipment to be used in the construction. That
capital was provided by Brazil in the form of suppliers' credits
for equipment preferentially produced in Brazil. During the peak
of the construction (1978-1982) CONEMPA hired a maximum of 5,000
Paraguayan workers in Itaipu, most of which are now working in
the Yacyreta Project. UNICON had a maximum of Brazilian 35,000
workers during the same period. 69
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CONEMPA
Paraguay
Compania General de
Construcciones, srl
Barrail Hermanos SA de
Construccion*
Jimenez Gaona y Lima
Ingenieros Civiles*
Ingenieria Civil Hermann
Baumann
Construcciones Viales,
Civiles-Industriales - ECCA
SA (Ingenieria J. C. Wasmosy)
Empresa Constructora Minera
Paraguaya (ECOMIPA)**
* One firm until 1981
** Began in 1981
UNICON
Brazil
Cetenco Engenharia SA
Companhia Brasileira de
Projetos e Obras (CBPO)
Camargo Correa SA
Construtora Andrade Gutierrez
SA
Construtora Mendes Junior SA
FIGURE 5.3
LIST OF FIRMS. CONSTRUCTION CONSORTIA
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Likewise for the assembly of permanent equipment in
Itaipu, another consortium of companies was formed, as shown on
Figure 5.6. Itaipu Industrial Construction Ltd. (ITAMON -
Construcdes Industrials Ltda - Montagu Eletromecanina rf*
Hidreletrica de Itaipu ) is formed by the following firms:
ITAMON
Montreal Engenharia SA A. Araujo Engenharia e
Montagens SA
SADE - Sul Americana de EBE - Empresa Brasileira de
Engenharia SA Engenharia SA
TECHINT - Companhia Tecnica SERTEP Engenharia e Montagem
Internacional
TENENGE - Tecnica Nacional de ULTRATEC Engenharia SA
Engenharia SA
FIGURE 5.4
LIST OF FIRMS
ITAIPU ELECTROMECHANICAL ASSEMBLY
Referring to the financial aspects of the project,
Table 5.4 shows the vast amount of resources consumed by Itaipu
during the its implementation. Comparing the investment made by
Eletrobras (its subsidiaries and associated state companies) to
those made by Itaipu Binacional, the resources spent at Itaipu
were almost equivalent to those spent for the Electric Power
311
sector as a whole. As shown on Table 5.5, the origin of
resources invested in Itaipu came primarily from credit
operations. Although high values are shown for Internal Credit
operations they should be viewed carefully, as those are funds
transferred from Eletrobras, which has borrowed abroad heavily
during the late 1970s and early 1980s.
TABLE 5.4
INVESTMENT ELECTRIC SECTOR, ITAIPU
GDP Eletrobras Eletrobras Itaipu Itaipu as
BRAZIL Investment as % of GDP Investment % of GDP
US$ bn US$ bn US$ bn
(1) (2) (2)/(l) (3) (3)/(l)
1971 -75 732 12 1 . 6 0.1
1976 -80 1, 059 23 2 . 2 1.1
1981 -85 1, 202 23 1.9 16. 6 1.4
1981 235 4 . 9 2 . 1 4 . 2 1.8
1982 237 5.2 2 . 2 3 . 8 1.6
1983 229 4 . 5 1.9 2.7 1.2
1984 240 3 . 9 1.6 3 . 1 1.3
1985 260 4 . 4 1.7 2 . 8 1.1
1986 -90* 1, 580 30 1.8
1991 -95* 2
,
049 28 1 . 4
1996 -00* 2
,
678 48 1 . 8
Source: Eletrobras. Piano 2010 . 1987
* Estimates.
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TABLE 5.5
BRAZIL
ITAIPU BINACIONAL
SOURCES AND USES OF FUNDS
, PERCENTAGES
1981 1982 1983 1984 1985 1986
SELF-GNTD
-25. 7 -40.9
-50. 6 -49.1 -67
. 2NSG
-31. 1 -41.1
-51.7
-55.4 -70
. 5OtRes 5. 5 0.2 1.1 6.3 3 . 2
GVT TRSRY 0 . 0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
CRDT OPTNS 125. 7 140.9 150. 6 149 . 1 167 . 2
Internal 67 . 6 80. 5 57 . 2 59 . 7 21.7
Ext+Res63 29 . 5 16 . 6 42 . 8 38 . 6 77 . 5
USES
CAPITAL EXPDT 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0
*Inv. 95.5 90.5 74.1 38.5 59.2
*Amtz 4.5 9.5 25.9 39.9 40.8
Int. 0.1 7.8 13.4 7.9 8.7
Ext. 99.9 92.2 86.6 92.1 91.3
Sources: Calculated from SEST, Relatorio
. various years and
from ITAIPU BINACIONAL, Relatorio , various years.
Percentage of Total Resources.
SELF-GNTD
NSG
OtRes
GVT TRSRY
CRDT OPTNS
Internal
Ext+Res63
CAPITAL EXPDT -
*Inv.
*Amtzn
Int.
Ext
See Observations
Self-generated resources = NSG + OtRes
Net Sel f-generated resources
Other resources
Funds allocated from Federal, State or
Municipal sources Government/Total Resources
Funds allocated from Credit
Operations/Total Resources
Credit institutions within Brazil
Credit institutions abroad and Res. 63
Capital Expenditures = invst + amtzn
Investments as percentage of Capital
Expenditures
Amortizations as percentage of Capital
Expenditures
To credit institutions within Brazil
To credit institutions abroad, Res. 63 and
Av MF/GB588
p. 197, for explanation on negative values.
Implications and Conc1iiRinn<;
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The intent of this chapter was to study the decisions
regarding the Itaipu hydropower project from political and
economic facts to evince the high degree of state autonomy
during the decision-making phase and the gradual loss of that
autonomy during the implementation stage vis-a-vis powerful
private national and international interests — namely the civil
construction, electrical and mechanical equipment manufacturers
and financial institutions. The joint Brazilian-Paraguayan
Itaipu endeavor is characterized by unique accomplishments
referring in particular to the variable state autonomy and its
subcategories, political and financial autonomy, and the
international context, as established at the outset of this
chapter.
It was seen that Itaipu decision and implementation has
spanned seven different Administrations and three regimes in
recent Brazilian political history — Quadros/Goulart
, Castello
Branco, Costa e Silva, Medici, Geisel, Figueiredo, and Sarney.
Paraguay, on the other hand, was governed by Stroessner since
1954. In Argentina, a decisive actor in the Itaipu decision, the
political regimes have gone from a populist-electoral to a
military dictatorship to an elected-Peronist government, to a
military-authoritarian, highly-repressive regime, and lately to a
transition regime.
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The Itaipu decision was conducted in a political
climate dominated by conflictive relations between Brazil and
Paraguay and Brazil and Argentina, especially the latter.
Although this decision stemmed from the fact that energy was
necessary primarily to power factory equipment and to supply
electricity to homes and public services in the Southern
industrial part of Brazil, the final decision in reality stemmed
from national security concerns. in the early 1970s, Brazil had
the expertise and the political/economic conditions to build
several dams along the Southern rivers, thus being able to supply
the energy demanded by the region. One of the principal national
security concerns was to avoid collusion between Paraguay and
Argentina against Brazil, for the simple reason of strategic
location of the Brazil/Paraguay border and the extremely fertile
soil. Therefore the Brazilian military insisted in making
Paraguay a partner in the Itaipu endeavor.
That, however, was not the road chosen by the
repressive, insulated, authoritarian regime between 1967 and
1974. Costa e Silva, under the influence of the hard-line
faction of the Brazilian military, engaged in construction of the
turn-key Angra I Nuclear Power Plant as shown in Chapter IV, and
the first step toward defining the construction of large
hydropower plant with Paraguay, along the common stretch of the
Parana River. These were two fundamental decisions which
reflected the highly militaristic character of the authoritarian
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regime, that privileged the ideology of national security and
development above all other considerations. The highly
autonomous central government agencies of information (SNI,
National Information Service) and security (National Security
Council), together with the military ministries, were influential
in underpinning the Itaipu decision to national security
objectives in the Basin region. Politically important to the
development project of the military regime, Itaipu was one of the
highly visible, grandiose project which the exclusionary, pro-
business military regime visualized as bringing economic
development to Brazil. Economically, Itaipu policy output was
welcomed by the financial capital, by the capital goods
manufacturers, both local and multinational, and by the
construction firms which depended on hydropower projects.
The decision was taken rapidly when a mistrustful (as
perceived by the Brazilian military) Peronist government was
ready to take office in 1973, which prompted the signing of the
Itaipu Treaty in April of that year. Whereas this was a first
step in the decision, it was a decisive step which involved a
commitment between the two governments.
Although Brazilian government imposed its bureaucratic
and political strength during the Itaipu decision-making phase,
in the implementation phase Brazilian state autonomy dwindled,
both politically and financially. Itaipu devoured a huge sum of
investment, the vast majority being internal and external debts.
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That investment represented an important percentage of the
Brazilian GDP, primarily during the recession years of 1981-1983
and was particularly significant when compared with investments
made by Eletrobras - the holding Brazilian electric power
company (Table 5.5). More significantly, Itaipu' s share of
investment during the same period remained at 10 percent (see
Table 4.3), but much of Eletrobras investment was directed to
Itaipu (loans, transmission lines). During the late 1970s
resources were relatively easier to secure due to the high
liquidity situation of the international financial market in the
aftermath of the 1974 oil price increase. When the international
financial systems signaled the first warning signals in 1980, the
highest political post on the electric power sector was changed
to comply with governmental priorities. Schulman did not accept
the policy and spending orientation set by Delfim Netto and Cals
and his substitution by Costa Cavalcanti as president of
Eletrobras reaffirmed the Brazilian government's disposition to
maintain international financial agreements and contracts to
purchase equipment.
General Jose Costa Cavalcanti — a 1937 military
academy classmate of President Figueiredo and of Army Minister,
General Valter Pires — , held jointly the position of president
of Eletrobras with that of president of Itaipu Binacional,
showing a political resiliency which made him survive through
successive administrations. 70 Costa Cavalcanti is probably the
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most perfect example of an anfibio.71 H is nomination guaranteed
that the electric sector and the large scale endeavors of Itaipu
and Tucurui would continue undaunted, despite the generalized
lack of financial resources. Costa Cavalcanti's nomination was a
guarantee to the business community that resources for Itaipu
would not stop flowing.
Notwithstanding that voluntarism, it seems that the
autonomy showed by Itaipu, or Eletrobras, in the late 1970s and
early 1980s did not match the relatively higher levels of state
autonomy of the decision-making phase, 1966-1973, which coincided
with the insulated, exclusionary Costa e Silva e Medici terms.
During its implementation phase, Itaipu lost political autonomy
vis-a-vis business interest and political clientele — in a
similar manner to other central government agencies. Political
society, entrepreneurs and workers gradually began forcing more
liberalized political stances on the part of the Brazilian
government and an administrative openness which demonstrated the
weaknesses of Itaipu project. Its gigantism and geopolitical
connotations were often criticized despite its need.
The beginning of its operation showed further
weaknesses. In late 1982, Itaipu's lake was filled. In 1984,
Itaipu installed two 50-cycles turbines, but generating at only
20 percent capacity to supply Paraguay. The transmission lines
to the Brazilian grid were only completed in 1985. Repeated cuts
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in investments have curtailed Itaipu 's financial and
administrative autonomy.
For Brazil, undoubtedly Itaipu is and will continue to
be an important source of electric power for industrial Southern
Brazil. However, Brazil is bearing the full burden of the debt
incurred to build it (See Tables 5.5 and 5.6). In 1985 Itaipu
Binacional began selling energy to Eletrobras and ANDE and should
have received US$ 273.4 million dollars; actually Itaipu only
received US$ 9.8 million. The remainder was used to pay royalties
and to roll over loans. 7 2 if this system of rolling over almost
100 percent of the debt continues, the total amount Itaipu
TABLE 5.6
ITAIPU DEBTS, 1987 BALANCE
TYPE US$ 1, 000 %
WITHIN BRAZIL
Eletrobras 5,715, 419 47 . 4
BNDES/Assembly 529
,
487 4 . 4
FINAME/Agents 610, 984 5.1
Other 23, 355 0.2
SUB-TOTAL 6,879, 245 57
,
1
ABROAD
Commercial Banks 1.743, 126 14 . 5
Resolution 63 95, 284 0.8
Buyer's/Supplier's Cr. 566, 776 4.7
SUB-TOTAL 2 ,405, 186 20.0
BANCO DO BRAS I
L
Notes - Ministry of
Finance 2,763, 519 22 . 9
TOTAL 12,047, 950 100. 0
Source: Itaipu Binacional, Financial Division
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will owe at the end of its planned life (50 years), will be US$
250 billion in 2023, more than double the present Brazilian
foreign debt. Thus it will not pay for itself as originally
planned.
For Paraguay, Itaipu changed its economic life in a way
similar to that of Volta Redonda (CSN) Steel Plant which changed
Brazilian economic life in the 1940s. Like Brazil, Paraguay's
development can be divided before, during and after Itaipu.
The Paraguayan economy went through boom and bust under
Stroessner. During the construction of the dam (1975-1981), GDP
annual growth rates reached 11.4 percent in the years 1978-81,
the peak of the construction. The so-called Paraguayan "miracle"
generated euphoria; the construction sector expanded above 3 0
percent each of those years; the great majority of Paraguayan
private commercial banks were set up at that time. Similarly to
the so-called Brazilian "miracle," the Paraguayan counterpart
engendered perverse social and economic consequences when Itaipu
construction ended.
Since 1982 Paraguayan GDP decreased or barely
maintained its previous level. Inflation has risen from 15 to
30 percent. Characteristically, the Itaipu boom was not been
used to save and invest in productive activities; Paraguayans
preferred to speculate in the financial and real estate markets
as well as expanding its informal economy — particularly
contraband. 73 Paraguay's fertile soils have attracted 450,000
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Brazilian to live and produce on Paraguayan lands, what caused
the Portuguese language to be spoken and taught inside Paraguay,
whereas Spanish was spoken in the Western portion of the State of
Parana a few decades ago. 74 Additionally, the Paraguayan
foreign debt, which was non-existent until Itaipu began, soared
to US$ 1.8 billion in 1986, approximately the amount which Itaipu
brought into the country. 75 Paraguay is currently using 250,000
KW or 5 percent of the electric power currently produced at
Itaipu (4,800 MW)
.
It is not receiving any money to repay the
US$ 50-million loan to establish the partnership. This situation
should change in the future as Paraguay is already moving toward
a revision of the payment clause. 76
In conclusion, the state autonomy during the initial
decision phase of the Itaipu project gradually eroded, giving way
to putting political power and autonomy under some form of
control, parallel to what has happened to the central government.
The seemingly unchecked financial autonomy of the 1970s was
substituted by a controlled form spending by the Brazilian
government (SEST) or became subject to macroeconomic guidelines
imposed by the IMF. In addition, political parties, labor unions
and industrialists reigned in the state autonomy during the last
decade of the military regime.
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CHAPTER VI
THE TUCURUI HYDROELECTRIC POWER PLANT-POLITICAL POWER, DEVELOPMENT POLICY
'
AND LIMITED STATE AUTONOMY
The infrastructure development project of Tucurui
Hydroelectric Power Project must also be analyzed under the
notion of state relative autonomy, as this case-study contrast
with the autonomous decision on Itaipu. During the elaboration
and execution of this project the capacity of the Brazilian stat
to formulate and implement the Tucurui policy diminished becau
of factors related to the international interests.
This chapter analyzes how and why authoritarian
Brazilian policy-makers decided to build the largest solely
Brazilian hydroelectric power plant on the Tocantins River, 300
kilometers South from Belem, state of Para. This chapter
analyzes how the agency for electric power in the Northern region
Centrais Eletricas do Norte do Brasil s.a. - Eletronorte
. a
subsidiary of Eletrobras — implemented the Tucurui project even
when the international market for metals was in crisis and in
face of the critical financial situation of the mid-to-late-
1970s, both of which called for careful and sound planning of any
grandiose projects, especially with a US$ 8 billion project like
Tucurui
.
Tucurui was born as an integrated development project.
It does not justify itself solely on the basis of supplying
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electricity to cities and towns of the Eastern Ma.on. Sound
engineering practice for hydroelectric power plant construction
even recommended Tucurui to be the last dam built on the
Tocantins River.
1 The determining reason for building Tucuru,
was the high energy demand for the production of non-ferrous
metals and the requirements for mining, a overwhelmingly
superior demand to that mentioned above.
This chapter is organized as follows: it begins with a
brief historical overview of development in the Amazon. This is
followed by the decision reconstruction of the mining-industrial,
bauxite-alumina-aluminum, energy complex. This reconstruction
will examine how decisions or non-decisions have influenced what
was decided about Tucurui. A parallel analysis is undertaken
showing how the international interests articulated with the
Brazilian state and the national private capital interests,
especially in the area of export of industrialized metal
products
.
Next, an analysis of how the Tucurui decision was
implemented is elaborated. Beginning 1976, two European
consortiums of banks and capital goods industries manifested
interest in financing Tucurui. This section shows how and why
the international financial capital and the multinational capital
goods industry had its eyes on the development of the energy,
mining and industrial projects of the Eastern Amazon, and how
they related to the Tucurui project, from a position of political
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power. This section also shows that interests within Brazil -
just as powerful as the foreign ones - articulated around
Brazilian contractors and suppliers, were strong enough to
prolong and sustain the building of Tucurui during the crisis
years of the early 1980s and even after the 1982 debt crisis.
The chapter ends with a section analyzing some of the
outcomes of Tucurui. Despite facilitating production and export
of alumina/aluminum and other minerals, contributing to an
increase of foreign currency generated by export of manufactured
products, Tucurui has left a legacy of unresolved environmental
and social problems, exacerbated when one verifies that the
pollution caused by activities that generate foreign currency
will be costly to the environment, thus decreasing the benefits.
Therefore, not only decision reconstruction -- as in
the Dahlian pluralist method of policy analysis —
, is
considered; this case study also considers reputation analysis
of the decision-making and implementing elites — a methodology
derived from the joint elite and policy analysis. Therefore, an
analysis of the ministerial and presidential action is crucial to
fully comprehend the decision-making process in this case. In
addition to these two methods, structural analysis is fundamental
in this case: the hypothesis that the state could be a provider
of the conditions of reproduction of capitalist relations of
production in the periphery, internationally and within the
country, must be analyzed through structural analysis.
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Multinational and large national firms were the benef iciaries o£
the integrated develops mining-industrial-energy project,
leaving behind thousands of unemployed workers who had to
dislocate once again.
First, it is argued that the decision to build Tucurui
can be empirically determined as a result of the multinational
interest in the mining and industrial transformation of bauxite
in the Eastern Amazon. it will be determined whether it has been
a decision taken by Eletrobras or Eletronorte directors or
resulted from government decision and actions taken by the
Ministers of Mines and Energy, Antonio Dias Leite (1969-74) and
Shigeaki Ueki (1974-79). Eletronorte, despite its apparent high
degree of autonomous formulation and definition of engineering
projects, could not rely on self-generated financial resources in
the case of Tucurui; it depended on negotiated pricing policies
which curtailed Eletronorte
' s managerial and technical capacity
to define the equipment to be used in the construction.
Furthermore, during the latter part of the implementation under
Minister Cesar Cals (1979-85), Tucurui was delayed numerous times
due to lack of financial resources — in view of the severe
balance of payment crisis of the early 1980s and the debt crisis
of 1982 —
,
and because of badly managed environmental issues.
Second, as argued in Chapter II, the government itself
dictated the use of its state enterprises as sustainers of
growth, in order to maintain the conditions of and to promote
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capitalism in the periphery. Therefore the utilization of state
enterprises to implement development projects in the 1970s and
early 1980s, resulted from a political relationship which limited
the state enterprise managers' autonomy to pursue sectoral
objectives. Directed from a higher echelon of decision-making,
such decisions only partially reflected the interests of
Brazilian society. After all, electric energy was needed, but
the form by which it was achieved could have been used to
distribute resources better throughout Brazilian society, it will
be shown how political power was used by the highest hierarchical
positions on the state to influence or to obtain actions from
state enterprise managers and how firms responsible for the
construction of Tucurui were capable of changing the
implementation to serve their particular interests, endangering
the environment and social settings, as well as on the part of
the interests of financial and industrial foreign capital with
respect to their Brazilian clients.
A. Historical Overview
In the Amazon region several myths coexist with bleak
realities. Everything there has a sense of vastness, of immense
wealth. Since the 1600s it attracted different interests.
Spaniards and Portuguese built the first forts in the mouths of
the larger rivers, protecting the Amazon hinterland from
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exploring expeditions. in the l7onccn 1 00s, settlers tried to enslave
the native Indians while the Teanfern Jesuits counteracted trying to
establish a religious nation. The results were whole nations
decided. The rubber boom of the 180 0s attracted half-a-mil! ion
Northeasterner to the Amazon. Even an epic battle to conquer
what today is known as the state of Acre from Peru was fought. 2
in the early twentieth century Brazil nuts, gold and diamonds
continued luring thousands to the Amazon El Dorado. However, of
those who sought wealth very few became rich or made it back home
alive. The vast majority was overwhelmed by the forest, remained
planting subsistence crops or entered in the circle of
indebtedness of the "aviamento"3 £ysteIn< which resulted ^
wealth for few and misery for many. Nevertheless, Amazon myths
still attract even today.
Today's explorers are more sophisticated, but the
patterns of exploration resemble past ones. During the past
decades the Amazon region has seen government-sponsored action in
infrastructure, mining and industrial development, which have
favored the dynamics of capitalism. Recent Amazon development
projects — a region which comprises 59 percent of the 8.5
million square kilometers of the Brazilian territory but has only
11 percent of the population (3.0 inhabitants per square
kilometer) —
,
were started with the construction of the Belem-
Brasilia Highway in the late 1950s, as an offspring of the
construction of Brasilia integrating the North to the South. In
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the mid-1960s Herman Kahn, of the Hudson t««-m* -un rtuaso Institute, proposed th
creation of an immense lake. The National Security Council
responded with the National Integration Plan (PIN)
, a policy
directed to keep the A.azon region under the Brazilian control,
in view of these foreign interests. These actions took place
under aegis of the National Security Doctrine, fully supported by
the harsh authoritarian Costa e qilv^ •U5 bl a ar»d Medici governments
(1967-74). in the early 1970s the Transamazon Highway was
started, disrupting Indian tribes and leaving a path of misery
behind. Daniel Ludwig's floating pulp and paper plant (Jari
Project) startled everyone with its trip across three oceans.
Recently, infrastructure, mining and agricultural projects cause
extensive, uncontrolled deforestation, displacement and
relocation of native populations, disrupting their traditions and
culture and killing thousands.
When the mineral reserves of the Serra dos Carajas were
revealed in 1967 by U.S. Steel, and particularly when the bauxite
reserves of the Trombetas River (Oriximina) region and of the
Capim and Gurupi Rivers (Paragominas) region were announced by
the Aluminium Company of Canada (Alcan) in 1972 and by the
British Rio Tinto Zinc, these companies urged the government to
provide energy to explore these resources. 4 In the case of
aluminum alone large amounts of energy were necessary since it
accounts for a substantial proportion of the inputs; in the case
of mining, it was necessary for electrifying the exploration of
or
o
mines and the railroads on an industrial scale. 5 Most
importantly, in the costs of production of a ton of aluminum -
what ultimately determines the profits of the firms - bauxite
accounts for 15 percent (including transportation,, alumina f
18 percent, and the other inputs in the final transformation int
aluminum 67 percent. Just in the second stage of transforming
alumina into aluminum, electric energy accounts for 80 percent of
the input costs. Therefore electric energy accounts for 55
percent of the total cost of factors of production of a ton of
aluminum
.
6
President Geisel's grandiose development projects were
thought to provide the structural requisites that would enable
Brazil's entrance into the class of developed countries and world
power. 7 That p i an proved to be unrealistic and continued an
inequitable development process on social and on economic
grounds. m addition, the still unresolved ecological problems
caused by Tucurui turned it into a potential danger as well as
learning case for future Amazon development projects.
Tucurui, the largest solely Brazilian hydro-project, --
a 3,960 MW-power plant in its first phase (2,640 MW in 1988,
progressively augmented then on) and 7,920 MW in its final stage
(in 1993) —
,
is the largest single development project in the
Amazon region, and the fourth in the world after Itaipu, Guri in
Venezuela, Grand Coulee in the U.S. Its dam spans almost
thirteen kilometers (eight miles) taming the fast waters of the
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large Tocantins River, up stream from its mouth in Bel,,, state
of Par,. until the late 1960s electric power officials believe,
Amazon Region rivers were unsuitable for energy generation,
and powerhouses could be anchored. In reality, it is now
understood that there was a political decision to postpone
infrastructure projects in the Amazon, since they were not yet
attractive and profitable for the ejBp^eiteiros . 8 The
Coordinating Committee on Energy studies for the Amazon Region
(ENERAM)
,
found it unsuitable to build power plants along a 250-
kilometers-strip of flat lands on both sides of the Amazon River
because of the high flooding risks and environmental damages.
The studies, lasting from 1968 to 1971, indicated a potential -
after the 250 kilometers range ~ of more than 100 million kw for
the region, ten times larger than the total Brazilian installed
capacity in 1971. 9
As mentioned before, the power plant itself was
unjustified if it were not linked to the energy intensive mineral
and metallurgical projects, since any transfer of electric power
among regions required technology for long-distance transmission,
then unavailable. Even with impressive population and economic
growth rates, the states of the Northern Region to which Tucurui
would supply electricity do not demand large amounts of electric
power, as shown on Table 6.2. Still, in the Medici period (1969-
74), Minister Antonio Dias Leite began negotiations on the
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Leite
construction of a hydroelectric power plant on the TocantinRmr
' ^ n0t yet defined to be Tucurui. Minister Dias
negotiated the construction of a hydroelectric plant with
Japanese groups in conjunction with the implanting of the alumin;
and aluminum plants. During the negotiations, oias Leite invoke,
the "Law of Participation," mandating beneficiary large consumer
industries to be co-investors in infrastructure projects." The
Japanese were eager to produce alumina and aluminum in the
vicinity of energy sources since the cost of producing aluminum
in Japan skyrocketed on the wake of the 19 73 oil shock, when
Prime minister Kakuei Tanaka visited Brazil, both governments
signed a letter of intention considering an US$ 800-million
financing agreement for the construction of a hydroelectric
plant, "but there was no firm commitment on the part of
Japan. "11 Furthermore, the Japanese groups were more interested
in avoiding high transportation costs and escaping strict
controls and regulations for producing alumina and aluminum in
the advanced countries. Therefore, placing production units near
the estimated 7-billion-tons-bauxite mines and near the source of
abundant energy, with lax environmental controls suited their
interests. Another important consideration was the 1974 prices
for bauxite "in natura," USS 6-7 per ton; alumina sold for ten
times as much, and the price of aluminum was quoted at US$ 1,000
per ton in the London market, prices attractive enough to
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transform the Eastern Amazon into a significant bauxite-alumina-
aluminum producing and exporting area.
The Tucurut Decision- A Decision wi+h^
a Manor Devpl npment Policy Decision
When the Mining Code was re-enacted in 1967, one the
objectives was to give unprecedented incentives to private mining
companies to research and exploit mineral areas, especially in
the Amazon while maintaining the state enterprises' rights to
explore mineral resources. Before 1967, the foreign companies
could explore minerals only if they were associated to Brazilian
firms (The 1987-88 Constituent Assembly negated such right)
.
Some of the examples were Companhia Auxiliar de Emoresas de
Mineracao (CAEMI, of the Azevedo Antunes Group) associated with
Bethlehem Steel in manganese exploration in the Federal Territory
of Amapa and with Hanna Mining in iron ore in Minas Gerais, and
Union Carbide (in association with U.S. Steel) and CVRD in the
Iron-Carajas project. The association model for mining became
commonplace, protected and fostered by the authoritarian regime.
In contrast, during the Goulart regime, demonstrations and
political resistance were continually staged against the
associative model for mining. 12
Tucurui was decided during the Ernesto Geisel
government, which began March 1974. Geisel appointed Shigeaki
Ueki — who had been the Financial Director of Petrobras when
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Geisel was its president - as Minister of Mines and Energy. 13
Geisel's presidency was characterized by the active use of the
state enterprises as instruments of economic development policy,
in the wake of the 1973 oil shock, the Brazilian state planned
its industrial and mining policies within PND II seeking to
develop the capital goods industry and the basic inputs sector
through large scale import-substitution, and the insertion of
peripheral regions into the capitalist relations prevalent for
the rest of the country. As Minister Ueki stated,
The large scale production of aluminum would be theideal solution to the absence of non-ferrous materials
-- copper, zinc, tin -- as it [aluminum production]
would enable the import of other basic inputs without
unfavorable balance of payment repercussions.
Therefore government should take the initiative to
produce abundant and cheap energy in the region to
ultimately produce aluminum. 14
To achieve the objectives defined on the PND II the
Brazilian state specifically engaged its state enterprises in the
mining sector — the CVRD and its subsidiaries — in activities
related to substituting imports in basic inputs. Between 1974
and 1976, CVRD was turned into a policy instrument 15 and its
capacity was extensively used in development projects located in
the Eastern Amazon. CVRD 1 s access to foreign capital and
commodities markets was instrumental in engaging the company in
several projects. In that period, CVRD diversified into new
areas of action according to government objectives. In addition
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to new mining projects, new plants for peptization of iron ore,
sea transportation, prospection and engineering, CVRD expanded
its activities into the fields of paper and pulp, fertilizers and
aluminum, including a regional decentralization contributing to
PND II
>
8 national integration objectives. We turn to the
analysis of the linkage between CVRD, its partners and
Eletrobras/Eletronorte, specifically for the construction of
Tucurui serving the bauxite-alumina-aluminum and Greater Carajas
projects
.
1
. Bauxite
The mining of bauxite in the Amazon started as a result
of the 1967 Mining Code which lifted restrictions to giving
mining concessions to multinational companies. Mean (Aluminum
Company of Canada) revealed its bauxite deposits on the Trombetas
region right after the 1967 Mining Code went into effect,
calculated in more than 500 million tons or the equivalent of 50
years exploration at 10 million ton per year. In 1972, the
Canadian firm partially pulled out of the Trombetas reserve
because of a slump on the international markets for bauxite.
Although the decision resulted from the market uncertainties
regarding the fuels and mineral areas — a signal for coming
rearrangement of the sector — the decision also reflected the
fact that the Brazilian authoritarian state induced its mining
344
enterprise, CVRD, to become part of the project, and to incur in
expenditures for prospection. Mean's pullout was an intentional
delay waiting for Docegeo (Rio Doce Geologia e Mineragao) CVRD's
mineral prospecting subsidiary, to assist the multinationals in
minerals research in the Amazon. Docegeo spent an annual average
of US$ 15.6 million in geological prospections of non-ferrous
minerals, phosphate and inputs for steel industry during the
years 1975-80.16 while the Brazilian state acted as a "growth
sustainer" making knowledge of mineral resources in the Amazon
available to the multinationals, it also took care of its own
interests. At the same time that CVRD was induced to
participate, it gave fiscal incentives and made available
knowledge, attracting other investors. Although CVRD
participation was justified on grounds of preventing total
dominance of the multinationals, CVRD lacked autonomy to decide
in the bauxite projects.
Once knowledge of soil was available it was passed
along at very little cost to Alcan and other multinational firms.
Although Alcan, and a group of other six multinational firms
resisted CVRD's partnership, Minister Dias Leite negotiated CVRD
participation in the bauxite exploration, and its
industrialization before export. They constituted the Mineracao
Rio do Norte (MRN) , in charge of the exploration of bauxite from
the Trombetas region. In 1975 CVRD and the partners agreed on
the following division of shares: CVRD retained 46 percent, Alcan
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19 percent, Companhia Brasileira ^ Aluminio (CBA) — the largest
aluminum private Brazilian company - 10 percent, and the
remaining 25 percent were divided among a Norwegian, a Dutch, an
American and a Spanish firms. " By 1986 the composition of
state-multinational-local capital on MRN had changed, and the
Spanish firm had pulled out:
OWNERSHIP OF MINERAQAO RIO DO NORTE
CVRD - 4 0%
Alcan - 24%
Reynolds
Metals (US) - 5%
CBA
Billiton-Shell (Great
Britain-Netherlands)
Norskhydro As (Norway) -
Source: SEST; Gazeta Mercantil
. 13 January 1986
10%
16%
5%
The initial annual production of this US$ 300-million-project was
estimated at 3.4 million tons beginning 1979. In the first years
the output was totally exported but the bauxite was progressively
used to make alumina and aluminum, marking Brazil's presence in
the aluminum world market; by 1985, 69 percent of Brazil's
bauxite production (4.5 million tons) came from the MRN-Trombetas
project. 18 Actual investment in MRN by 1981 was US$ 403 million
dollars for the first phase, making it the largest Brazilian firm
in mining of non-ferrous metals, and the world's second largest
exporter. The expansion of the mining of bauxite up to 8 million
tons was linked to the conclusion of the alumina/aluminum
projects in the country. In 1983 and 1984, CVRD was negotiating
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the MRN expansion of production to 4 . 7 million tons per year in
order to meet Alumar's (Muminio_do Maranhao s.a. i demand of 1.2
million tons. 19 The alumina/aluminum plants - Albras/Alunorte
and Alumar — will be discussed in the next section.
Other bauxite reserves, in addition to the 1.7 billion
tons Trombetas reserve, 20 were discovered by Docegeo on the
Almerim region and in the region between the Gurupi and Capim
Rivers (Paragominas)
,
the former estimated in more than 0.5
billion and the latter, 2.4 billion tons. 21 The British firm
Rio Tinto Zinc was given concession to explore part of the
deposits in the Paragominas region in association with CVRD,
forming the Mineracao Vera Cruz . CVRD's share is only 36
percent, but its importance is its closeness to the alumina and
aluminum plants, Albras and Alunorte, contributing to the
lowering the costs of production. The investment in the
Mineracao Vera Cruz project was US$ 300 million aimed at
producing 4 million tons of bauxite per year. 22
MRN was a controversial joint-venture from the start
despite its important role in the international market. CVRD's
position as the largest shareholder did not equate to having much
weight in the firm's decision-making. MRN Brazilian partners
(CVRD and CBA)
,
despite having 50 percent of the capital always
experienced pricing problems. By 1986 CBA's Chairman, Antonio
Ermirio de Moraes — one of the larger industrial entrepreneurs
in Brazil and a critic of the military regime — spoke out
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condemning the pricing behavior of the foreign partners in MRN.
According to MRN s policy imposed by the multinationals, any
changes in price requires approval of 2/3 of voting capital; any
capital increase requires 90 percent of the votes. The foreign
partners using their oligopsonic strength forced the selling
price down, thus obtaining fallout profit in international
markets. Ermirio pointed out that
If undeveloped countries like Brazil do not devel
serious policy on bauxite, they will always be me
suppliers of raw materials and exporters of low-pgoods.
^
J ^
Furthermore, BNDES decided against financing MRN or
entitling it to incentives in view of Mean's disproportionate
decision-making power over the other partners — namely the right
to withdraw from the MRN-Trombetas Project during the first ten
years (1974-1984) and the right to acquire as much as 1.2 million
tons per year (more than half of the production) at reduced
prices on long term contracts just because it was the original
holder of the concession. 24 The Brazilian state enterprise CVRD
therefore lost autonomy in the MRN-Trombetas project, and became
weak where it most counted: in the financial decision-making
component of that variable and in the capacity to price its own
products
.
348
The Industrial Projects and TnmnU Hvdro-PnwPr Plant: ThPLoss of Relative state Autonomy
The aluminum policy of the Brazilian state was a
priority on the PND II in view of the pressing need to substitute
imported basic inputs to complete industrial development in
Brazil. It was a combination of political will of developing the
Amazon, producing for the internal and external market, and of
foreign producers' strategic transfer of production to the
periphery near the bauxite mines and abundant energy sources, in
the wake of the 1973 oil crisis. Negotiations for these projects
began in 1972-73, accelerated with the Geisel government's wishes
of exporting energy with profit from the Northern Region's
rivers. Tucurui was going to materialize part of this plans
together with the alumina/aluminum plants implanted near Belem
and Sao Luis, Maranhao, both ports on the Atlantic Ocean facing
world markets of the North Atlantic.
As in the bauxite exploration (mining-electric sector
linkage)
, industrial and energy policies were also intertwined
for the Northern Region. Since 1977 CVRD's subsidiary Valenorte
Aluminio Ltda , originally created (1972) as an engineering and
consulting firm for bauxite exploration, became the CVRD holding
coordinating aluminum investment in the North of Brazil. 25
Negotiations for the processing of bauxite began with
Dias Leite, the Minister of Mines and Energy, in 1973. Dias
Leite, a kind of CVRD spokesman since he had been its president
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during the its greatest expansion period, initially only dealt
with Aluminum Resources Development of Japan concerning the
production of alumina, which interested the Japanese because of
stricter environmental controls. m December 1973, the Japanese
demonstrated interest in the production of aluminum as well,
since their energy costs at home were rapidly increasing. Soon
after Geisel's inauguration, Minister Ueki formed a joint
committee involving CVRD, the recently created Eletronorte and
the Light Metal Smelters Association ( LMSA) of Japan with the aim
of performing a feasibility study. 26 The five largest companies
making up LMSA - Nippon Metal, Showo Denko . Mitsui
. Sumitomo and
Mitsubishi
— were looking for alternative sites of production
outside Japan; among the sites considered were Venezuela, New
Zealand, Australia and Brazil's Eastern Amazon. 27 Brazilian long
association with the Japanese in steel making (USIMINAS) was a
strong asset in the new aluminum partnership. Both countries and
the firms did control prices, the investment was highly risky and
included the energy factor as well: they were complex and they
required the intervention of both governments.
The initial study, with projected investment totalling
US$ 2.6 billion, recommended a two-staged one-million-ton year
plant (at US$ 1.1 billion), an alumina plant (US$ 500 million), a
hydroelectric power plant (US$ 800 million for a Stage I 1200 MW)
and infrastructure (US$ 200 million, village, roads) . The
Aluminio do Brasil (Albras) first stage was projected at 640,000
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tons, with half the total investment, an attractive investment
considering the international price of US$ 1,000 per ton in 1974;
it would consume 1,200 MW and was going to be built in the town
of Barcarena near Belem. The Alumina dn Norte do Brasi]
(Alunorte) was included in the initial study to produce 1.3
million tons annually, but the attractiveness of alumina
production was lower since it competed in price with imported
alumina. Both were in partnership with Valenorte and LMSA-NAAC
.
The euphoria regarding of the initial plan between CVRD
and LMSA agreement signed on 17 September 1974 dwindled as the
Japanese become aware of the economic downturn as the aftermath
of the 1973 oil crisis. Excessive inventories of aluminum
worldwide and falling demand turned the aluminum/alumina project
in the Eastern Amazon unprofitable at that time, specially
considering that the "law of participation" mandating final
consumers as beneficiaries to invest in the construction of the
hydroelectric power plant. 28 LMSA stalled the negotiations
while the Tucurui decision was being drafted. The Japanese
withdrew their responsibility for investing in the energy supply,
turning the "law of participation" into a dead letter. Three
other factors induced LMSA's delay on a decision until 1976: a)
both Japanese and Brazilian governments and firms had no control
over aluminum prices internationally; b) highly risky investment
demanded government action, as presented in Chapter II, and
government-to-government negotiations ; and c) as the scale of
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production increased, so did the cost of investment and cost of
electric energy. All three factors caused Japan's loss of
interest in the project. Additionally, an aluminum plant takes
three years between its design and commissioning. A Tucurui-size
hydropower plant takes eight to ten years to build, considering
the difficulties of construction in the Amazon. This Japanese
decision delayed for a year the Brazilian government decision
about the construction of the power plant. A statement from
Minister Ueki showed some embarrassment with the situation
created by the Japanese pull out. He stated that "with or
without partners" Tucurui was a priority program for governmental
action. 29 Furthermore Ueki specifically mentioned,
We want to break a vicious circle that is happening.
There is no industrial project in the Eastern Amazonbecause there is no electric energy and there is no
decision to build the power plant because there are no
industries to create demand. Therefore, the government
decided to build the hydroelectric plant once and for
all. 30
Albras and Alunorte were eventually installed in the
1980s, but not before strenuous long negotiations. According to
an Eletrobras official, the market slump was used by the Japanese
to scale-down the project, to achieve preferential electric
energy price varying with the aluminum price on the London
market, to negotiate supplier's credits to CVRD for Albras and
Alunorte equipment, and to obtain BNDES fiscal and investment
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advantages. Albras and Alunorte were scaled down and the
Brazilian government committed itself to the supply energy, to
build the infrastructure for the project and to guarantee foreign
loans in exchange for eventual export income. 3
1
Geisel's 1976 visit to Japan was decisive in
materializing the project. it was already clear that PND II was
an "exercise in voluntarism, "32 thus Geisel wanted to accomplish
a few large scale projects, of which Tucurui was a show-case
example. Albras — by then transformed into an association
between Valenorte (51 percent) and NAAC, Nippon Aluminum Amazon
Corporation (49 percent) — was built slowly, beginning operation
in 1984, and is expected to produce at full capacity (320,000
tons per year) by 1988. 33 Alunorte decision was repeatedly
delayed for it was cheaper to buy alumina in the international
market. Nevertheless, Alunorte project of an 800,000 tons per
year alumina plant, which was integrated to Albras (Barcarena,
Para)
,
only started construction after Albras was operational in
1985.
Despite Geisel's reassurance that the Brazilian
government was going to bear the full burden of the hydroelectric
project and the needed infrastructure — apparent in Ueki's and
Geisel's classification of Tucurui as "the redemption (sic) of
Para and of all the Amazon" 34 — the Japanese LMSA continued
redimensioning the project down to less than 10 percent of what
was originally planned in 1974 (40,000 tons by 1981). In 1977
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Brazilian restrictions on imports and rising internal interest
rates, discussed in chapter IV, frustrated Japanese suppliers who
had planned on selling equipment to Brazil. 35
Albras and Alunorte accords on stockholding, technology
and sale of aluminum and energy involved Seplan, BNDE
,
Consider,
the National Institute for Industrial Property (INPI)
,
import-
export incentives agency (BEFIEX)
, Portobras and Eletronorte, and
were only signed in 1978. Despite CVRD being the majority
stockholder many decisions required approval by 2/3 of voting
stock, what in effect gave LMSA control of decision-making. 36
Once more BNDE refused to finance the projects and to grant them
fiscal incentives. Only in 1980, after BNDES had been
transferred to the Secretariat of Planning (adding an "S» for
Social in its acronym), could the all-powerful Minister Delfim
Netto obligate BNDES to finance the Albras/Alunorte project. 37
The Japanese association obtained from Mines and Energy
Minister, Cesar Cals, the guarantee that energy would cost Albras
and Alunorte a price corresponding to a 1/5 of the aluminum price
in the international market, during 20 years, without
readjustment or increases, income tax exemptions up to 15 years
guaranteed to projects in the Eastern Amazon and the provision of
infrastructure by the State of Para. 38 In mid-i980 LMSA-NAAC
obtained an elimination of the contract clause which stipulated
that 50 percent of Albras production would serve the purpose of
substituting aluminum imports to Brazil. Only when this
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agreement was finalized, the Japanese NAAC invested US$ 400
million dollars in the plant. 39 In a demonstration Qf its^
over the Brazilian partner, NAAC also secured the purchase of 55
percent of output at 93.5 percent of the international market
price with an option to buy the other 45 percent of the output at
96.6 percent of that price. 40
By 1985, in area of 6,000 hectares, Albras had invested
US$ 580.7 million of a total of US$ 1.5 billion. In 1982 the
consortium Albras/Alunorte was extinct and the two plants
operating under separate management. Albras increased its
production to 80,000 tons in July 1985 - a target which had been
planned for six years earlier according to the original
schedule. 41 Alunorte's investment, estimated at US$ 700
million, was at the level of US$ 175 million by 1985, without any
indication that it would be profitable to produce alumina, since
it could be found at a much lower price than the estimated US$
250 per ton coming out of Alunorte. 42
Aluminio do Maranhao (Alumar) was decided in 1982, and
it was considered to be one of most modern, efficient integrated
alumina-aluminum plant in the world, with an annual production
capacity of 500,000 tons of alumina and 110,000 tons (Stage I out
of a total of three)
. A totally private enterprise owned by
Alcoa (Aluminum Company of America, with 49.9 percent), Billiton
Metais (Shell, 40.1 percent) and Camargo Correa (10 percent),
bought in 1984 from Billiton, 43 it competes with Albras for
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external markets, and a portion of the internal market. it has
an adjoining alumina plant, Alunar, which will be capable to
produce 3 million ton per year of alumina when completed. By
1987 two modules were operating of Alumar.
Tucurui's engineering design was conditioned by the
aluminum plants, as shown on Table 6.1 and 6.2. Eletronorte
'
s
engineering had to specify the machines to be used in Tucurui
"backwards, that is from Albras's point of view." 44 They worked
closely with Japanese specialists from LMSA in the specification
of the basic project.
TABLE 6.1
ELECTRIC ENERGY CONSUMPTION-ALUMINUM OUTPUT
(MW - 000 TON)
energy
ALUMAR
output
ALBRAS
energy output
1984 186 80 32 20
1985 200 100 90 40
1986 460 200 290 120
1987* 486 434
1988* 486 434
1989* 558 300 596 320
Source: Eletronorte, Relatorio Anual , 1986.
* Estimates.
Energy in MW, Output in 000 tons-year.
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TABLE 6.2
PARTICIPATION ON TOTAL ELETRONORTE SUPPLY, (%)
1985 1986
ALUMAR* 27 90
Manaus 15 ; ?6
CEA - Centrais Eletricas do Amazonas 1.95 1 1fiEletroAcre
CELPA* - Centrais Eletricas do Para 23*70 14*47
CEMAT - Centrais Eletricas Mato Grosso 11.80 6*87CERON - Centrais Eletricas Rondonia 3.07 1*74CELG* - Centrais Eletricas Goias 0 55 o\r
cvr
s *
CVRD 0.84 0.80CEMAR*- Centrais Eletricas Maranhao 15.34 9 6?
IC0MI
" 0.25 0*14
33 . 28
10. 13
Source: Eletronorte, Relatorio Anual
. 1986.
* receive energy from Tucurui.
With the beginning of the industrial projects,
Tucurui 's importance was fully recognized. The designing of the
Greater Carajas Program, initially elaborated by Japanese
consultants, 45 took into account that the developments planned
for the Eastern Amazon were not possible without Tucurui'
s
energy
.
However, according to the data above in Table 6.3 and
Table 6.4 one can easily contrast that the income paid by final
consumers (Albras, Alumar) to Eletronorte does not match the
energy they receive. Alumar, which is paying 25 mills per KWh (1
mill= l/1000th US$ 1.00), consumed 33.9 percent of the total
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TABLE 6
.
3
ELETRONORTE
OPERATIONAL INCOMEPARTICIPATION OF ASSOCIATED COMPANIES AND FINAL CONSUMERS
, (%>
1985 i9 86
1. ALUMAR 21>9
2. MANAUS* 33.3 Vt'
t
3. ALBRAS 6>7
4. CELPA 15>0
5. CEMAR 10>0 8.3
Source: Eletronorte, Relatorio, and Income Statements, 1985-6.Energy supplied from Tucurui, except for Manaus (*).
TABLE 6.4
ELETRONORTE
ENERGY SUPPLY
PARTICIPATION OF FIVE LARGEST CONSUMERS, (% of MW)
19155 1986
1
.
ALUMAR 27, 9 33 . 9
2 . ALBRAS 11
.
2 21
.
0
3 . CELPA 23 . 7 14 . 5
4 . CEMAR 15. 3 9 . 6
5. MANAUS 15. 7 10. 1
6. OTHER FINAL CONSUMERS 7. 7
7. OTHER STATE CONCESSIONAIRES 13 . 9
Source: Eletronorte, Relatorio
, 1986
Obs.:
- Total Eletronorte Supply = 10,254,809 MWh or 1170 MW
- 38 % to State Concessionaires, Celpa, Cemar, Cemat, etc.
- 62 % to Aluminum Companies.
- Manaus, not supplied by Tucurui, had its own thermal
generation
.
- Tucurui generated circa 80 % of Eletronorte 1 s energy,
in 1986.
while it paid 30.2 percent. More strikingly, Albras is heavily
subsidized paying only 13 mills per KWh -- about one fourth of
its cost to Eletronorte. The data shows that for an energy
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supply of 21 percent it paid only 12.6 percent of Eletronorte
s
sale of energy in 1986.
The description of the Tucurui decision highlighted the
fact that it was taken as part of the PND II mining and
industrial policies oriented toward substituting basic imported
inputs and toward the development and occupation of the Eastern
Amazon. Those policies however were contingent upon exogenous
factors, such as the 1974 oil shock, the ensuing worldwide
recession and the environmental regulations imposed to aluminum
manufacturing in advanced countries.
International interests prevailed in both MRN and
Albras/Alunorte decisions. The availability of resources for
investment in the bauxite-alumina-aluminum complex, its timing --
and more importantly the form by which the investment arrived in
Brazil — dominated the evolution of the decision-making process
rather than a voluntaristic political and technical rationale.
The elites in charge of the mining, industrial and energy policy
coalesced with national and international financing institutions
and with mining and industrial groups to agree on this
development policy. The resulting Tucurui policy output is
therefore geared to provide the international and national
private sector with a crucial, inexpensive basic input — a basic
state role described by Gerschenkron for promoting rapid
industrialization and development.
.
The Implementation of Tucurui
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When Tucurui's first two turbines began generating
power on 22 November 1984, that fact was the culmination of
almost ten years of implementation of that development project.
This section will analyze how the national and international
interests have articulated to carry out the project which
provided income and profits for the corporations in charge of
building and supplying equipment and materiel.
1
*
Investment Financing and the Infl uence of the InternationalBanking and Capital Goods Industries
The influence of international banking system on
investment financing in the Third World was thoroughly studied by
Stallings. 46 The abundance of petro-dollars in the European
financial markets and the advanced countries' s economic recession
were sufficient reason for the eagerness in finding new and
promising markets. Brazil's hydroelectric projects were such
interesting and promising markets.
When Tucurui was decided and its implementation began
in late 1975, Eletronorte president, Colonel Raul Garcia Llano,
wanted to produce a "fait compli" which would make Tucurui's
construction irreversible. President Geisel and Minister Ueki
were committed to its construction, even without the Japanese
loans and lawful participation. At that time, Tucurui was
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expected to cost US$ 2 billion, including the transmission lines
which would supply electric power to the alumina/aluminum
complex, the Cara j as-Itaqui Railroad, to Belem and other cities
in the region and a long transmission line to the Northeast in
view of exhaustion of Northeastern
• s hydroelectric potential.
Shigeaki Ueki insisted that
...the dimensions of Tucurui make it the largest
project to be executed by Eletrobras in Brazilian
territory, since its value surpasses that of all the
ships, refineries and oil pipelines summed up that
Petrobras owns. President Geisel himself referred tojust two projects in his latest ' pronunciamento '
:
Itaipu and Tucurui. 47
With political support of that caliber, Llano went
ahead and began the bidding process for the preliminary civil
works necessary before the construction of the dam itself.
Construtora Camargo Correa won that first bid which paved the way
for future bid-winning since it was already installed at the
construction site, 13 kilometers of the city of Tucurui.
In the meantime, an intra-agency rivalry began. During
the negotiations involving Eletronorte, Eletrobras, Ministry of
Mines and Energy, Ministry of Industry and Commerce, Ministry of
Finance and Planning, it was clear that Eletrobras was only
interested in finding funds for Tucurui if it could also find
resources for the development of Itaparica, a power plant on the
Sao Francisco River, in the Northeastern State of Bahia, in such
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a way that it would render political dividends for Eletrobras «s
president, former State of Bahia Governor Antonio Carlos
Magalhaes, and for Eletrobras Director of Coordination, former
State of Ceara Governor Cesar Cals.
Eletronorte, "resulting from the laziness of Eletrobras
in developing Amazon potential," 48 sided with fche agencies Qf
Ministry of Industry and Commerce, CONSIDER
,
and its nationalist
Minister, Severe Gomes, and with CVRD ~ interested in developing
Eastern Amazon mines and industrial potential — trying to find
markets for the development of Brazilian basic and capital goods
industries, one of the PND II -s primary objectives. Severe Gomes
announced that Tucurui and Albras/Alunorte were going to be
delayed for lack of resources, according to the economic policy
of the early part of Geisel's term. That gave time for the
national aluminum producers to prevent comercial damages.
Against this nationalist view of Brazilian development, Antonio
Carlos Magalhaes, stated that it was the "Ministry of Mines and
Energy's responsibility to determine hydroelectric projects,
their schedules and their power." 49
Antonio Carlos Magalhaes travelled to Paris with
President Geisel in April 1976 to continue negotiations initiated
by Brazilian Ambassador to France, former Finance Minister
Antonio Delfim Netto. There were two main proposals for
financing the construction of Tucurui from different banks and
capital goods industries. The first proposal, involving an
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European Consortium was objected to by Ueki because of its
diverse range of equipment suppliers from three different
countries (France, West Germany and Italy) that could cause
delays. 51 The second proposal was more acceptable and
eventually adopted making Tucurui's equipment be supplied solely
from a French group of banks and capital goods firms. 52
However, both groups were granted Brazilian projects, since the
economic recession in Europe and excess liquidity made the
negotiations very attractive to the Brazilian authorities. A. C.
Magalhaes could not resist the political appeal of building
another large hydroelectric power plant in his native Northeast
(Bahia) and granted the European Consortium the financing and
supplier's credit to Itaparica Hydro-Project, built on the Sao
Francisco River, in the Northeast. This was an accommodating
solution that pleased Eletrobras, the foreign comercial banks,
equipment suppliers and the construction companies.
Eletronorte, not having participated of the Paris round
of negotiations, was suddenly surprised. A high official stated
Those negotiations with the French came as surprise to
us and it was stuck down our throat. 53
Eletronorte reluctantly accepted this contract with the French
since it meant a slim margin of equipment to be built by
Brazilian firms, who were already capable of an "index of
nationalization" of 90 percent on turbines and 100 percent in
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generators, following the guidelines of the Nuclei of
Articulation With the Industries (MAI), institutionalized by
Geisel at each state enterprise, and of the PND II.
Eletronorte's concerns were seconded and strongly resented by
several interest groups, such as the Brazilian Association for
the Development of Basic Industries (ABDIB)
, the Brazilian
Association of Electrical and Electronic Industries (ABINEE)
, and
the Brazilian Association of Machinery Manufacturers (ABMAQ)
whose directors voiced their discontent for the low share granted
to the Brazilian firms on the Tucurui project. 54
As a result of the financing and supplier's credits
agreement the Brazilian industry could only supply less than 40
percent of total equipment to Tucurui. Eight turbines were going
to be supplied by Creusot-Loire/Neyrpic (330 MW each totalling
2,640 MW for the first stage), with some minor assembly done by
its Brazilian subsidiary, Mecanica Pesada
. even though formally
it was Mecanica Pesada who supplied half of the turbines. With
respect to he eight generators that could be totally produced in
Brazil, four of them were be produced in France by Alsthom-
Atlantique, and four of them produced in Brazil by General
Electric (United States) and Brown Boveri (Switzerland) utilizing
internal financing from BNDE.
However the financial scheme obligated the suppliers to
uncommon associations. For example, normally the generators
manufactured in Brazil by GE and Brown Boveri had their most
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sophisticated parts not yet produced in Brazil Sported from
their main plants, Canadian GE and Brown Boveri-Swit Zerland. But
since Tucurui-s imported equipment was financed by French banks,
both General Electric and Brown Boveri had to couple their
equipment with some French parts for the two generators each had
contracted with Eletronorte
.
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This unusual financial package was finalized only in
late 1978, when the French president, Valery Giscard D'Estaing,
visited Brazil. In that visit the agreement between the
Brazilian Government and the French banks and manufacturers was
signed, but that was detrimental to Brazilian interests. As
stated by an Eletronorte official,
Evidently the costs of such an agreement were muchhigher than they would have been were the contracts
made with a simpler scheme of supply. 56
There is a clear sense here that the French financing and
supplier's credits have contributed to the slump in capital goods
industries, as have all other loans made to Brazil in the period,
beginning a protracted crisis from 1978 on.
The hydro-mechanical equipment of Tucurui were supplied
by Brazilian firms in another package, but the majority of the
firms supplying Tucurui project were subsidiaries of the
multinational firms mentioned above. By force of the contract of
supply of turbines, generators and transformers, the firms which
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were supplying the first package were not able to participate in
the second bid.
This process described in this case was a pattern
reproduced many times over the latter part of the 1970s and early
1980s. A severe crisis in the national capital goods industry
resulted from the fact that loans were tied to supplier's
credits. Tucurui's index of nationalisation did not achieve 50
percent as a result of the loans agreed with the European
Consortium of banks. 57 In addition> the dollars entering Brazil
via Central Bank caused a spiralling inflation, and a financial
"merry-go-round" as financial applications became less risky
than productive investments. The political liberalization
climate helped the capital goods fraction of the industrial
entrepreneurs to endorse opposition banners, to sign the
"Manifesto of the Eight," and make statements in favor of the
Estado de Dire ito Democratico and redemocratization
.
Not only international banking and capital goods
manufacturing interests were operative in the case of Tucurui
project. Brazilian contractors which had been historically
linked to infrastructure development projects since the late
1940s were just as eager to participate, as will be seen next.
However, they have not coalesced in a consortium, as they did in
the case of Itaipu; this time only one major construction
company was awarded the contract.
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When Sebastiao Ferraz de Camargo Penteado — carrying
all three traditional Paulista coffee-elite last names ~ began
his company in the 1930s he could not imagine that Construtora
Camarqo Correa (now the parent company of subsidiaries in
agriculture, industry and services) would build numerous dams
throughout Brazil in consortium with other firms or alone,
producing 25,400 MW, about half of the 1986 Brazilian installed
electric power capacity. The history of Construtora Camargo
Correa (from now on just Camargo Correa) can be traced parallel
to the development hydroelectric power sector in Brazil.
Sebastiao Camargo' s personal worth was calculated to be US$ 1.2
billion, according to a recent Fortune survey. 59
Since 1975, Camargo Correa has been building Tucurui.
Having won the initial bid for the preliminary works in 1975,
the company was awarded a construction contract, in January 1977,
for the civil works valued in US$ 1.82 billion. In 1977, all
state investments were being scaled down, as we have seen in
Chapter IV, except for investment in Itaipu and in Tucurui,
although Tucurui was delayed for other reasons as will be
seen. 60 Several delays and cost overruns have increased the
costs of Tucurui to more than US$ 5.6 billion (plus US$ 3.5
billion on interest yet to be paid) , of which Camargo Correa
received more than 57 percent of that total. 61 Right after the
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commissioning of the power plant in November 1984, Camargo Correa
was awarded — without any formal bidding process once more —
the construction and installation of Tucurui Stage II to be built
until 1993, but costing only 14 percent of the total.
Camargo Correa and Eletronorte worked close together in
the solving the logistics problems — that is, the "Amazonian-
problems of building a huge power dam in the middle of a forest
whose only means of transportation were military airplanes and
barges up the river 300 kilometers from Belem. (The Transamazon
Highway passed nearby but it was impassible during the rainy
season
.
)
Camargo Correa benefited from the three consecutive
years in which unprecedented floods occurred (1978-1980), which
increased Tucurui 1 s costs and schedule of completion at the same
time. The first flood, on March 1978, ruined the civil works
done, which obligated Camargo Correa to ask resources not only to
reconstruct what was lost but also to change the construction
principle from an "economic height" to a "safest height of the
dam" — that is, adding 13 meters to the total height of the dam
—
,
increasing the costs of the dam by 20 percent,
approximately. 62 Subsequent heavy floods in 1979 and 1980 also
delayed construction and forced Camargo Correa to layoff and
dismiss thousands of workers, resulting in social unrest in the
63area
.
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However none of these problems described above were as
indicative of Eletronorte dependence on Camargo Correa as the
financial backing Camargo Correa provided to finish Tucurui. By
1980, with the definitions of the Greater Carajas Program
(including Iron-Cara j as
, industrial plants, railroad and hydro-
power plant) and the pressing need to supply electric power to
Belem
— then suffering successive black-outs - turned Tucurui
an "indispensable" project. But that need was not met with
resources by the federal government. As Eletrobras president,
Mauricio Schulman stated
The electric sector is pressed for funds, and that's
why those projects that can be postponed will be
postponed in order to concentrate resources on theindispensable ones. 64
Despite that fact, Tucurui' s activation was delayed to December
1982, then December 1983 (from 1981), and then again to December
1984. From 1980 to 1982, notwithstanding Costa Cavalcanti's
reassurance that the priority projects of Itaipu and Tucurui were
not going to be stopped, repeatedly Eletronorte remained short of
resources for investment. As an illustration, in 1979
Eletronorte asked for an investment budget of Cr$ 17 billion (US$
632.7 million); Eletrobras reduced it to Cr$ 14 billion; Seplan
reduced it to Cr$ 12 billion and later cut a flat 20 percent from
all state enterprise investment. As a result, Eletronorte
received only Cr$ 10 billion (US$ 372.2 million), 59 percent of
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what it had asked for. 65 This lacR Qf resources had Uttle
influence on Camargo Correa
- s ability to continue civil works
with its own resources. During three months on the first
semester of 1982 Eletronorte did not pay a cent to Camargo
Correa, which disbursed a total of US$ 250 million of its own
resources. According to Eletrobras's supervisor at Tucurui site,
Roberto Dourado,
Although a Cr$ 157 billion-budget (US$ 875 million) hasbeen approved for Eletronorte during the 1982, only Cr$
35 billion (US$ 195 million) have been actually
disbursed up to June 1982, rather than Cr$ 80 billion(US$ 445 million) which should have been paid. 66
Camargo Correa avoided paralyzing the construction, but it
charged interest of 10 percent a month, plus monetary correction,
above interest charges by banks. Camargo Correa thus avoided
dismissing half of the almost 30,000 employees, a fact which
would have caused further severe social problems, what, in fact,
demonstrates Eletronorte weakness and its dependency on the
contractor, Camargo Correa.
Evidently Camargo Correa had all interest in keeping
the construction going — eventually Eletronorte 1 s financial
troubles would be solved. At the highest point of the feverish
construction activity in 1980-81, Camargo Correa received from
Eletronorte about US$ 90 million per month, which represented
more that 70 percent of all receipts Camargo Correa had for those
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years. 67 Notwithstanding this impressive income, Camargo Correa
did not pay its workers as well as it was paid by Eletronorte.
in April 1980, in the wake of labor strikes in the industrial
Southeast, some 8,000 Camargo Correa workers went on strike for
better wages, better food rations and better living quarters.
One week of workers protests evolved into riots and looting at
the site of the construction. The workers confronted security
guards and later the Military Police sent in from the State
Capital, Belem, headed by a sheriff from the Division of Social
and Political Order (DOPS - a division of the Federal Police
Department), to repress the generalized mutiny. The extra
official count was 7 dead — including a woman and child in
market looting — and dozens of injured. 68
Camargo Correa 1 s power and influence can also be
depicted not only by what was delineated above but from the fact
that this firm has invested heavily in industrial enterprises in
the Eastern Amazon region. In 1984 Camargo Correa disbursed US$
240 million to associate itself with Alcoa and Billiton Metais in
tne Alumar - Aluminio do Maranhao project. Moreover, Camargo
Correa was granted exemption of income tax (US$ 92 million,
representing 75 percent of due income tax) provided it would
invest in the area. Camargo Correa used that to implant a Ferro-
Silicon industrial plant near Tucurui. That location also gave
Camargo Correa a 15 percent discount on electric power rates,
granted by the National Department of Water and Electric Energy
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(DNAEE)
,
an i.portant input since the salting of silicon is a
highly energy-intensive activity. 6 9
The facts described above demonstrate an important
blurring of the public-private distinction. The literature on
implementation of public policy has dealt with specific problems
of implementation
- namely the problems of communication of ends
and means, of resources, of capability, and of political
disposition of implemented. ™ The Tucurui case is a show-case
example of how international actors - multinational corporation,
and financing institutions - have influenced its implementation
with over-pricing and restrictive commercial schemes. it also
shows how Camargo Correa became a surrogate public institution in
order to obtain private gains during the 1982-83 debt-crisis.
D. The CAPEMI Case : Military Politics, PresidentialSuccession and The Environmental Question at Tucurui
When Tucurui lake began filling up 2,430 square
kilometers (240.000 hectares or an area of 170 by 15 kilometers
average) of land it submerged 13.4 million cubic meters 71 of
tropical forest with 43 billion cubic meters of water. Besides
the worth of the wood, valued anywhere from US$ 350 million to
US$ 2.5 billion, depending on the estimates done, Tucurui lake
has become one of the largest potential ecological disasters in
the history of hydroelectric reservoirs. The environmental
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question at Tucurui was also at the centerstage of political
events in the first half of the 1980s.
Tucurui
-s lake was not only the largest flooding of a
tropical forest but it was potentially the most dangerous case,
as pointed out by experts. 72 At least three other similar cases
have occurred before: i) in 1974, the Temmengar dam (Malaysia)
was closed inundating the adjacent forest, whose decomposition
produced an acid strong enough to break the rotors of the
Japanese turbines; ii) in Brokopondo Hydro-Project (Surinam) tons
of fish died, and clouds of hydrogen sulfide, methane gas and
sulfur dioxide emanating from the semi-dead reservoir waters
flooded in 1964, were carried as far as Paramaribo, 100
kilometers from the dam at the delta of the river, intoxicating
thousands73
; iii) in the Amazon region itself, the small hydro-
project of Curua-Una, near the city of Santarem, Para where the
submerged forest is still bubbling gas and poisoning water since
1977, occasionally preventing operators from getting close to the
operations control house. 74
Technically, the photosynthesis of a torrid tropical
sun over that quantity of water, wood and leaves produces an
incredible amount of nitrogen and phosphorus in its biochemical
reaction. The existing wood and leaves — which were supposed to
be extracted by Capemi Agropecuaria , a subsidiary of a private
military pension fund conglomerate, CAPEMI ( Caixa de Peculios,
Pensoes e Montepio-Benef icente S.A. ) , especially created for the
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Tucurui project ~
f summed up 500 tons of biomass per hectare;
when that quantity of biomass rots it produces 200 tons of carbon
dioxide per hectare, 7,295 kilos of nitrogen per hectare, 450
Kilos of phosphorus and 40 tons of plankton, all of which consume
an enormous amount of oxygen.^ To maintain the ecological
equilibrium the waters should be renovated every two months,
what has not occurred causing a deficit of available oxygen to
prevent fertilization and decomposition. if Eletronorte had not
eliminated, for cost reasons, a water passage at the bottom of
the dam's main body, the reservoir waters would be continuously
renovated preventing that problem. As a consequence of not
having done that only the top 15 to 20 meters of the lake are
being renewed, leaving stagnant the bottom 50 meters.
That ecological damage called the attention of
environmentalist and researchers worldwide: a National Institute
of Amazon Research (INPA, Institute Nacional dp Pesauisas da
Amazonia
) report indicates that only in 1993 will there be an
ecological equilibrium after repeated mortality of fish and
release of poisonous gas; 76 the World Bank concluded that
environmental and health concerns, adding up to 3-5 percent of a
hydro-project total costs, and finally conceded, in 1986-87, to
numerous demands of environmentalist groups demanding revision of
loans for tropical forest hydro-projects where environmental
damages were imminent. 77
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By 1985 there were signs of Tucurui being an
"ecological bomb," resulting from the a series of technical
mistakes and omissions, and politico-administrative
malfeasance. 78 m December 1984, only one month after the
closing of the dam, scores of fish laid dead at the margins of
the lake.
1
'
Decision Reconstruct ion and Fjjtes TnvnlvpH
Tucurui 's » ecological bomb" could have been avoided if
Eletronorte and other agencies had power to stop the uses of
public resources for political objectives and private gains.
Despite deforesting the reservoir being an Eletronorte concern
since 1977, only in 1979, when Joao Figueiredo was already in
power, was the decision made to extract the wood. 79 That
decision however, became one of the worst political, financial,
administrative and ethical scandals of the military regime,
strongly contributing to the "ecological bomb" situation created
at Tucurui.
The agreement between Carlos Galluf, the president of
the Brazilian Institute of Forest Development (IBDF) , the agency
for forest management and control, and Eletronorte to extract the
wood coincided with the interests of the small lumber and timber
entrepreneurs of the Eastern Amazon — the madeireiros . IBDF and
madeireiros considered that to do the job there were needed 90
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small lumberyards scattered throughout the area with an yearly
production of 60,000 cubic meters during two years, in addition
to the existing capacity of 1.5 million cubic meters in the
Southern Para area. Despite the short length of time the
project's return on investment seemed attractive for all
involved, but it rapidly diminished as the decision was postponed
for political reasons. 80 By May 1979 local madeireiro^ found
that two years (Tucurui was then scheduled to be commissioned in
December 1981) were simply insufficient to import forest
equipment, install the lumberyards, open roads, build ports, make
barges for transportation, all of which could easily take one
year. Apparently the decision was delayed repeatedly to alienate
the local entrepreneurs, as will be seen next. 81
Behind the delay were powerful political and military
groups struggling for the commercial exploitation of the area.
On the one hand, the civil construction companies which were
sensing severe reductions in future public investment spending
and saw an opportunity to project their image abroad. 82 On the
other hand, the military high echelon (the SNI, the National
Security Council) were considering a vast, politically visible
project for the area (Greater Carajas) ; therefore there should be
a grandiose scheme for exploiting the wood too. According to the
June 1979 IBDF/Eletronorte basic guidelines, an area of 10,000
hectares near the dam was reserved to be cleared under
Eletronorte ' s responsibility. But in the remaining 216,000
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mum
hectares IBDF would be responsible for the extraction, for
contracting small local entrepreneurs, for the construction of
roads, ports, deposits, and for the sale of "class I»-wood
abroad
.
83
IBDF and Eletronorte defined that only national
companies could participate in the bidding process with a mini
capital of US$ 750,000. That was rapidly changed to US$ 9.5
million to exclude dozens of small timber and lumber firms
contracting directly with the government. But the problem of
selling that huge amount of wood in only two years without
wrecking markets and prices remained. 84 IBDF anticipated the
bid arguing that time was running out while Eletronorte kept
postponing the bid for the small area near the dam. 85
So in November 1979 Construtora Norberto Odebrecht
Andrade Gutierrez
,
Servix Engenharia and Brasilinvest
. associated
to foreign firms and to, at least, 23 local madeireiros
,
proposed bids for extracting the wood. 86 Apparently Carlos
Galluf had his way in the project, involving large Brazilian
companies, foreign associates contributing with technology and
know how, and engaging experienced local entrepreneurs. However
by April 1980 this decision was superseded by on-going
negotiations to implant large scale development projects inserted
in the Greater Carajas Program and to have a grandiose scheme for
the forest extraction. Carlos Galluf was ousted for his refusal
to accept other solutions and was replaced by Mauro Reis, who was
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more cooperative with the central government wishes to nullify
and redo the bid. By that time, exultant madeireiros demanded
that in the second bid the minimum capital be reduced from US$
9,5 million to US$ 950,000 "reducing IBDF's pharaohnic solution."
87 None of that occurred, of course, since the Brazilian
government wanted to find a grandiose, visible project to which
it could cling for the duration of Figueiredo's six-year-term.
Few changes occurred in the second bid, the most
notable one being the reduction of the area to 103,410 hectares
and 5.6 million cubic meters, about half of the original forest.
Most strikingly, a sole tender was presented by Capemi
Agropecuaria this time around. The other companies "were
•convinced' not to participate" 88 because that was "a mission,
more or less imposed by the government to be executed by us," as
a Capemi official stated. 89
Capemi Agropecuaria and its company holding were
repeatedly favored by the central government, after signing the
contract in August 1980. First, the fact that it did not have
enough capital was disregarded by the Minister of Agriculture,
Amaury Stabile (1979-85) , who ordered IBDF to consider the
holding's capital to satisfy that clause. Second, an addendum to
the contract was signed in November 1980 reducing the area to be
extracted to 65,000 hectares (from 103,410) and the volume to 3.0
million cubic meters (from 5.6). Additionally, even if the
original contract explicitly mentioned "the maximum amount
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possible" to be extracted, the supplemental contract allowed
Capemi Agropecuaria to extract only "class-I", export-type wood.
Third, the National Council of Foreign Trade (Concex) acceded to
central government pressure to lift legislation prohibiting the
export of unprocessed logs. 90 Fourth> the National BanR ^
Cooperative Credit (a federal agency subordinated to the Ministry
of Agriculture) guaranteed a US$ 100 million French loan to
Capemi, against its bylaws mandating such collateral be posted
only to cooperatives. Such actions were part of a powerful hard-
line military scheme in the 1979-82 years to return to power, or
at least to maintain some political power, as discussed in
Chapter IV. General Ademar Messias de Aragao, president of
Capemi, supported the hard-line stance of top-echelon military
ministers (SNI, the Cabinet of the Army Ministry and the office
of the Secretary General of National Security Council attended
meetings with Capemi, IBDF, Ministry of Agriculture, Eletronorte
on a regular basis) who were struggling against political
liberalization. These actions were also inherent to the
government's decision of concentrating investment in the Greater
Carajas Program, instituted a couple of months after the signing
of Capemi contract, a fact that demonstrated the political
importance of this project. 91
Two years later in 1982, the outcome of Tucurui's wood
extraction project was dismal. Early in 1981 Capemi had
subcontracted Servix Engenharia (one of the four original
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tenders) but a few months after Servix rescinded it because
Capemi was not honoring payments. 92 Notwithstanding expected
sales of US$ l billion for "Msec t.ir class-l» wood against an investment
of US$ 165 million, Capemi, unable to perform the job alone,
contracted three other firms, which in their turn were also
unprepared for such a gargantuan endeavor. 93 Facing
unsatisfactory results, Eletronorte commissioned an ecological
study concluded in March 1982 recommending that "the minimum are
to be cleared should be 85% of all vegetation in future Tucurui
a
reservoir i94 Still uncertain whether Capemi was going to
perform the job Eletronorte constantly warned IBDF/Capemi of the
timetable while, at the same time, knowingly allowed Capemi to
use toxic defoliants with the tacit agreement of the SNI and
National Security Council. 95
Capemi 1 s performance was criticized from several
angles. First the effective extraction of the wood did not comply
with "the maximum possible" dictated by the contract. Tucurui
wood samples marketed at Hannover and Paris fairs attracted
potential European buyers, in late 1980, incited Capemi's to find
international partners. Maison Lazard Freres, a French financial
house, constituted a firm associated to Capemi, Compagnie
Forestiere d'Amazonie (or Amazon Timber Company, in Panama) , and
put together a US$ 100 million loan. Under the terms of their
contract Capemi agreed to supply 5,000 cubic meters of logs per
nth for two years and 1.8 cubic meters in lumber, totalling 3mo
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million cubic meters. However the results were bleak. Jean
Claude Meyer, Lazard Freres official, stated
1rreaSiar
e
H» 1
CritiCiSm
° f the Brazilian wood is its
HpsgSpSi^SSSS^ SEISES?1
equipment and the third supplier's credit of French
?™?2-partPe?ea°- ly ^ US$ 25 *^i°n °fthe
bankers the mo;t !i?
Vlng Untouched *»t interested the
in terms of volume Capemi only delivered 3,600 cubic meters of
logs and 340,000 cubic meters of lumber up to June 1982.97
Financially, Capemi only applied US$ 10 million direct expenses
in the project, and circa US$ 30 million in roads, ports, etc.
However, US$ 15 million were spent in various other activities
including political public relations to the hard-line fragment of
the bloc-in-power: i) at least US$ 3 million were contracted
with Antonio M. Abissamara, who bought the magazine 0 Cruzeiro
from Alexandre von Baumgarten, assassinated in October 1981
allegedly with the involvement of SNI 98 ; ii) another US$ 2
million in a contract signed between Capemi Agropecuaria
president, Fernando Pessoa, and Antonio M. Abissamara ( FAN-
Consultoria e Empreendimentos Internacionais ^ to publicize Indian
Foundation activities and the relocation of the Paracana and
Gavioes Indians, as a 'proof of Brazilian government good-will;
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iii) other two contracts to advertize Tucurui wood abroad and
within Brazil, for an undisclosed amount. 99
Capemi was also politically favored with the July 1982
Seplan decision to cut 10 percent across state investment. SNI
rapidly endorsed it, seeing an opportunity to delay Tucurui for a
year and thus permitting Capemi to recoup. SNI « s shifting role
-- already characterized in Chapter IV by its involvement in the
RiOCentr°
-
bombi
"9> in electoral analyses and in countrywide labor
conflicts, can be definitely characterized with its involvement
with Capemi/Tucurui. That 10 percent cut across the board did
not reach Itaipu, a development project as important as Tucurui,
but Capemi 's peculiar situation of malfeasance were not enough
reasons for the government ( IBDF) rescind the contract after the
French Maison Lazard Freres had done so for Capemi 's dishonoring
of schedules.
2
•
Political and Environmental Consequences
In March 1983, Capemi bankruptcy was requested by
Unibanco, a Brazilian commercial bank, and Deputy Carlos Alberto
De Carli (PDS-AM)
,
a congressman and an entrepreneur from the
State of Amazonas engaged in the Paulo Maluf presidential bid and
creditor of US$ 414,000, who became administrator of Capemi'
s
remaining assets. 100 Capemi political importance related to the
fact that its high-officials were involved in a power struggle,
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interna! to the .ilitary regime, for Figueiredo's succession.
Capemi's chief-executive, General Ade.ar M. Aragao, a retired
hard-liner, who supported General Octavio Medeiros candidacy
(Figueiredo's ^ectore and the sistena^lOl candidate), but
would support the Planalto Palace second choice, Minister of
Interior, Mario Andreazza.
This bankruptcy prompted a Parliamentary Investigating
Commission to investigate Capemi's politico-administrative
malfeasance. Capemi's folding forced the Brazilian government to
assume its US$ 27.75 million-debt with French financial
institution, Maison Lazard Freres.102 Capemi Agropecuaria
•
s
inexperience in exploiting a tropical forest should have been
offset by hiring foreign experts, as a clause in the IBDF-Capemi
contract mandated. Capemi, on the contrary, dishonored the
contract with IBDF and with French backers, who finally broke the
contract. After that, Capemi sought help from domestic banks,
further complicating its already precarious situation
Eletronorte was left with the pressing responsibility
to clear 10,000 hectares adjacent to the dam, and to use
defoliants diminishing the biomass left to decompose in the rest
of the area. Eletronorte was determined to follow
recommendations suggesting the clearing of 85 percent of the
future lake's area. Considering that less than 3 percent had
been cleared by Capemi, in April 1983 — with Capemi already out
the picture --, IBDF/Ministry of Agriculture opened a 32,000
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hectares-tract for bid at the right margins of the Tocantins
River, where were concentrated first-grade, resistant to climate
wood (mahogany, iee, angelim, iatoba, etc.). Three alternatives
were devised:
coLanLf w% T °£ fered to domestic constructionompanies, but did not wish to participate at their own risk(when they wanted in 1979 they were shunned away) 103°™
ii) medium size Para madeireiros - who did not want in viewof little time left and lots of risks.
iii) small size Tucurui and Maraba madeireiros - no
jo£
a
i04
al structure
'
no equipment to do the large scale
None of these alternative worked for reasons ranging from
economic (high cost of cutting, transporting, warehousing),
insufficient time to promote sales abroad, social and judicial
pending questions (Capemi left unpaid more than 1,000 workers and
relocations of 18,000 people in three cities and two indian
reserves, Paracana and Gavioes, shown in Map 6.2). But time
continued to be a crucial factor, as argued by an IBDF report
Considerations led to the conclusion that the endeavor
was not economically feasible given the ten months
period (1 May 1983 to 30 September 1984). Considering
the rainy season from October 83 to April 84 that was
reason enough for the large construction companies and
madeireiros to refuse participating at their own
risk.
"
1Ub
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Therefore an imminent environmental disaster both by
the ecological impossibility of lake's waters to digest the
submerged forest
- for the lake would need 230 times more oxygen
than it has 10 * and by ^ indiscrilTlinate use Qf hazardous
chemicals, forbidden in most countries including Brazil.
According to Eletronorte, clearing the 10,000 hectares
resolved the safety problem of operating the turbines. But it
did so at a very expensive cost of US$ 25 million with no return
since the trees
- which could have been sold by US$ 550 million
in foreign markets - were buried before the reservoir was
filled 107
,
and the job was only done after Capemi had left its
area of influence to avoid legal conflicts. 108
Since there was no escape from ecological damage, the
Minister of Agriculture, Amaury Stabile, tried to reduce the
environmental, financial, and political fiasco. IBDF inventory
found out that Capemi had spent US$ 53.5 million in equipment,
building roads and ports, villages, offices and warehouses, cut
some 400,000 cubic meters of wood but only delivered a fraction
of that. As disparate as estimates of cutting, warehousing and
export had been Capemi' s own estimates were only a little above
that. 109 Above all, not even General Aragao and Eletronorte
president, Douglas Luz 110 statement at the hearings of the
Capemi Investigating Commission elucidated much.
Capemi 's folding influenced negatively the hard-line
candidacy of General Octavio Medeiros, for his known connections
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es as a
was
with the case reported in daily newspapers and magazin
consequence of growing political liberalization. Figueiredo-
support for Andreazza matured, at the same time as government
pressured against the approval of the "Direct Presidential
Election
- Now!" amendment. By mid-1984, after the amendment
defeated, Tancredo Neves' consensus candidacy developed with the
distinctive feature that military power exorbitance and
wrongdoing were not going to be investigated. HI
In the absence of censorship, and the fact that an
opposition governor was elected in the State of Para (Jader
Barbalho) helped unveiling the proofs of use of defoliants and
toxic chemicals sequentially. Eletronorte had allowed the use of
defoliants with the knowledge of the National Security Council
(CSN
'
Concho de Seguranca Naciona]
) already knew that Capemi
had used and left unused, unmarked barrels in the areas that it
worked during 1981 and 1982 . H2 Therefore Eletronorte and INPA
were constantly attacked by the press and politicians. INPA
president stated that although ecological impact would certainly
happen, five to eight years would be necessary to extract that
amount of wood, but it would "smell less than Venice anyhow!" 113
Moreover, Eletronorte itself used defoliants to clear
path for transmission lines. In all areas where defoliants have
been used at least forty six people 114 died and hundreds were
left with sequels of grave consequences such as increase in the
number of natural abortions, blood in the urine of children. 115
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The use of pentachlorophenol and Tordon 101 (Agent
Orange) disrupted local economy. Fifteen percent of Para's
economy lived off Brazil-nut extraction by natives in the
forests; part of that economic activity was impacted by the
killing of some 2,000 by those toxic chemicals. The most
striking fact, however, was that Capemi paid workers wages in
arrears in kind
,
that is with unused barrels of
pentachlorophenol. since the workers evidently had little use
for the substances they abandoned the barrels in at least 400
different places dispersed throughout the area. Even though
former Capemi teams were hired by Eletronorte to collect the
toxic barrels it was hardly possible to comb such a large area.
Water pressure burst the barrels left, although a large portion
of were found.*" In order to minimize consequences to fauna
Eletronorte initiated an animal rescue project 117 which was
extensively used in public relations campaigns during 1984-1986
to demonstrate that Eletronorte cared about environment.
As of July 1984 the water passages at the bottom of the
dam were progressively being closed with concrete with the last
one scheduled for closing on September 1984. Nevertheless
several actions were taken to prevent it. The State of Para
Legislature requested explanations about the consequences of
Tucurui closing. The State government was concerned about
salinization of drinking water — which would result from the
water reflux of Tocantins River right after the closing of the
:roin
.8
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dam
-
and the disruption of the riparian fishing economy
affecting see 300,000 people downstream when Tocantins River
would stop running for 60 days in the 300 kilometers traot f
the dam to the delta and the 1. 2 million people in BeW11
The Government of Para sued arguing if Eletronorte had infringed
state and federal laws in several counts: water code, forest
code, national environmental law (Law 6938) and for the "crimina!
submersion of the wood "119 Pllv.+.v^ .un . Furthermore citizens grouped under
the National Movement for the Defense of Life sued to stop
Tucurui
.
120
Tucurui created social problems as grave as the
ecological ones. Around 4,000 families or 17,310 people^
were expropriated at prices set in 1978 and not readjusted when
payment was made in 1980. That was a motive of unrest and deaths
in 1980, when the majority of relocation cases were resolved
including by the use of force. Governor Alacid Nunes (1979-83),
indirectly elected by the PDS
, ordered the intervention of the
Military Police of the State of Para to clear the areas, causing
unrest and at least 11 deaths. 122 Furthermore, the village of
Tucurui — which had had a 3,000 inhabitants, a sleepy, Brazil-
nut selling town until the mid-1970s — was by 1985 a disorderly
town, with a population of 80,000 dwellers, most of them young
and unemployed, a condition exacerbated by the end of the
construction of Tucurui Project. These social facts were
explored by Opposition governor Jader Barbalho. 123
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The fact that sixteen tons of pentachlorophenol were
found in the future lake's area!24 containing 23 percent Qf
lethal dioxin (enough to kill 5.3 million persons according to
experts), despite its irrefutable dangers, were politically used
by Deputy De Carli to obtain an injunction forcing the closing
the da. by Eletronorte . 125 what ±n reality ^^ ^ ^
the closing of the dam be done only after Capemi s assets had
been taken out of the future flooded area and auctioned. In fact
this was the creditors last ditch effort to save some of the
money sunk in the Capemi project. Eletronorte responded trying
to gain time by legally maneuvering and counteracting
politically. As it was stated by a high Eletronorte official, if
Capemi/IBDF were so interested in the case they would have
rapidly taken out the tractors, the three operating lumberyards,
5,000 cubic meters of wood in deposits, 300 small wood houses, an
energy generator . 12 6 in addition, Eletronorte had formally asked
Capemi where the barrels were and got no response prompting a
hurried search over the areal 2 ? Eletronorte 1 s president, Douglas
Luz did not hesitate between abiding by the injunction and
following technical opinions. He stated
The lawsuits are untimely, innocuous, and have
political objectives... We will not be able to close
the water gates after the rain begins and the dam may
break with the force of the water. 128
In an action resembling more an adventure, Douglas Luz dodged the
court summons for 15 days. His action was politically backed
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since no other action was taken by central government. Luz
profited from an early rain in the headwaters of the Tocantins
River, and on 6 September 19 84 ordered to close the ten remaining
Mufas, out of total of forty. The only other authority present
was, significantly, the Minister of Welfare, Senator Jarbas
Passarinho (PDS-Para)
,
who remained behind Figueiredo government
even after defeat was certain on Electoral College. That very
night Douglas Luz was dismissed for "budgetary reasons . 129
Since Tucurui was one of the principal Figueiredo
government projects, part of the Greater Carajas Program put
together by his Administration, its commissioning was politically
crucial for Figueiredo. Thus the Luz action was politically
justified, in the optics of the bloc-in-power
, and also was kept
Capemi and Maluf supporters away from central power avoiding the
dangerous financial malfeasance which could possibly incriminate
high-echelon figures in Figueiredo team, which would worsen their
lame-duck months. The dismissal involved other political aspects
too. Douglas Luz maintained close working relations with
Eletrobras president, Costa Cavalcanti, and with former Governor
of Parana, Ney Braga, a PDS dissident (Liberal Front) who
embraced Tancredo Neves candidacy. (In 1985 Braga was nominated
president of Itaipu Binacional.) That was reason enough to
irritate Figueiredo. However Figueiredo was already irritated
with Luz because some months earlier Luz refused to purchase the
building where Eletronorte headquarters is located in Brasilia.
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The price of the building was increased by Cr$ 3 billion (US$
1-63 million) over its market price, this difference was going to
be donated by the building's owner to finance the presidential
campaign of Joao Figueiredo's candidate, Mario Andreazza . 130
Tucurui was inaugurated with pomp and fanfare 22
November 1984 by Figueiredo, in the hope that the waters would
cover the political, environmental and social damages done. six
months later samples of water were analyzed at the Swedish
University of Upsala, financed by London's The Observer , when
unmistakable proofs of poison pentachlorophenol and dioxin were
found. 131
Tucurui's gloomy outcome was better exposed by
Lucio Flavio Pinto words. He wrote
Ten of million of tons of vegetal mass were submerged
by Tucurui lake In 1984. More than 10 million trees
were slowly drowned and died. Two years later every
one who visited the lake saw a desolating, perturbing
scene: limbless and leafless trees lay at the margins
or even on the center of the lake floating in direction
of the dam. Even though a total disaster has not
occurred water plants proliferate, gases are released
despite the strong Tocantins current. 132
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This chapter set out to analyze the influence of
political power over a policy process - the decision and
implementation of the pioneer Tucurui develops project in the
Eastern Amazon. The hypotheses posed at the beginning of the
chapter
-
that is, the use of state enterprises as sustainers of
growth and promoters of caDitsiie* np al st development, according to the
theoretical model set cut in Chapter I! and the influence Qf ^
political power structure and system of political domination had
over decision and implementation of Tucurui policy - were not
rejected.
The methodologies used in this study of the relative
influence of private and state actors over the decision and
implementation of Tucurui - decision reconstruction and elite
reputation analysis
- produced a pattern of findings from which
some observations can be made. At the institutional level,
political power was observed to be heavily concentrated at the
top executive position - the Geisel and Figueiredo presidencies
—
,
at the ministerial level (Mines and Energy, Agriculture,
Planning, SNI and CSN)
,
at the main executive officers of the
state enterprises (Magalhaes, Cals, Schulman, Costa Cavalcanti,
Llano, Luz), and at the international and national large private
companies involved in the project or in any other economic
activities in the region.
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The chief figures active in this development project
originated from the ranks of the milit*rv ^ <-km a y, of the politicians and
of the dominant class. Anfibios (amphibious, see glossary), such
as Cesar Cals and Costa Cavalcanti, politicians such as A.C.
Magalhaes, and military such as Medeiros, occupied positions in
the state bureaucracy, both in repressive apparatus and in the
Executive high positioned teen i cos and bureaucrats. Native
populations, working class and middle sector leaders or
organizations had very little say and were not active
participants in the policy-making process or in influencing some
the implementation surrounding Tucurui, nor did they or could
they exert any real influence over the ultimate outcomes of this
project
.
Eletronorte was involved in an intra-agency rivalry
with holding Eletrobras, which only agreed to Tucurui after the
final decision had been reached within the highest circles of
power. Geisel and Ueki justified the project in terms of both
the "redemption of the Eastern Amazon region" and of capitalist
development in a peripheral zone of the country, although that
principle was camouflaged under the "National Integration"
banner. The interest shown by Japanese, Canadian, British,
Dutch, and American capital associated to state and private
Brazilian mining and industrial capital in aluminum and other
non-ferrous metals, and iron-ore were crucial elements behind
their initial decision in 1974-75.
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Eletrobras supported Eletronorte
• s creation and
Planning of Tucurui only rhetorically, merely conferring real
support after financing had been secured with the European
consortium of banks, not only for Tucurui but also for a
Northeast power plants, since the region was the homeland of the
two major politicians at Eletrobras helm (1975-1978), Antonio
Carlos Magalhaes and Cesar Cals.
Unable to obtain the application of the "law of
participation,
«
that is the joint investment of major consumers
in the hydro-projects, the agency (Eletronorte) and Tucurui
project were at the mercy of the foreign banks and capital goods
suppliers, Tucurui became a show-case example of loss of
political and financial autonomy. The capital goods interest
associations — ABDIB
,
ABINEE
,
ABIMAQ, which included Brazilian
and international capital — voiced their discontent with low
proportion of equipment ordered to national companies. Brazilian
entrepreneurs, moreover, choose to embrace opposition views and
to support its political party, the MDB during the latter part of
Geisel years.
In addition Eletronorte left entirely to Camargo Correa
and other private firms the implementation of the project,
depending on the financial capacity of the main contractor to
keep the construction running. Eletronorte also left to private
engineering firms the supervisory and logistic functions, which
have greatly elevated the final cost.
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Confronted with the objections from the Brazilian
capital goods producers and with the limitations imposed by a
more restrictive international financial market, the Figueiredo
government, also pressured by balance of payment deficits, cho
to counterattack by including Tucurui in the over-arching
mining/industrial, energy-intensive complex, Greater Carajas
Program, for which available resources were channelled. m
addition, Figueiredo mobilized the support from the hard-line
military faction of the regime, by engaging Capemi "as a
mission," a private military pension fund run by retired
military. Although a private company, Capemi, was an instrument
for marketing the achievements of the military regime and
particularly of Figueiredo government. That firm, with the
veiled support of the SNI and of CSN and other sites of hard-line
military positions, counteracted the ongoing political
liberalization. As a consequence state autonomy — as well as
the autonomy of the Eletrobras subsidiary in charge of building
it was relinquished once more in the greatest political,
administrative and environmental fiasco at Tucurui, adding to
earlier losses of political and financial autonomy.
395
Endnotes
1. " Interview with Eletronorte official, 1986.
flLL^^c^jLiSi Ed . ^Brasil ia
,
^197 7 )'
.^^-^^
"avlS pSt" ^notion goods on credit?5 ?he flow of
the other hand lL ^ro^ss^Y charged down the line. On
the inverse"?!™ nft *?*lr bOSS " ™e Production fo Lw!nghiL= ^ % i P °?ressivel y lost value as it ascended the
(PetroPolis- Ed
mi
v^
10n -
1Q?^ Mira"da Neto ' ° Uilsm dZaS^njametropol . . Vozes, 1979) pp. 108-125.
4. - Antonio Dias Leite, Politica Mineral p. Enerqetica (Rio deJaneiro: IBGE
, 1974), p. 45^ M ' lK1 ° a
5. - The inputs to make 1 ton of aluminum are combined in twostages: a) 4 tons of bauxite, 194 kilos of soda ash, 910 kilos offuel oil and 533 kWh of electric power are combined to form twotons of alumina; b) 2 tons of alumina mixed with oil coke
^nni^K^'T fluoride (totalling 700 kilos), and principally16,000 kWh, produce 1 ton of aluminum. Eduardo Celestino
Rodrigues, "Unidades e Coeficientes de Conversao," Crise
Energetica (Rio de Janeiro: Jose Olympio Ed., 1975), pp. 173-186.
6. - Ibid.
7. - See Riordan Roett, "Brazil Ascendant: International
Relations and Geopolitics in Late Twentieth Century," Journal of
International Affairs 29 (Fall 1975) : 134-147
.
8. - Interview with Eletronorte official, April 1986. The risks
and the costs of constructing a power plant in the Amazon in the
1960s were uncounted. The technologies and the logistic for
constructing such plants were only gathered in the 1970s,
according to a construction company official interviewed (1985).
9. - MME, Balanco Eneroetico NaeSonal . 1984.
396
E?;t;onorle^l84
i
K
D
p?
S
4
teite
'
i^^Eois. (Brasilia:
Jun I 97""p
M
"6° Bhering
'
President of Eletrobras, o Globo . 7
^Ea^!LS^";oCa yR°o° ri an" Gerald° Mflller 'taaitaiigmo. ( i de Janeiro: Paz e Terra, 1978)
"Nissei
U
"
k
^ho
aLa^S^ge i;eration B«zilian-Japar,ese, a
Energy sector it Tilt ^h* 19!^ P°siti°" In the Mines and
fact
9
that he hao i rL i
eCh"OC"tic abilities, and from the
Nina's S^S^i
15. - See Raw, op.cit.
. pp. 310 ff.
16. - See Raw, op. cit
.
r p. 375.
17. - CVRD, Relatorio Anna]
, various issues, and idem "BauxiteAlumina and Aluminum," n.d. s ,
IL ^nSSi ?el ?t6r ^°, Au la1 ' 1985. The commercial importance ofthe mineral is irrefutable: 27 percent of all Amazon bauxite isprocessed m Brazil before it is exported, ibid, idem .
19. - MME, Relatorio Anual . 1982.
20
•
" Rio Doce Engenha ria e Planeiamento - RDEP, ProietoAlumina /Aluminio : Pre-Viabil idade
r
April 1975, p. 2/1.
21. - CVRD, Eastern Amazon — Preliminary Devel onmpnt Plan
April 1981, 1:15. '
22. - Idem, Bauxite, Alumina/Aluminum...
. n.d.
23. - See "Mais Exportacoes, Menos Dolares," Gazeta Mercantil
.
13 January 1986.
24. - Liicio Flavio Pinto, Caraias. Ataaue ao Coracao do Brasil
.
(Rio de Janeiro: Marco Zero, 1982), pp. 81-82.
25. - There is a Valesul Aluminio, an association of CVRD,
Billiton and Reynolds, in Rio de Janeiro, producing 87,000 tons
since 1982. Now it receives 80 percent of the alumina produced
at Alunorte Tt- q i —_ i _ . .
the private "sector Slch v?eZTi^T^^ coarctations withon an established private market! US State interference
26.
- RDEP Project Alumina/Aluminum, April l975
_ p . 2/2 _
Masil,
M
MasLr
U
Thes^ 1^™^,', * Industrie go n -
Rio de Janeiro)
, insti^to ^ ^ '
U™J (Federal University of" uu 0 de Economia Industrial, 1983 .
June'isve^p
2
'
.
£rs^^-AlMinio^R^t6rio de vi^hh.h.
,
^a^St?*?^^,;;*
^
d
"96trioa de Tucurui
— » ^<=»
1^^^ ^£t Saras.
32. - Carlos Lessa, "A Estrategia op.cit.
33
'
" MM2
'
Relatorio Annai
,
1977 and 1984.
34
-
" Jornal do Brasi]
, 5 August 1975, p. 1-8.
35. - Raw, op. cit
.
. p. 385.
36 Pir>to, Caraias.
. .
r op.cit. . p. 79.
37. - Marcos Dantas, "As Seis Iritias e o Nosso Aluminio," Folhade Sao Paulo, 12 April 1981, Folhetim, p. 14.
38. - MME, Portaria 1654, 13 August 1979.
39. - Veja, "Mais Projetos," 28 May 1980, p. 100.
40. - Pinto, Caraias. .
.
. op.cit.
. p. 81.
41. - The two other modules went into operation in October 1985
and October 1987 while the fourth will be commissioned in October
1988. Cf. Jornal do Brasil
. "Tucurui comeca operar amanha , " 22
November 1984, and Folha de Sao Paulo , "Urn negocio que a OPEP
abencoou," 24 March 1985, p. 4-44.
42. - Seplan. SEST. Sinopse da Atuacao da SEST no periodo
1980/84 . Brasilia, 1985.
398
43.
- MME
, Relatorio Armai iooc
Tucurui o *-~ur^.
«n 1985 and Folha da ««n x^,^ „ Com
March 1985. movido a eletricidade , » 4°, p. 44, 24
the ^^iS^iSd^][* 250 "* - Action of
4
19
5
8 6 :
Interview with ^tional Energy Commission official, April
i!^, ?!r5?_ra fallings, Banking, to the Third «.hh. t,cPortfolio Investment in t „ i q ^ n World; USC^Tif^^r^^ University of
JornL 2^^l^^^^ir energia e, 1981,"
4
19 86 :
InterViGW With Eletronorte official. Brasilia, September
^^^^] foc^oDer r?9^?rgia * A
Na^inn^T? ?6 L
' Indochine et Suez, Deutch Bank, Banca
?GIE? s?j£i,Lar?r^and ^ 9 GrUpp° Industria Eletromeccanica( )
,
Siemens, Alsthom-Atlantique
,
Voigt.
May 1976!
r
p
P
°25?
S TUCUrUi COntinuam ero estudos," 0 Globo
.
23
52. - Banque de L'Union Europeenne, Credit Commercial de FranceSociete Generale, and the firms Creusot-Loire
,
Nerpyc, Empain-
'
Schneider, Alsthom-Atlantique, under the leadership of the first.
53. - Interview with a high Eletronorte official. BrasiliaSeptember 1986. '
54
-
~ Industria e Produtividade
,
July 1976.
55. - Data gathered at Eletronorte headquarters and interview
with Eletronorte officials. Brasilia, April 1986.
56. - Interview with high Eletronorte official. Brasilia,
November 1986.
57. - Paulo Davidoff Cruz, A Divida Externa Brasileira
. op.cit
other civil engineering centrals' *tV in . a?ditio* ^road- andhighways Camargo Correa bSilt in n.J°f * llSt ° f dams and
^^^^^ J"*
11 see A_Indu Stria_da
^°^^^it^ Janeiro: UFRJ - Institute deKeiatorio de Pesquisa, 1979).
59.
-
Fortune, June 1987 and Veja, July i98 7.
declared^nat'TucururCar10 -^ °bra de Tucu™ s - «
possible to tap resources ™l ° fmonstrate that it was
proven wrong iS the foUowfng years^S'SflS* WhiCh W3SJanuary 1977. g . 0 Estado de Sao Paulo , 23
n^; Z
ElGtronorte, Relatorio anua]
,
1979-81 See al^n
63.
-
Interview with Eletronorte official. Brasilia, April 1986.
jo^i te^^^'asit^0' para Tucurui no exteri-'-
^tember'lfsl?" *
Elet™t e . s Fi—ial Department. Brasilia,
66. - "Empreiteira de Tucurui nao recebe ha 90 dias," Jornal doBrasil
. 11 July 1982, p. 29. —
67. - Eletronorte Financial Department. See also "Atraso doGoverno com Camargo Correa nao prejudica Tucurui," Jornal do
Brasil, 26 October 1981, p. 16.
68. - Officially Camargo Correa and Eletronorte denied the death
in a note. However eyewitnesses have given repeated reports to
newsmedia. See Samuel Wainer, "o Motim de Tucurui," Folha de Sao
Paulo
. 9 April 1980, p. 2.
69. - According to Eduardo Celestino Rodrigues "Unidades e
Coeficientes de Conversao" ferro-silicon smelting consumes 5,500
kWh per ton of ingot in each of primary and secondary smelting.
Crise Energetica (Rio de Janeiro: Jose Olympio Ed., 1975), pp.
173-181
.
(Berkley
f
f
5nLer"ty
a
Sf
a
2ali?c?niri
daVSki
'
implementation
I!l^lefflentation^La (Gamboge? KiT^s
,
^ '
^PeriSff^fffSf^ the
1978. The total volume waTc^se"^,!"6^aZ°" <S™"« inincluding less commercial types ™illion cubic meters
scientisL^et'at'EletronorL0
,
1 ?1 ' e™ir°™entalists and
condemn the flooding of 2Se roresr^
3^^' to
similar cases. The re ^ 5 °n evldences from
secret. ,^^1 off^S
Jn;tItut
B
e
r0
fo?°?o°es?
S
Dli:i^r fi^TSS? ^ BraZiUangather information. More than LJSf'f? 18 ln 1976 "77 to
SS32? Bra^^
September 1977 to analyze alternative for TucurSi fores?
'
the
76. - National Institute for Amazon Research (INPA) RelatorioTecnico para a Eletronorte
y 1984. INPA had produ^id a previou stechnical report for Eletronorte in 1979 pointing to the
ecological dangers.
77. - Eletrobras request for a US$ 500 million loan from theWorld Bank was denied until Eletrobras complied with
environmental recommendations, especially for Balbina
hydroelectric dam, in the Amazon Region, projected to be floodedin 1988 with a 33 million cubic meters of wood in it. Interviews
with World Bank official. Washington, DC April, July and
September 1987.
78. - The expression "ecological bomb" was officially coined by
the then Special Secretary for Environmental Protection, Paulo
Nogueira Netto, in a letter to the then director of INPA,
Henrique Bergamin Filho, which became public in 1982.
401
mandating S^cSna of™ 3824 ' 23 I960)
reservoirs was enacted
°d fr°m 311 art ifi<=ial water
Sao Paulo and R!o in pr!o r
e
Lca^s
ted
H^°
blemS
^
f WatSr to
of enforcement of this law.
owever, there were problems
82
;k\ B?!Sd °n their exPerience, gathered in the past decade,with building large-scale development projects in Trllil ?hevwanted to participate in international bids in Europe Africa andMiddle East Interview with Construtora Norberto n^r-tlll^
official. Washington, DC, 19877^
?^P /Tn"P qUeinf B^ sico Para a Exploracao da Madeira de Tucurui,"IBDF/Eletronorte. Brasilia, June 1979.
84. - World wood sales amounted to 3 million cubic meters
annually and Tucurui 's wood would make a substantial differencein prices and volumes sold worldwide. 170 different kinds of
wood, most of which unknown in the world market, were shown inthe Hannover Fair and in the Paris Expobis generating hundreds of
orders.
85. - IBDF president, Carlos Galluf, tried to preserve Para's
entrepreneurs interests after he met them in Belem, in October
1979.
86. - Interview IBDF official, September 1985.
87. - Nodario Azevedo, president of the Brazilian Associate.' zi
Wood Producers, in "Sera refeita a Licitacao de Tucurui," Gazet-
Mercantil 09 May 1980, p. 1.
88. - Interview with Capemi official, Brasilia, May 1984. This
information was confirmed by a construction company official,
Washington, DC, 1987.
89. - Interview to Patricia Saboia, "A Capemi explica resultados
insatisfatorios em Tucurui," Gazeta Mercantil 15 June 1982, p. 12.
402
^oncex TciLtlToTzTontl af°1Uti°n "°- 129 Was "need by
1981, only a feS tJont^aftL ccntract
E
had
r
b
0r>
°" 13 *™«*
Benedito Moreira director „ =
o een signed. However,
authorization to export is hL» k^' fated that " the
missing!" "Madeireiros ' t^-i*. 18 the wood which is
Tucuru?,.. ,ssryss ^ror^^sir" 2 3CAPEHI em
Cara^s^rograJT
18
"' 24 N°VSmber 1980 instituted the Greater
SussesS:;att ss !T:<;m5s fr°°working. "A Capemi Explica ,» op.cit . y
94.
- Structura S.A., Relatorio
. March 1982.
C^^n
MT^eSMfr°\Ineet ingS With SNI ' Nati°nal Security Council,apemi, IBDF, Ministry of Agriculture, Eletronorte officials inDecember 1981, February and June 1982. Interview with Ministry
of Agriculture official. Brasilia, November, 1984.
96. - Any Bourrier, Paris Correspondent 0 Globo
. 14 June 1982
p . 11 . '
97. - "Capemi explica...," op.cit.
98. - Alexandre von Baumgarten, a staunch anti-Communist
connected to hard-line military, acguired the magazine 0 Cruzeiro
in the late 1970s, and tried to resurrect the old magazine
offering space to ideological, political or even commercial
interests of the so-called "community of information." That
relationship soured not after long and Baumgarten, feeling
physically threatened, allegedly wrote a "Dossier Baumgarten" in
which he described involvement with General Newton Cruz, Chief of
The Central SNI Agency (Brasilia) , second man below General
Octavio Medeiros. They were supposed to get state and private
enterprises advertizing to maintain the magazine afloat but could
not do it in view of political liberalization. In February 1981
the solution found was to sell the magazine to AMA an editing
house whose owner was Antonio Mourao Abissamara, former IBDF
public relations officer between 1979 and September 1980,
indicated by his brother-in-law General Newton Cruz. Since
September 1980, O Cruzeiro was controlled by Capemi already under
contract with IBDF. According to the dossier, SNI influenced the
403
responsible for tenino^™'
a"ton i° «• Abissamara was
going tfbe done^ 1^"'"?^™^ ^ Pr°jSCt »
disappeared, and a body? later con??™**?
Baumgarten
assassinated or disappeared « ™" s ^?
lge
" *» case he
e tiroteio sucessorio
P
Nem tudo e colnc^ncia"" "sto'fi T tUd °February 1983, pp. 14-20. ^J-nciaenci , Isto E , 9
o
9
pro1«tl
R
S
b^ Slfc? 1 "nhecia as irregularidades e nao parou<-< ^iuje o, roina de Sa o Paulo ? Mar-ph iqqt -d^w . ^,
the Commercial Director of f Roberto Amaral was
the first bid ami *S IBDF who forced the cancellation of
if riif™? a
6 awardln9 to Capemi in the second bid even
eLerien^
9r
S
PeCUar
i
a d
° n0t COm^ to the edict, nor did hive
Aa?icultt^; wh
S transferred from IBDF to the ministry of
wirespecIan™^ PS^tl0K-° f Coordinat^ for Biomass Affairs
went bankruni
y
»rtt
f?r him. His position lasted until Capemi
em Tucurui » Fnih a h
faz mudancas e acha que vai se sair bemr , ol de Sao Paulo, 26 September 1982, p. 39.
Pauio' 3 T:rcri9 8rp.
S
12.
aPreSSada P°r aga°'" ^^-^
l
01
'*
~
^
S
!
e
-
the definition of sistema in Endnotes, Chapter IV.As for Medeiros being Figueiredo's choice see p. 173 ff.
102. - Capemi owed circa US$ 139 million in debts to foreign anddomestic banks, international and domestic equipment suppliers
and to firms and persons who rendered services. Interview withMinistry of Agriculture official, Brasilia 1984, analysis ofdocuments on Capemi activities.
103. - Interview with Construtora N . Odebrecht official.
Washington, DC 1987.
104. - "Madeira de Tucurui obriga Governo a decisao politica "
Globo, 21 March 1983, p. 12.
0
105. - IBDF, Tucurui - Relatorio da Diretoria Tecnica , 12 pg,
Brasilia, March 1983. IBDF president, Mauro Reis, stated "Tucurui
nao tem solugao," a few weeks later. See "IBDF nao tern solucao
para Tucurui," Jornal de Brasilia
. 6 April 1983, p. 7.
106. - According to Prof. Jorge Furet, University of Brasilia's
Dept. of Ecology, "...in order for Tucurui to absorb that
quantity of wood it would need 2.3 kilos of oxygen per cubic
meter of water. The usual quantity is 10 milligrams or 230 times
less than it would be necessary in this case... Filling the lake
up without clearing the vegetation is against all rules pointed
y
'
Jorna l de Bra S1 ha
,
6 April 1983, p. 7.
2?50o"per
a
hec?are
t
chL^rHti?Kting c°™i^i°n found that the US$
SfSfATflorsoarenP^lpn"- ^ CPI da BBOj ,
E^etronortf^T,
l6tt
^
r frOI
°
Co1
'
Raul G
"
Llan°- President of
AltllTr^VXll itsV.^ ^ SilV3 ' ^ropecuaria Cape.i
109. - IBDF, Levantamentg, March 1983. Not even the
2lS
1
2Sr»2S»f?y
GIlt
i
gat
i
n
2 Comraiss ion was able to elucidate howS^Lr V?- y extracted, how much was actually spent indirect activities, or how much was sidetracked.
110. - Col. Raul Llano had died in December 1982 of heartfailure.
ni I- Guillermo O'Donnell and Philipp Schmitter,Negotiating (and Renegotiating) Pacts, » in Transitions fro™
Authoritarian Rule. Tentative Conclusions about Uncertain
Democracies
. (Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins Univ. Press, 1986)37-47
.
'
;
'
PP
112.
- Eletronorte, INPA and CNPq allgedly knew IBDF/Capemi useddefoliants since 1981, with the knowledge and tacit agreement ofthe SNI and of the office of Secretary General of National
Security Council. Minutes from meetings, December 1981 and June
1982. See also statement by Henrique Bergamin, "Ameaca Ecologica
em Tucurui ainda sem Solucao," Jornal de Brasilia . 10 April
1983, p. 10.
113. - Ibid, idem.
114. - According to Sebastiao Pinheiro, a SEMA engineer, who was
hired to clean up operation. "Denunciadas mortes causadas por
agrotoxicos em Tucurui," Folha de Sao Paulo 6 April 1984, p. 23.
115. - Joao Batista de Melo Bastos, Secretary of Agriculture of
the State of Para, "Quadro de desolacao e dramatico," Folha de
Sao Paulo
. 10 July 1984, p. 22. See also "Tucurui e o tremendo
impacto ecologico," Jornal de Brasilia , 4 March 1984, p. 6.
116. - Dioxin, the substance released, is so poisonous that only
7 parts to the trillion are lethal and even less is enough to
405
officials
^Sey'Seiieeed^ost h
Acco
F
ding to IBDF and Eletronorte
the opinion of SebaltUo p h ^
relS h
?
d been founcL This is not
stated that Dow Che^J ? « ? r?' 5011 eng^eer of SEMA , who
were forbidden in Brazil
S
^
Pplled the toxic chemical knowing they
about it since he had b^n
Af lcuiture Minister Stabile also knew
Dow Quimica the Brazi^T^n ° f the Board of Directors of
Eletronorte ' contrac? If Sldfy " Agromax, a firm under
lof and
?
°uL ?riiS» SST8 '" Jornal da Tardp - 16 1984, p.
aaje, 6 June ll85? p?"S? Amaz6nia: ^ a p—a '" I^ttl
-
2Eexa£a2_CuruEira, what in Tupian folklore meansprotector of Nature who hits tree trunks signaling Animals of
nis'reet SSSS"^ T^"' CUrUpira hates^aun^hunters andms f backward in disguise.
118. - Members of the State House Parliamentary InvestigatinqCommission on Natural Resources were not convinced by thf 9explanations of Eletronorte Coordinator of the Presidency,Armando Arairjo about the consequences from closing Tucurui on
A^L^
Vi
r°
niTient
°n
-
the re9 ion ' s Population. Interview withrmando Araujo, Brasilia, April 1986.
119. "Governo do Para entra na Justica," Folha de Sao Paulo .10 August 1984, p. 14. "
120. - "Uma acao popular na Justica para paralisar Tucurui "Estado de Sao Pau1o
r
29 June 1984.
has
121. - Official Eletronorte numbers, though they could be more
122. - See "Tucurui: a Babilonia brasileira , " 0 Estado de Sao
Paulo
, 11 September 1980, p. 26.
123. - Ciro Dias Reis, Tucurui. Relatorio da Gazeta Mercantil
.
22 November 1984, p. 4.
124. - O Globo
. 1 July 1984. Eletronorte officials confirmed
the fact. Interview September 1986.
12 5. - Randau Marques, "Tucurui: Pode estar comecando uma grande
tragedia," Jornal da Tarde 23 June 1984, p. 6.
126. - Laercio Silva, "IBDF se omite no fiasco da Capemi,"
Jornal de Brasilia , 7 July 1984, p. 7.
406
127
* ~ Armando Arauio "FlPi-rnnn>-f^ ,
veneno/._jcrnal^^i^"^
°™f^984 p
qU
i 6
CaPemi eSCMde
128.
- "Agao Popular nao i
Sep^ember^!?^ L'^Ap^enttv'hi^"0 ' ^ d° 7Delfi^etto becLse'ne igSSSS?.^1K££ ^££2? *
hn^l reaS°n f°r dismis^l at a time of an unrealistic Y
percenrreal?^
011011
°
f inflation of 97 Percent wSh a 250
111* \ Ab M°r Gondiln ' "Fechamento de Tucurui ja provocaacidentes," Correio Braz. i 1 i ense
, 9 September 1984
, p? 10
d^iJflfl'TjS^sg? p?"" " AmaZ6nia ' V6ja 3 Prova * "-iLernal
i-J:^" ^
LU
S-° ^
la
y
i0 Pint°' " A des°lagao toma conta de Tucurui,"Estado de Sao Paulo, 29 November 1986, p. 67.
CHAPTER VII
CONCLUSIONS: THE DYNAMICS OF POLICY-MAKINGAND SOME DEMOCRATIC PERSPECTIVES
This study concludes with a comparison of the patterns
of power and policy-making observed in the two major development
projects executed during the authoritarian military regime. The
principal objective of this comparative analysis are: 1) to
determine to what extent the basic patterns involved in policy-
making were similar or different in each project; 2) the extent
to which the same leaders, groups and institutions participated
in each project; and 3) the extent to which the same class and
class fractional interests benefited from the two projects
implemented
.
It is important to recognize that this comparison is
not exhaustive. Although other state sectors were also analyzed
in Chapter IV -- industrial, mining and other infrastructure
projects — our focus was on the two most unique development
projects undertaken by the authoritarian regime. Other type of
decisions could also be fruitfully studied (social policy, or
other redistributive, regulatory or distributive policies)
.
Second, we have not considered — except in passim — the
similarities between the hydro-power policy-making between the
military regime and the civilian regime which preceded it. There
are many apparent similarities despite the differences in the
size of hydro-power projects undertaken three or four decades ago
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and Itaipu or Tucurui. Large construction companies have largely
influenced hydro-power policy both then and now. But emphasis on
generation, as pointed out by Tendlerl has vastly expanded to
include the interests of equipment producers, transmission and
distribution equipment manufacturers and assembly contractors.
While continuity merits further examining in view of regime
changes, the disparity shown in these two case-studies have
surpassed any apparent continuity. Third, the scope of this
study was limited to the 1964-85 period. with the return to
competitive party politics, unnoticeably as of 1974-76 but more
vividly after the 1979 party reform, it is quite conceivable that
the role of many elites, groups and institutions within the
policy-making process in the Nova Republic* (1985+) period have
undergone substantial changes.
Despite its limitations, this comparison of the Itaipu
and Tucurui projects is capable of providing useful insights into
several important aspects of the policy-making process in Brazil.
In the first place, because both projects had distributive
implications, they were highly publicized and controversial
projects that mobilized major social forces within their sector.
Consequently, both provide excellent opportunities for observing
patterns of political participation and interest representation
within the military regime. Second, the expenditure of huge
resources for Itaipu and Tucurui precluded appropriation in other
electrical sector projects and in other social expenditures.
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Furthermore, both projects involved more than one decision and
spanned more than one presidential term; their final outcome
therefore revealing indicators of the overall balance of class
and the power of class fractions power within the state and th
dominant class during the authoritarian military period.
Finally, the fact that the decisions were of different scope
nature permits an examination of the factors that led to an
autonomous or to a heteronomous decision-making within the
Brazilian political system.
A. Patterns of Policy-Making
In Brazil, development policy has changed less abruptly
in Brazil than other cases in Latin America such as Peru in 1968
(and again in 1980), Argentina in 1976 (and again in 1983), and
in Chile 1973 (and again ?). Major development policies have
been initiated by the Executive branch. Individual congressmen
may have been particularly interested in one or another project
affecting their constituencies but their influence has been
imperceptible. Congressional oversight and inquiry was done in
the Nuclear Program, Tucurui and CVRD cases but Congress did not
have the power to recommend any policy changes. In the Itaipu
case, the role of Congress was basically to rubber-stamp the
Treaty of Itaipu, essentially handled by the central military
government and diplomatic ranks in the Brazilian side. In the
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Tucurui case, the failure nf tr i o the Inquiry Commissions proposals to
stop the flooding of the re^P^^v ,,,-4-uy n servoir with tons of biomass inside,
and the incapacity to enforce the recommendations to the Nucl
Program, confirm that only the Executive was an effective poli
initiator.
ear
cy
ies
In Itaipu case, all different international treati.
and final decision were the product of Executive predominance.
Ata das Cataratas of 1966 was the final result of an Executive
and diplomatic approximation that began in 1950s, when President
Juscelino and Generalissimo Stroessner inaugurated the Friendship
Bridge. The 1973 Itaipu Treaty was the ultimate output of a
process set in motion by General Costa e Silva shortly after he
was empowered in 1967. it spanned the repressive Costa e Silva
and Medici governments, and was entirely drafted under the
instructions of the National Security Council and Itamaraty.
Likewise, Acuerdo de las Altura^ of 1979 resulted from a
negotiation process involving the private and the public sector
of Brazil, Argentina and Paraguay. A similar pattern is also
detected in the case of Tucurui, in its initial phase. The 1973
proposal of Mines and Energy Minister Dias Leite, was drafted
following the directives of the National Security and Development
Doctrine and its National Integration Plan for the Amazon. The
1974-76 decision-making process was elaborated under the close
supervision of General-President Geisel and Mines and Energy
Minister Ueki.
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A presidential deci^-inr. 4-«a cis on to undertake development
P-^cts was not
, at leasfc in ^ cases ^^^^ ^
soiely the outgrowth of specific demands or direct pressures
'
brought to bear on the system by the potential
development projects. Among
fronfcier
rural workers, mdians from the Amazon and most of the working
class engaged in these develops projects, levels of
organization and mobilization were so low that the dominated
classes were essentially incapable of articulating their policy
preferences or pressuring the political system directly.
Illustrating this point, despite scattered outbreaks of violence
in the construction sites of Itaipu and Tucurui, no decision or
implementation directive can be traced to specific demands
expressed by organizations representing such groups. Moreover,
no policy has been modified as a result of demands posed by
working class organizations in these two cases. The highly
organized economic interest association, multinational
corporations and international banks, in contrast, frequently
made direct requests for favorable policies. The executive was
unquestionably influenced by these demands, but in neither the
Itaipu nor the Tucurui Project can the specific content of the
policy initiative put forward by the state tbe attributed solely
to pressures from the private sector.
Rather than a direct response to carefully articulated
group demands, the decision of a General-President to commit his
ng
r
administration to anv nxr-ny particular type of project should be seen
as a result of a more complex andp ambiguous set of indirect
Pressures. On the one hand, the executive was charged „ith
primary institution*! responsibility te planning and promoti
economic qrowth • t-h»+- ^ ^. at is, for establishing and sustaining the
conditions reguired for capitalist accumulation, on the othe
hand, the executive also was vested with primary responsibility
for striving for legitimacy and preserving the stability of the
state and of the Pnn>-c m ji itcn e tire military authoritarian system.
These general pressures were, of course, filtered
through personalities and ideological biases of individual
presidents and the immediate managerial-political elite. They
were also conditioned by the specific historical context within
which each General-President ruled. Different presidents could
and did, therefore, react differently to similar set of
pressures. General-President Costa e Silva, for example, pushed
ahead with the insulation of the policy-making process and the
expansion of the state enterprise system while General-President
Geisel was forced to stop unchecked growth of estatizacao due to
mounting financial crisis and growing discontent from business
sectors. Nevertheless, all the development projects examined in
this study appear to have sprung from a presidential conviction
that some form of state action was necessary to stimulate
economic growth and preserve legitimacy and security of the
state
.
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A pattern of state intervention and presidential
influence can be traced to the l 940s
, with Getulio Vargas-led
National Steel Company (CSN) and Rio Doce Valley Company (CVRD)
followed in the 19 50s by regional hydro-power projects and the
creation of Petrobras; President Juscelino Kubistchek
inaugurated the internationalization of the Brazilian economy
with the Target Plan, but his grandiose project was the
construction of Brasilia, the new inland capital. Joao Goularfs
presidency deteriorated into a
-paralysis of decision."?
General-President Castello Branco was committed to institutional
reform and to exclude working class demands on the state.
General-President Costa e Silva hard-line stance was committed to
a Emerging Power project in which the Angra I Nuclear Power
Plant, the Transamazon Highway, and the Rio-Niterdi Bridge were
grandiose projects pursued while dissidents and opposition were
violently repressed. General-President Medici furthered
political support to the Brasil-Grande?* ideals with Itaipu
Project and Steel Plan, while Finance Minister Delfim Netto
masterminded the engagement of international and local capitalist
and financial interests. General-President Ernesto Geisel
initially wanted to push ahead with the Grandeza project, but the
oil crisis and its consequences on the balance of payments were
an effective deterrent to the grandiose development projects —
Tucurui, Acominas
. Ferrovia do Acq , Nuclear Program,
Petroleum/Petrochemical Program, Albras/Alunorte Industrial
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Complex. Neverthele^o *-u
fina .
*
thGy WSre
-PI—ted under tremendouncial and political duress rM i. General~President Joao
Figueiredo could muster enouah r-«c°Ug resources to initiate his own
72 7
project Greater caraj4s
- —— -3,1(3 <the
" °" P-ties, won state Executive
elections and strongly ^^ ^ ^ ^
authoritarian regime
. In additio^ i979 _ ig85 ^
deep recession in the Rra.iiiBrazilian economy, for the first time
dUrin9 mUitary rUle
' »» relationship between economic
.rowth and the legitimacy of authoritarian regime „as shattered
.
in the case of itaipu, diplomatic treaties with
Paraguay were conceived as mechanisms for simultaneously
Placating Paraguayan interests - thus obtaining their agreement
on the use of a common good
-, and to satisfy Bra 2 ilian
military security concerns with respect to Argentina. The
establishment of the Binational Entity was designed to gain the
support of Paraguayan public officials and to gain the confidence
and political support of the construction and capital goods
interest groups. 3 In the case of Tucurui/ the principal
motivation was put forward by the Second National Development
Plan's "second import-substitution industrialization" and the
ideology of developing the Amazon on grounds of National
Integration. In both projects, concern for providing electric
power for the industrializing regions of Brazil and concern for
continued economic activitvy were expressed, but the major
considerations were w ifhn,,f, t out question, political rather economic.
Perhaps the best way to conceptually the policy-
initiating role of the executive and of state enterprises within
the military regime is in terms of "relative autonomy." The
executive was neither wholly free from active pressures from the
dominant classes, nor simply an instrument directly manipulated
by members of the ruling class. The general limits of the
state's autonomy in any policy area were contingent upon the
structural constraints and instrumental pressures characteristic
of the particular period focused. The specific limits were
always a product of bargaining, compromise, co-optation,
leadership, and coalition-building (within the military regime).
The executive could and frequently did press against or "test"
the constraints and pressures that restricted his freedom of
action
.
Once a president had made the original decision to
sponsor a particular project, the second stage in the policy-
making process was the drafting of a formal or informal agreement
between the ministry/state enterprise responsible with the
private sector. During the drafting process, which generally
lasted several years in the two case studied, it was not uncommon
for the minister and his subordinates to carry out extensive
"consultations" with the major interest groups that would be most
directly affected by the decision. In 1963-64, for example,
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Eletrobras President (and
. hydro .pQwer consultant)
Maroondes Kerraz teste* the Paraguayan government fcy stating^
the best solution to tap the huge hydro-power potenti.l in the
Parana River was to devisi-oiate the river into Brazilian territory
and then build an entire! v ny.a ,n •ly Brazilian power plant. Marcondes
Ferraz was "sounding out" diplomatic problems with Paraguay
before the Brazilian government finally decided to pursue the
twin military and diplomatic course to convince Stroessner and
his staff of building itaipu. Prior consultations were by no
meanS obli9at°ry, however, as evidenced by Minister Ueki's
failure to discuss his Tucurui proposal with anyone outside the
Ministry of Mines and Energy and the state enterprises under its
area of influence, Eletronorte and CVRD. Likewise, for Geisel's
failure to discuss the Nuclear Program outside the military
ministries, National Security Council and diplomatic circles.
After the final version of major development projects
had been decided, the third stage of policy-making began with the
formal establishment of the institutions responsible, Itaipu
Binacional and Eletronorte. Once the projects reached the state
enterprise, they were inevitably subjected to close critical
scrutiny by both bureaucratic tecnicos and concerned private
sector groups ~ a stage of policy-making process.
Closed meetings of construction companies and capital
goods manufacturers with state enterprise officials provided the
principal arena for this review process. Over a period of months
or years, the objections ftf «-v,D o the ma] or interest groups leaders
were taken again to the in«=m * .6 l sulated ministerial or state
enterprise's boardrooms Th^. is was repeatedly the case with
Itaipu final line-up of con^mnfP r onstruction companies (UNICON and
CONEMPA)
,
of equipment manufacturers and assembly (ITAMON)
.
Direct negotiations amonq COntr„f.9 co ractors, industrialists, bankers
with Itaipu officials, the ministers and the president both in
Brazil and Paraguay sought modification or elimination of
objectionable provisions, such as was the case with the
.-cycle
question," and the
--heights question-, with Argentina. These
direct negotiations constituted a step in the policy-making
Process: a process best described as circular in which decisions
were taken during the implementation phase.
in the case of Tucurui, negotiations between Minister
Dias Leite and the Japanese mSA, and later between Minister Ueki
and NAAC has similarly assumed the form of closed consultation
and negotiations. Although a more aggressive press offered
society some view of was happening inside the decision-making
process, particularly with the political visibility represented
by the appointment of A.C. Magalhaes, a clientelistic politician,
to the presidency of Eletrobras. Political liberalization did
not automatically transformed demands into public policy.
General-President Figueiredo and his Mines and Energy Minister
Cals reinforced insulation on the Tucurui-Capemi imbroglio.
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Military regime presidents attempted to mobilize mass
support behind their development project. Bmilio Medici was
particularly inclined to use PR (public relations) ^
boast the achievements of his government, while newspaper and
television news of resistance against his policies were censored
Ernesto Geisel austere figure was not apt to marketing
techniques, so he marshalled support for his grandiose
development project through offers of ministerial and state
enterprise appointments and other types of patronage to some
dissident faction within their authoritarian-developmentalist
coalition. The appointment of Severe Gomes as Ministry of
industry and Commerce in 1974 was a calculated attempt to utilize
patronage to co-opt the nationalist Paulista industrialist for
the government's Second National Development Plan. On the other
hand, the appointment of Jose Costa Cavalcanti to the presidency
of Eletrobras in 1980 was prompted by the Figueiredo
administration's desire to consolidate support and to guarantee
the execution of hydro-power projects making continued use of
Eletrobras borrowing capacity.
While the executive was the principal initiator of
development project and was able to exert considerable leverage
within the bargaining process, important limitations were placed
on presidential autonomy in policy-making by both economic
interests associations and international interests, particularly
during the implementation phase. Aluminum producers stalled
419Geisel initiatives nn-Mi iu til market conditions were adequate and
Figueiredo government agreed to thoe modifications sought by the
Japanese partner with regard to cost ofy ™ energy. m the Itaipu
case, while decision-making process k»y has been essentially
insulated and Brazilian interests largely prevailed in the
implementation nhacc n-,p se. Paraguay and Argentina resisted and were
able to modify initial policy with respeot to cyoles and the
height of the Parana River dams downstream from Itaipu.
Opposition party and dissident organizations also were
able to restrict executive autonomy. indeed, most of the public
debate over the Itaipu and Tucurui projects was conducted through
newspaper reports. Opposing factions used newspapers as their
primary vehicle for mobilizing opposition against the
government's financial deals and bad management of the
environmental questions at both projects. In effect the press
Played a crucial role in transmitting opposition policy
preference to the executive during the harshest years of the
exclusionary-military regime and thereby helped to shape the
political environment within which political liberalization took
place. That, however, was not sufficient to modify policy.
The influence of the major interest associations within
the state and state enterprises was a function of economic
resources, the technical information, and the strategic services
they controlled. The growing planning and regulatory capacities
of the Brazilian state made the decision on state hydroelectric
power and other development project relate ,3 CZ l ively independent fromprivate cooperation. But the count™-.
,
ntry's economic development washighly dependent on continued private . -a sector investment. This
investment, however, decrea^ ^
,
creased considerably after 1977-78, and
particularly during the 1981-83 recession t ax . Industrialist
complained that the governments economic policies were
inhibiting capita! investment and wrongly attacked ^u^.
Financial capital thu^ r-P.r-r--;^s carried a great deal of importance in
state policy-making realm.
To express their objections or their support for
development projects major interest groups had a number of
channels open to them. Most had trained staff capable of
drafting technical studies and position papers to support their
policy preferences in direct consultations with the state
enterprise tecnicos. Brazilian tecnicos and politicians were
often capable of shifting from one executive positions in a state
enterprise to another and to shift to the private sector
periodically. These patterns of recruitment and career mobility
between the private sector and ministerial advisory board-state
enterprise, and from political position to the administration has
been systematically studied" demonstrating different forms of
elite circulation in Brazilian state industrial enterprises and
private sector in recent years.
It s important to note that the influence of the major
economic interest associations in policy-making appears to have
grown steadily during +-k
"
"9 millta^ „hile in the 195Qsthe same industry leaders influence(J
policies, in the 19 7 0s and 1980s that inf ,influence was exerted by
heterogeneous economic int«.»-==tteres associations. indeed, whenever
»ass organization such as the Ecclesiastical Base Communities
the labor union confederation Sole Worker. Central (CUT, £antEaI
^-^^^Oim^^ or other iarge labor unions began to
assert some degree of autonomy within the political system, they
were guickly brought back under control of the executive
techniques of reDreq^inn h-;,,- •p ss o , division or co-optation. The raids
against Sao Bernardo Metal Workers Union in 1980 by the
Figueiredo administration illustrates the basic mechanisms
utilized to demobilize the peasantry and exclude them from active
participation in politics during the political liberalization
years
The determining factor in the fourth stage of policy-
making is the extent to which the executive was successful in
generating consensus on his projects within the state enterprises
and interest groups during the consultation phase. The executive
did initiate development projects during the military regime
relatively free from direct interest group pressure or from
political Congressional opposition, but no development project
could gain approval in the business community unless it was a
product of consensus among the dominant economic forces within
the military-bureaucratic-private sector coalition. In the final
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analysis, the executive was forced to make major concessions t
the mterest groups before any progress in implementation could
be achieved. In the case of Itaipu, no effective consensus
between Brazil, Paraguay and Argentina ever developed in the
consultation stage and thus itaipu project was approved in 1973,
partly as an outcome of the Peronist victory in the Argentine
presidential elections. In the case of Tucurui, Japanese
retreated from their willingness to invest in Tucurui and in
infrastructure for the aluminum plants in the region forcing the
Brazilian to pick up responsibility for the project. They
nullified most of the potential effects of the "Law of
Participation." Figueiredo's efforts to speed up the Project
through the establishment of Greater Carajas Program equally
conceded on subsidized cost of energy to aluminum manufacturers.
A final point to be made regarding basic patterns of
policy-making during the military regime is that even when the
developments projects passed the four stages, there were still
considerable problems to implement them. In both cases the
difficulties were related to resources being tied up to loans and
equipment supplied. Another type of problem was related to the
lack of political responsibility to execute them. Contractors
knowingly spent project resources for other activities not
related to Tucurui 's deforestation project leaving a messy
environmental problem behind. The enormous Brazilian foreign
debt is partly owed to irresponsible implementation of
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development project even if the country's expansion of the
capitalist economy required higher levels of investment.
To determine whether or not a "ruling class- exist:
Pluralist like Dahl5 argue that it is necessary tQ d„trate
empirically that the same leaders that make policy in one issu,
area also make policy in other areas and that the same allian.
wins consistently in all issue areas. From the case of Brazil's
development project presented in the preceding chapters, it is
evident that significantly different sets of leaders were
involved in setting policy in each sector and that no single
coalition won consistently over time, except the large
empreiteira Camargo Correa.
Some degree of overlap was observed among top executive
officers. Prominent figures such as Costa e Silva, Medici,
Geisel, Figueiredo, Golbery, Costa Cavalcanti, Velloso, Dias
Leite, Ueki, Magalhaes, Cals appeared as influential in both
development projects in at least some stages of the policy-making
process. But even in these cases, which are largely attributable
to the fact that all were important leaders with wide ranging
policy responsibilities, their relative influence fluctuated
dramatically over time.
In the electrical energy sector, Costa Cavalcanti
appears to be a key figure, capable of providing political
gathering political support for the rtaipu develops project
and overlapping to the Tucurui proiect m« *j . His tenure in office as
Minister of Mines and Energy (1967-1970, and Minister of interior
(1970-1974, allowed him to preside Itaipu Binaoional. Geisel
tenure as Minister-Chief of the Military House of the Presidency
and as president of Petrobras - added to the fact that his
brother was Medici's Minister of the Army
-, was politically
capable of conducing him to the presidential term. His chief
political advisor Golbery do Couto e silva had masterminded the
creation of SNI and was a strategist of abertura. Although not
directly involved in the decision and implementation of the two
major development project Golbery was a key figure in the
political aspect of both projects. His trip to Asuncion in 1965
was crucial to the final resolution of the AJyLJ3as_Cataratas
. In
1981 his resignation as chief political advisor to Figueiredo had
the political effect of putting the hard-line on the defensive
after the Riocentro incident, what facilitated the denouncement
of the Capemi case.
Other key figures and factions involved in the policy-
making of the electrical energy sector were Mines and Energy
Minister Dias Leite, who had also been president of CVRD, and
Minister Ueki, who had previously been Petrobras »s Financial
Director under Geisel. Dias Leite approval for Tucurui was
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related to his strong support for mineral development of th
Eastern Amazon and its linkages with electric power. s
overlap was seen in the case of Eletrobras president A.c.
Magalhaes and director of Coordination, Cesar Cals. Magalhaes
left Eletrobras to be Governor of the State of Bahia, where by
1979 was being implanted an important Petrochemical Pole in whic
the State government had high stakes. Cesar Cals was elected
indirectly to the Senate by his native State of Ceara, and
subsequently appointed by Figueiredo to be the new Minister of
Mines and Energy. Although key figures changed positions some
continuity of personnel is observed from one stage of decision
making to the next. Key figures in state enterprises of the
electrical sector who had been historically linked to hydro-
power projects were still in action during the last decade.
Outside government and state enterprises, some overlap
between policy-makers was observed. Congressional figures and
party leaders had little interests in the policy-making of the
project, except in cases where some political gain could be
extracted by denouncing one or another aspect, particular the
environment-political-administrative Capemi imbroglio.
Integration and participation of other ministries, given their
functional specialization, was problematic. The Ministry of
Agriculture participated in the Tucurui project but their views
were hardly adopted.
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The same type of specialization was characteristic of
the private sector leadership. E^ite^s. (construction
companies) had their interest representation dealing directly
with technical and financial sectors of state enterprise.
Equipment and other capital goods manufacturers dealt separatel
with both Itaipu Binacional and Eletronorte. Example of other
projects were recalled on when negotiating terms and schedules.
But some overlap existed: Camargo Correa was probably the main
beneficiary of both projects. This firm was personally called to
participate in the Itaipu project by Generalissimo Stroessner.
Eletronorte awarded Camargo Correa the first bidding, and its
president personally participated in extending the bidding
process to the construction of the dam. Although no formal
alliance existed between construction companies and equipment
manufacturers and assemblers, collusion among different companies
and subcontractors formally existed and coordinated policy and
political alliances.
As spokesmen for the industrialist, FIESP (FIESP,
Federacao das Industrias do Estado de Sao Paulo ^ leaders such as
Claudio Bardella, Paulo Villares and Luis Eulalio Bueno Vidigal
were at least tangentially involved in both development projects.
Their involvement as industrialists and as spokesmen for the
Brazilian entrepreneurs rallying for democratization and
embracing opposition views was crucial for the continued
allocation of resources to both projects, in particular Itaipu,
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as demonstrated in Chapter V. But in no moment were they the
principal force behind the policies finally adopted and on
several occasions they played almost no role at all.
Low subject mobilization is a recurrent characteristic
of the Brazilian political system for the unsubstantial
participation of citizens in input-output bargaining, citizens
demands continued to follow a corporatist/patrimonial scheme - a
particular demand creation without consideration of lower classes
demands
.
Some observers of Brazilian political system have
termed this pattern of interest representation and leadership as
a form of exclusionary elitist model or more cautiously
authoritarian-modernization elitism. 6 But it does not preclude
the occupation of power positions by competitive universal
impersonal rule, political appointment or election. Competitive
universal impersonal rules are the least used to staff decision-
making position within state enterprises and state agencies, with
the exception of Justice, Treasury and Diplomacy careers.
Political appointment results from pressuring and small
"bureaucratic rings" elites, 7 while all interest and groups
race in elections. But despite fluidity in leaders, limited
pluralism best represent Brazilian political system for at least
two important reasons. First, the low competition and the fact
that bargaining, negotiation and compromise took place among top
governmental, military and civilian officials and private sector
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leaders. The representatives and organizations of the dominated
classes were effectively excluded from the process in both
development project or granted only token participation. Kheneve,
working class mobilization threatened the stability of the
regime, it was systematically repressed. Second, there was some
competition among major interest groups active in each sector,
international and national construction and capital goods
interests acted in an unified and cohesive fashion within both
projects to kill or modify objectionable points or aspects,
international capital goods manufacturers competed tc supply
Brazilian Nuclear Program but they coalesced to supply equipment
to Itaipu and Tucurui projects.
Obviously some important bargaining and negotiation
took place among the political representatives of the different
classes and class fractions represented within the bloc-in-power
during the military regime and different class alliances were
dominant in different sectors art different times. But this type
of conflict certainly should not be equated with pluralism, only
a limited set of policy options were permitted into the political
arena
.
The pluralists focus too narrowly on who participates
and which leaders and groups succeed at a particular moment of
the policy process. Two or more actors with even slightly
different policy choices are enough for them to find pluralistic
competition. Pluralist do not care that these actors might
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represent only minor variations of the same basic class
interests. From a Marxist point of view, however, it matters a
great deal. Political conflict that takes place only among
dominant class fractions is not pluralism but rather a particular
form of ruling class domination.
C. The Electric Power Projects *nrl the Ruling glass
All development projects produced clearly identifiable
sets of winners and losers over the course of the military
regime. In the case of the Itaipu project, the principal
beneficiaries were the Brazilian and Paraguayan construction,
Brazilian and international industrial and financial fractions of
the bourgeoisie who had sought since the start of the military
regime to accelerate the expansion of capitalism in Brazil.
Despite extensive subcontracting to small construction companies
and industries both in Brazil and Paraguay there were significant
pressures because of the grandiosity of the project. In the
final analysis they too benefited substantially from the ultimate
outcome of the policy adopted. In the first place, the
international industrial and financial interests demanded and
obtained major concessions from the Brazilian government on the
crucial questions of loans, energy costs to aluminum plants and
generation and transmission systems to both projects that
significantly reduced their potential redistributive effects. In
the
Lon
md
«- second place, Bra2ilian and paraguayan construction
«»
^ lndU£trial— — ™ credit incentives to
carry out the modernization of their „r rn plants and equipment; suchincentives had been onP -i-k^ •e the their principal demands through thedebate over Tfa^„the Itaipu project. Finally, as a result of
capitalist development achieved in industry and construct!
after 1964, both in Brazil and Paraguay, industrialist a
(owners or construction companies) emerged from the
military regime far more prosperous and politically influential
than they had been when military regime began.
The principal losers of the itaipu project were land
Poor peasants and landless agricultural workers whose dreams for
access to land were effectively crushed. Most of them were
displaced by the flooding of their fertile land both in Brazil
and Paraguay, and they were obliged to migrate to new frontiers
in the Southwestern Amazon region.
The working class must also be considered losers vis-
a-vis the enormous gains of the construction companies and
industrial contractors. While the towns around the construction
site for middle-managers and specialized workers provided for all
needs of construction workers, low-skilled workers did not have
the privileges granted to specialized and higher ranks workers.
Moreover, the massive influx of new migrants into the cities
nearby inevitably resulted in the state's failure to provide
effective urban services, provoked considerable overcrowding,
created high levels of under and unemployment, originated intense
competition for the available jobs, kept wages for Itaipu and
Tucurui workers low and inhibited unionization efforts among
large numbers of workers. m the Itaipu case having Brazilian
and Paraguayan workers made it more difficult to unionize.
In both cases, the principal winners were clearly the
construction companies, the Brazilian and international capital
goods generation and transmission equipment industry, and the
international financial community, for they were able to press
the sale the goods and services which helped them weather
worldwide recession of the mid-1970s - at least to some extent.
The principal losers were the displaced agricultural workers and
native Indians as well as the workers who were denied access to
housing and improved urban services existent in the new villages
built near the construction sites.
Three basic set of factors were involved in influencing
these outcomes. The first had to do with the class perspective
or "bias- that characterized the key policy-making personnel in
the executive branch and state enterprises. The second had to do
with the capacity of different classes and class fraction to
organize and pressure the state for favorable policy decisions.
The third had to do with the structural constraints imposed on
the state by the particular articulation of capitalist and
precapitalist modes of production characteristic of Brazil and
Paraguay during the military regime period. The relative
432
importance of each of these factors varied fron, one project to
another, and within each project fro, one stage to another; but
all three were involved in some way at each stage of the
projects.
Of major importance in determining the outcome of
either project was the common commitment to the goal of
capitalist development shared by all military presidents, their
principal advisors, the government party leaders and state
enterprise managers and obviously the private sector. Reflecting
this commitment, these two projects put forward during the
military regime consciously sought to increase the supply of
energy to the maturing industrial Southeast and to the
industrialization of the Eastern Amazon acting as provider of an
essential industrial input to sustain economic growth.
This ideological "bias" among top development policy-
makers within the military regime was not the consequence of
direct manipulation or persuasion on the part of a united ruling
class. Indeed, given the highly complex historical development
of the Brazilian social formation, the private entrepreneurial
elite was not a monolithic class, capable of issuing coherent
orders; rather it was a fragmented class divided into several
different fractions or segments each of which had different and
occasionally conflicting interests. Nevertheless, the general
interests of the bourgeoisie in creating and sustaining the
conditions for capitalist growth were the hegemonic interests
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within Brazil. The objectives, targets, posture, and
perspectives of top policymakers were extensively shaped or at
least greatly inspired on the dominant ideology. Thus, what most
top policy-makers considered an "appropriate., or
..reasonable-
course of state action, or non-action, in the energy sector was
normally very much in tune with the general interests of the
capitalist class. In effect, the entrepreneurial elite's basic
concern for capitalist growth had become part of the
.'national
interest." To work toward the achievement of these interests was
also to serve the interests of the nation as a whole. As a
result of this class "bias" within the state system, state energy
polices consistently favored capitalist class interests over the
interests of all other classes within the social formation.
Of course, this general consensus on the goals of
capitalist development among key policy-making personnel did not
mean that there was complete unanimity among them on how best to
achieve this goal. There was an important split within the
ruling class between the proponents of the self-reliant and the
internationalized associated-dependent development
strategies. These differences did not call into question the
basic goal of accelerating capitalist development, but they did
generate important conflicts within policy-making circles over
the precise content and pace of state-led development project.
The final outcome of these conflict over strategies of
development was largely determined by the differential capacity
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of the various classes and class fractions within the social
formation to organize politically and pressure the state for
Policies that favored their specific interests. But not even the
1987-88 Constituent Assembly was able to find a conclusive
solution to the strategy.
With regard electrical energy policy, the consumers,
the displaced peasantry, and workers demonstrated very little
capacity to exert concerted pressure within the policy-making
process. As of 1974, labor unions were a specter of what they
had been before or of what they would become in the 1980s. The
peasants were unorganized and consequently incapable of
preventing the provisions on land expropriation and relocation.
Moreover, the low level of organization of the construction
workers did not enable them to press for effective implementation
of some redistributive aspects of the two projects. m the late
1970s, the industrial workers unions of Sao Bernardo and Sao
Paulo surfaced as an independent political force. But the rapid
radicalization of the movement brought unions into direct
conflict with the Figueiredo government and the dominant classes.
As a result, these leaders were systematically excluded from
policy-making circles during the crucial debates on general
economic policy in the 1981-83 recession years. That independent
unions could be so excluded, despite relatively high levels of
mobilization achieved during the 1977-1980 period, revealed the
fundamental weakness of all peasant and industrial organizations
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and movements vis-a-vic fu„s the doml nant classes during the military
regime
in contrast to the groups mentioned above the
economically dominant groups were well organized and capable of
achieving and sustaining high levels of mobilization. As a
result, their capacity to pressure the state for favorable policy
outputs was considerable. it is important to understand
however, that the specific interests of the various fractions o,
the bourgeoisie were affected in different ways and to varying
degrees by the development projects. Under these circumstances,
some elements of the capitalist class were much more motivated to
intervene actively in the policy-making process than were others.
The heavy civil construction, industrial and financial
fractions, for example, participated in all stages of the energy
policy-making through interest representation such as National
Confederation of Industries (CNI)
,
FIESP, and civil construction
associations. But the role they played was decidedly a secondary
one with respect to bureaucratic elites. This limited influence
in the energy policy-making process is largely attributable to
the fact that their primary interest — promoting the conditions
for capitalist development — was adequately addressed within
policy-making arenas at all stages of the process — decision-
making by the executive, discussions on the bureaucracy and key
private sectors interlocutors.
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As both the project-case reconstruction and the
reputational findings presented earlier in this study indicated,
the most active and influential groups of the entrepreneurial
class involved in the electric power policy during the military
regime was the heavy civil construction fraction, represented by
some large Brazilian emp^teiras. Industrial and financial
groups, both Brazilian and international, were evidently active
and made efforts to influence decision-making in the two
projects. But their interest was a corollary of the
developmental ideology pervasive in the Brazilian state during
the 1964-1985 period. To accelerate the pace of development,
Brazilian internal savings were not sufficient, therefore the
Brazilian state did have to borrow heavily, as demonstrated in
the state enterprise's sources of investment funds, what
coincided with a period of financial surplus in the international
banking system.
In summary, the fate of the two development projects
over the course of the military regime was determined by the
concatenation of both instrumental and structural factors. The
objectives and targets of the top policy-makers in the executive
and in the state enterprises, direct pressures on the state
mobilized by concerned interest groups and their political
allies, and the structural constraints inherent within the
capitalist mode were all involved in defining the nature and
impact of state policy in the energy sector. No perspective that
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relies solely on either instrumental or structural causation,
instead of the two juxtaposed, can provide an adequate
explanation for the outcome of the two development projects.
Both projects are generating electric power to the
respective regions which they serve. Both projects have had
implementation problems and were financially burdensome to the
state and society.
D. The Military Regime and the Dejnocratizatioi] Process
The success of the military regime in maintaining
political stability over the 1964-1985 period is attributable
to a complex set of economic, political and ideological factors.
But among these, it is the remarkable strength of development
strategies that must be assigned fundamental importance,
notwithstanding the perverse effects on non-privileged groups in
Brazilian society. The first military governments initiated a
model of development based upon the implementation of large
economic projects. The last two military governments proceeded
the strategy despite the challenge posed by sequential Opposition
parties victories on the 1974, 1978, 1982, elections which
culminated with Tancredo Neves-led victory which transformed the
military regime to a transitional democratic rule.
The very structure of the military tended to undermine
the traditional loyalties upon which the stability of the regime
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' ary
rested. By de-emphasizing party competition and encouragi
discretionary policies and state-sponsored projects, the »iUt
re9Ue redUCSd ^ Si5" ifi-« P°^tics to simply authoritarian
administration. The absence of major socio-economic changes
widespread corruption, cronyism and nepotism, electoral
manipulation, and continuing privileged access to elites bred
cynicism and discontent, particularly among the growing urban
poor in the largest cities. By 1982, the government party pds
only elected governors in marginal Northeastern and Northern
States (with the exception of Santa Catarina in the South)
, and
the majority of the votes were identified with the Center-Left
political parties (pmdb, pdt, PT) . Although the voters were not
radical or revolutionary, they pointed in the direction change.
They were plebiscitary in nature. Democratic elections have
consistently shown a character of "referendum" on governmental
policies. Sixteen MDB Senators elected in the majoritarian 1974
elections were the first to capitalize on this discontent voters,
followed by the 1/3 Senators directly elected in 1978.
Consistently major Southern states — the most industrial and
where patrimonialist practices were relatively weaker — have
elected Opposition Congressmen.
Indeed, the elections occurred during the transition
Jose Sarney regime have confirmed the plebiscitary character of
recent Brazilian democratic elections. The point is that the
urban masses, the majority of the voting population, have become
4 39
disillusioned with a model of development which has undoubtedly
produced economic growth and industrial infrastructure, but has
failed to provide social development for the majority of
Brazilians.
Brazil is presently reaping the harvest of over twenty
years of vast economic growth with lack of social reforms. it is
by no means impossible that the present political parties will
manage to weather the political crisis of legitimacy and
transpose the transition period into a democratic rule. it is by
no means certain the military will remain docile; the
recuperative capacities of the military should never be
underestimated. it is clear, however, that the Brazilian
political system has reached a critical juncture in its
historical development. The ruling class must choose, indeed is
currently being forced to choose between social change and
repression, between "inclusive" and "exclusive" forms of social
and political control. The reforms embodied in the 1988
Constitution need not to be revolutionary, but they will have to
be more than cosmetic. If such reforms are not forthcoming
Brazil will enter in a period of rising praetorianism combined
with populist and leftist electoral challenges whose outcome is
indeterminate
.
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